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During the three years leading up to this year’s 60th anniversary of the signing 
of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, a series of workshops were held under 
the joint sponsorship of Columbia Law School’s Center for Japanese Legal 
Studies and the National Defense Academy of Japan’s Center for Global Security. 
Bringing together experts in international law and political science primarily 
from the United States and Japan, the workshops examined how differing 
approaches to use of force and understandings of individual and collective  
self-defense in the two countries might adversely affect their alliance.
The workshop participants explored the underlying causes of the gap in 
understanding between the United States and Japan with respect to these issues, 
and they considered the alliance in the context of each state’s interpretation of 
international law and policy positions regarding its rights and obligations under 
such law. In doing so, they also examined how the differing approaches could 
be applied to possible crisis situations of current concern in East Asia, and what 
that might mean for alliance relations.
Thomas H. Lee starts by articulating the fundamental issues regarding 
the international law of individual and collective self-defense in “The United 
States and Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Northeast Asia”. He applies 
them to four Northeast Asia security issues: the North Korean nuclear threat, 
offensive cyber operations, the status of Taiwan, and Japan-South Korea-
China territorial disputes. In doing so, he finds mixed outcomes for support of 
individual and collective self-defense as justifications for the use of force in each 
of these areas, if one applies their principles consistently under each scenario. 
In “Legal Frameworks on Japan’s Self-Defense with the United States,” 
Masahiro Kurosaki explains that, notwithstanding the 2016 policy change in 
Japan permitting the use of collective self-defense, there still exists a perception 
gap between Japan and the United States concerning the extent to which 
Japan is free to exercise such rights. He shows that this divergence arises from 
Japan’s adoption of a narrower view than the United States of the specific 
Introduction
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requirements for invoking such rights, and that this view is rooted in case law 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as well as in its own constitutional 
constraints. 
For framing discussions in this book, on the international law plane,  
one should first note from Lee’s and Kurosaki’s arguments that the United States 
and Japan exhibit contrasting attitudes toward the relationship of the U.N. 
Charter to customary international law on self-defense. On the one hand, the 
United States asserts an inherent right of self-defense based on principles of 
customary law, including a longstanding doctrine of anticipatory self-defense. 
On the other hand, Japan regards the U.N. Charter as superseding some 
customary law that the United States continues to embrace.
On the domestic law plane, one needs to consider the constitutional 
allocation of power for use of force between the executive and legislative 
branches. In his essay “Presidential Use of Force in East Asia: American 
Constitutional Law and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Matthew C. Waxman explains 
U.S. presidential power and congressional and bureaucratic constraints on  
such power, placing such issues in the context of military action in East Asia  
and alliance relations between the United States and Japan. He shows that 
although the president wields enormous power and discretion to authorize 
military action, political factors operate to influence presidential decision-
making in ways that can affect U.S. use of force and alliance management. 
These contrasts on the international and domestic planes could pose 
significant challenges to the U.S.-Japan alliance, notably at the critical stage of 
initial reaction to a variety of common threats to both states. To find possible 
solutions, such challenges need to be addressed in more detail. The next series  
of essays therefore consider the U.S.-Japan alliance in more specific strategic  
and legal contexts.
In “Japan-U.S. Alliance as a Maritime Alliance and International Law,” 
Hideshi Tokuchi emphasizes the importance of deterrence for Japan’s security, 
and the role played by the U.S.-Japan alliance and international law to reinforce 
this imperative. He argues that East Asia must be viewed geographically from a 
larger Indo-Pacific perspective, and that balance of power in this vast region is 
only possible through maritime security supported by the alliance. He illustrates 
how international law considerations interact with the alliance relationship in 
formulating responses to Chinese activities in the South and East China Seas.
In “Reconsidering International Law and Cyberspace Operations 
Through the Lens of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Michael J. Adams considers 
the U.S. government’s new “defend forward” cyber posture as well as Japan’s 
growing ambitions in cyberspace. He outlines the international legal 
framework applicable to cyber operations as well as gaps therein, including 
certain contested international law issues such as sovereignty and notice 
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of countermeasures in the cyber context. He then highlights domestic 
considerations bearing on the extent to which the allies may share obligations 
in the cyber domain, and he illustrates through scenarios how the United States 
and Japan might partner in defensive cyber scenarios.
Julian G. Ku argues that strict adherence to principles limiting the  
use of force, such as those set forth in the U.N. Charter, could encourage 
aggression and discourage defensive intervention by states, taking as an  
example potential hostilities in the Taiwan Strait. In his essay “How the Law  
of Collective Self-Defense Undermines the Peace and Security of the Taiwan 
Strait,” he shows how differing conceptions of individual and collective self-
defense in the United States and Japan weakens the international legal basis 
for any intervention by either of them into a China-Taiwan conflict. At the same 
time, he shows how Taiwan’s status prevents it from invoking such concepts  
in its own defense.
Hitoshi Nasu elaborates on the legal framework for the U.S.-Japan 
alliance under international law and Japanese security law in the context  
of Japan’s possible use of force in the event of outbreak of hostilities on the 
Korean peninsula. In “Japan’s Legal Readiness in the Event of Hostilities on  
the Korean Peninsula”, he shows how continuing limitations on the use of  
force under Japan’s legislative framework will constrain Japan’s options under 
various scenarios in the event of such hostilities. 
Kazuto Suzuki addresses the critical importance of space systems on 
national security, both from a socio-economic and military standpoint. In 
his chapter “Space Deterrence and the Role of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” he 
demonstrates the multiple ways such assets are vulnerable, and explains why 
conventional deterrence strategies and the current state of international law 
are insufficient to address such threats. He argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance 
can increase the resilience of their space systems by cooperating on early threat 
detection and enhancing “cross-domain” deterrence.
Finally, in “Toward Meta-Knowledge of Foreign Relations Law in U.S.-
Japan Relations,” Ryan Scoville turns attention inward to the operational 
aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and how deficiencies in knowledge of each 
other’s foreign relations law can hinder the effective functioning of the alliance. 
In citing examples showing how knowledge gaps can promote misperceptions 
between the countries (as well as third parties trying to ascertain their motives), 
he suggests ways in which such knowledge may be developed to reduce the  
risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation on both sides and by others.
The U.S.-Japan alliance has been hailed as the “cornerstone” of peace 
in the Asia-Pacific. Despite policy differences, the alliance relationship in fact 
has been strengthened and institutionalized over the years, culminating in 
the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM). That institutionally structured 
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platform, established under the 2015 revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense 
Cooperation, aims to respond to the full spectrum of contingencies across the 
globe in a “seamless, robust, flexible, and effective” manner. As the following 
essays show, notwithstanding differing approaches to how international law 
can be used to protect the national security interests of each country, there exist 
pathways to bridge law and policy to further their common security goals, which 
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Introduction 
This essay describes and assesses U.S. positions regarding the international law 
of individual and collective self-defense with respect to four present-day security 
imperatives in Northeast Asia:
1.  North Korea’s possession of nuclear missiles, and the threats they pose to the 
United States and U.S. allies, namely Japan and South Korea, both of which  
host significant U.S. bases and troops;
2.  Offensive cyber operations against the United States or U.S. nationals in 
Northeast Asia, by North Korea or China state actors;
3. China, and the threat it poses to Taiwan over which it asserts sovereignty; and
4. Island Disputes: 1
 — Senkaku/Diaoyu islands between Japan and China
— Dokdo/Takeshima Island between South Korea and Japan
This essay will proceed in two parts. The first part will review the historical 
background and current status of the international law of grounds for war—jus 
ad bellum. Particular emphasis will be placed on the law of self-defense, both 
individual and collective. The second part will apply the jus ad bellum elaborated  
in Part One to the four case studies. 
Jus Ad Bellum: Self-Defense
Until the twentieth century, there were no multilateral treaties governing jus ad 
bellum, and so customary international law alone regulated the use of armed 
force. Custom, in turn, was broadly permissive of a sovereign state’s right to use 
armed force in international affairs. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
for example, the state was believed to have the same right to resort to force as 
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an individual in the state of nature. Henry Wheaton, the first influential U.S. 
international law writer, put it this way in 1836: 
Each State therefore has the right to resort to force as the sole means of 
reparations for offences caused to it by others, in the same manner as 
individuals have the right to employ this remedy if they are not subject to 
the laws of a civil society.”2
Self-defense was one of many legal grounds for war. Instances that might be 
justified as self-defense today were justified on other legal grounds in the old 
international legal order. Violation of a treaty was a ground for war. So was another 
country’s expropriation of the property of a state’s nationals, or failure to pay 
contract debts owed to its nationals, without any felt necessity to characterize the 
use of force as self-defense.3 “Humanitarian” military interventions to protect the 
safety of nationals or third-country nationals such as during the Boxer Uprisings 
in China at the turn of the twentieth century were also viewed as lawful. Many 
international lawyers believe the use of force to protect one’s own nationals 
remains lawful today, but they typically classify it as self-defense, not humanitarian 
intervention.4 This conceptual evolution in characterizing military force to rescue 
nationals is an example of how dominant self-defense has become as a ground for 
war in the present day, overshadowing all other grounds.
The unprecedented scale of death and destruction posed by modern 
warfare culminating in the two world wars produced a fundamental shift in the 
international legal regulation of warfare. To be sure, the collective movement to 
mitigate the human costs of modern war had significant antecedents. For instance, 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had witnessed several multilateral 
law-of-war conventions such as the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Wounded and 
the Sick, and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions restricting various ends and 
means of warfare on land and at sea. But the years immediately after World War II 
ended were the critical period: the four current Geneva Conventions regulating jus 
in bello—the law in war—were open for signatures in 1949. With respect to jus ad 
bellum—the law of grounds for war, the United Nations Charter, adopted at the end 
of World War II in 1945, framed the flagship statement of the new international 
legal order. It also laid out a collective security mechanism to keep world peace and 
to organize collective responses to the sorts of aggression that had started the war. 
The text of the UN Charter constrains modern jus ad bellum to two grounds. 
First, Article 42 of the Charter authorizes the Security Council to “take such action 
by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security,” if non-force measures have been exhausted. Second, Article 
51 recognizes an “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.” A third 
consensus ground for the use of armed force abroad under international law is with 
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the consent of the territorial state in which the force occurs. We might call this a 
rule of customary international law or reason that is implicitly allowed by the UN 
Charter because Article 2(4) prohibits “threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state,” which would not to apply when the 
state consents.
Indeed, to understand what “self-defense” entails under the UN Charter, we 
must look first at this prohibition of armed force in Article 2(4), which states in full: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.
Article 2(4)’s prohibition on “the threat or use of force” targets aggressive or 
offensive war “against the territorial integrity or political independence” of another 
state. Thus, as noted above, use of force with consent is allowed. Presumably, a state 
could also use armed force defensively, for instance, to repulse an invader beyond 
one’s own borders or in defense of another country that is invaded, or perhaps to 
protect crucial strategic resources that may fall into the hands of an aggressor. 
Article 51, in this view, seems unnecessary, an intuition which is confirmed by the 
way that provision is written:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.5
PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
The opening phrase—“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair”—indicates that 
Article 51 is guidance for interpreting every UN Charter provision to preserve the 
sovereign state’s pre-existing “inherent right” of self-defense. It does not purport 
to define the right of self-defense. It does not necessarily follow as a matter of 
interpretation that what Article 51 says about this “inherent right”—specifically its 
condition of “if an armed attack occurs”— is a limit to the customary international 
law right of self-defense. Put another way, Article 51—the UN Charter’s only reference 
to self-defense— does not say “each state has an inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if, and only if, an armed attack occurs against  
a Member.” 
Is it possible, then, that an “armed attack” is not necessary for lawful self-
defense, even in the post-UN Charter era? The drafters and original ratifiers of the 
UN Charter, having just lived through World War II, may have thought, for instance, 
that it would have been lawful if the Allies had attacked Nazi Germany shortly before 
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its invasion of Poland, given Hitler’s prior record of militarization and documented 
aggressions, most notably his acquisition of Czechoslovakia. Even those who insist 
that an “armed attack” is a strict requirement of the right to self-defense typically 
allow some room for anticipatory self-defense in a hypothetical case where there is 
incontrovertible evidence that a foreign army is about to invade, such as when tanks 
are moving to the border, attack jets are taking off, or communications relaying an 
invasion order are intercepted. Nevertheless, some commentators cite Article 51 for 
the proposition that “an armed attack” is a necessary precondition for the exercise 
of the right to self-defense, just as some presume that Article 51 is an affirmative 
statement of the self-defense right rather than interpretive guidance regarding a pre-
existing customary international law right. 
The United States, however, holds the view that the threat of an imminent 
armed attack can also justify a resort to force in self-defense under international 
law. That is to say, although Article 51 refers explicitly to self-defense only in 
response to an actual armed attack, the United States maintains that international 
law also includes the right to use force when an armed attack is imminent. This 
view of the United States is widely known and is also shared by many like-minded 
states in the international community.
My close reading of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter is confirmed by 
historical context. The provisions were drafted after World War II to put an end to 
aggressive wars of conquest and expansion such as those waged by Nazi Germany 
and the Japanese Empire. Article 2(4) prohibits wars for territorial or political 
gain. It would have been counter-productive to have handicapped states facing 
future aggressors by taking away their right to defend themselves, individually or 
collectively. That is the point of Article 51. 
Of course, Germany and Japan also justified their wars in part under a very 
capacious sense of self-defense against hostile neighbors and great powers. And 
so we know for sure that their pretextual, self-serving invocations of self-defense 
are not part of the “inherent right to self-defense” that Article 51 safeguards. But 
neither Article 2(4) nor Article 51, nor any other provision of the UN Charter for 
that matter, gives clear guidance on the contours of the right to self-defense in the 
hard cases we confront today, such as the scope of the anticipatory self-defense 
right against a state like North Korea with nuclear weapons and some evidence 
of hostile intent to use them. And, as I have discussed above, there is a strong 
argument that Article 51’s “armed attack” precondition is not absolute both as a 
textual matter and as a practical matter. 
Because of this lack of guidance in the UN Charter, customary international 
law remains the primary source regarding the scope of any right of anticipatory 
self-defense. The key precedent is an 1842 letter by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster to British minister plenipotentiary Lord Ashburton in negotiations 
resolving armed clashes along the Canada-United States border. In 1837, British 
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forces landed on the U.S. side of the Niagara River. They chased off the crew of the 
S.S. Caroline, a ship that Canadian rebels and their U.S. sympathizers were using 
to ferry weapons into Canada, apparently killing one American crewmember in 
the process. The British then set the ship afire and sent her over Niagara Falls. 
The rebels and their American sympathizers retaliated and there were a series of 
reciprocal raids and skirmishes. In his correspondence with Ashburton years later, 
Webster cast doubt on the British invocation of anticipatory self-defense to justify 
their destruction of the Caroline that had fueled the border clashes:
While it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of self-
defense do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the 
necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice 
of means, and no moment for deliberation.6
Based on this passage, international lawyers have crafted an “imminence” 
requirement that is meant to capture Webster’s idea that anticipatory self-defense 
is only lawful when the need to defend oneself is “instant, overwhelming, and 
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” The standard as 
applied to individuals would entail a person who sees an opponent pulling out a 
gun to shoot first in self-defense. As applied to states, however, the standard is 
much more difficult to articulate and to apply.
Lawyers who cite the Caroline incident often neglect to point out two 
important facts that careful scrutiny illuminates. First, it is doubtful that Caroline 
was actually a case of anticipatory self-defense. The British use of force was not 
aimed to prevent a specific, imminent armed attack by Canadian rebels. Rather, 
the British intervened because the Caroline was habitually used to support attacks 
by the rebels, and the United States government had not taken sufficient actions 
to prevent such use. As such, the Caroline case study is more evocative of modern 
jus ad bellum doctrines of use of force in self-defense where a formally neutral 
sovereign state is “unable or unwilling” to stop aggressive acts against another state 
that originate or have significant support within its borders.7
Second, Webster did not explicitly conclude that the British had failed to 
meet his test. He did not assert that their armed incursion on U.S. territory and 
destruction of the Caroline could not be justified as a case where the necessity of 
armed force in self-defense was “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice 
of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Rather, he acknowledged that the 
incident had happened five years ago and that the British had made assurances 
that they intended no disrespect to U.S. sovereignty and admitted the violation of 
U.S. territory. Consequently, Webster concluded that it was better to consider the 
matter closed without deciding “whether the facts of the Caroline make out a case 
of such necessity for the purpose of self-defence.”8 To be sure, a fair inference from 
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his stringent formulation of the legal test is that the British acts did not suffice to 
meet it, but he did not say that. The upshot for today is that however demanding 
the Caroline formula may seem, whether it is satisfied will depend on the facts.
Without much attention to these historical details, modern international lawyers 
typically frame the Caroline standard as a gloss on UN Charter Article 51. Recall 
that the provision states that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations.” As previously noted, the conventional 
view—shared by the United States— is that the “inherent right” of self-defense 
applies not only if there is an armed attack against a UN Member but also if there 
is an imminent threat of such armed attack.
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
Article 51 refers to an “inherent right” not only of “individual” self-defense but also 
of “collective” self-defense. The concept of “collective” self-defense has pre-UN 
Charter antecedents in treaties of alliance and reciprocal assistance. But collective 
self-defense goes further than that. No treaty is required, although sometimes there 
is a treaty, such as the NATO Treaty or the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The basic 
idea is that if State A is attacked or under imminent threat of armed attack by State 
C and requests State B’s assistance, State B can use armed force against State C to 
come to State A’s assistance, even if State B itself has not been attacked by State C.
The basic idea is simple, but there are many complications. First, what 
if State A has a broader conception of what constitutes an armed attack or an 
imminent threat of armed attack than State B but nonetheless requests State B’s 
military assistance? In other words, may State B use force in collective self-defense, 
even if it were to conclude that it could not use force under the same circumstances 
(i.e., if it were attacked rather than State A) in individual self-defense? Or would 
such a use of force constitute prohibited aggression from State B’s perspective? 
Drafting a treaty is one way to help address such difficult questions. 
Second, collective security might be used as a pretext. Imagine, for example, 
that State A really wants to use armed force against State C but has no lawful 
ground for war against it. But State B is either at war with State C or does have a 
persuasive legal argument for use of force against State C. State A could use force 
against State C by approaching State B and asking it to request State A’s assistance 
as collective self-defense, or even by urging State B to resist State C’s aggression, 
even if it was initially unwilling to do so. 
Third, what if we are talking about unit self-defense, not national self-
defense? It is not State A itself that is being attacked by State C, but State A’s ship 
in international waters. If State A requests State B’s military assistance, is it lawful 
for State B to use force against State C as a matter of “collective self-defense”? Or 
is collective self-defense only appropriate if the attack on the unit is tantamount 
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to an attack on the “territorial integrity” or “political independence” of State A as 
specified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter? The conventional view today is that 
unit self-defense is generally sufficient as a ground for war, but the position opens 
the potential for pretextual uses and abuses. For example, what if State A puts its 
units in harm’s way, in the hope of triggering a hostile act by State C and enlisting 
State B’s military intervention? 
Northeast Asia Case Studies
Having described the fundamental rules and key issues regarding the international 
law of self-defense, let us apply them to four Northeast Asia case studies.
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE AND NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The recent commentary on the international law of anticipatory self-defense and 
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles has focused 
on two related factual scenarios. First, would it be lawful for the United States 
to launch a limited military strike on suspected North Korean nuclear weapons 
facilities and missile launch sites based on the current state of play in terms of 
North Korea’s technological capacity and expressions of hostile intent to launch 
nuclear weapons at U.S. territory? Second, would it be lawful for the United States 
to launch such a limited military strike as a matter of collective self-defense in 
response to the North Korean launch of an unarmed missile that splashes down 
in Japanese waters or in international waters after overflight of Japanese territory 
and, if so, would Japanese consent be necessary to make it lawful under the U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty of 1960? This second issue has been the subject of recent 
commentary by Professors Hitoshi Nasu and Masahiro Kurosaki, and so I will not 
address it here.
In terms of the case for the international legality of a U.S. military strike 
based solely on the threat posed to the United States, we begin by recalling the 
Caroline test (with my caveat articulated above that it originated as an “unable 
or unwilling” standard, illustrative of the nexus between that standard and 
anticipatory self-defense). Given the North Korean nuclear missile program’s 
current status, is the “necessity” of a U.S. military strike “instant, overwhelming, 
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”? 
The single most compelling factor for imminence is the special nature of 
nuclear ballistic missiles. They can impact within hours and deliver a devastating 
toll in terms of death and destruction, far beyond the capacity of conventional 
weapons. As an originalist matter, the drafting history of the UN Charter indicates 
that it was not drawn up with nuclear weapons in mind, despite (or perhaps 
because of) the fact that the United States was the only country to possess and to 
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have used them. Moreover, although it is not public knowledge, it is likely that both 
the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia) had for many years classified 
contingency planning for the preemptive use of nuclear missiles. Presumably, at 
least for the United States, this included a legal opinion that first use was consistent 
with relevant international law. 
In the wake of 9/11, the George W. Bush administration asserted in its 
2002 National Security Strategy Statement that the United States “must adapt the 
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”9 
The Statement continued that “[t]he greater the threat, the greater is the risk 
of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to 
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s 
attack.”10 The Statement was addressed most directly to the threat of international 
terrorism and Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession of chemical weapons. At the 
time, the North Korean long-range missile program was still in an embryonic state; 
specifically, there were no indications that North Korea had long-range ballistic 
missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory. North Korean nuclear missiles that can 
reach the United States seem to present a far greater and direct risk to U.S. national 
security than al Qaida or Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons.
There are also precedents directly on point that indicate special latitude in 
assessing imminence when the threat to be balanced is nuclear missiles capable of 
reaching U.S. territory. In 1962, the United States instituted a “defensive quarantine” 
by positioning U.S. naval warships to intercept the shipment of nuclear missile 
parts to Cuba. The United States, at the urging of State Department Legal Adviser 
Abram Chayes, did not use the word “blockade” to avoid characterization of its 
actions as a use of force, but it was a distinction without a real difference. Moreover, 
President John F. Kennedy and his Cabinet strongly considered a “surgical” air 
strike to take out suspected missile facilities in Cuba. They ultimately ruled out 
the option primarily on policy grounds, not mainly because of concerns about its 
international legality. In 1981, Israel launched an air strike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor 
at Osirak. It alleged that the reactor was producing weapons-grade material for the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons and expressed a belief that Israel would be a likely 
future target. As in the case of Cuba, the international community did not reject the 
claim to a right of anticipatory self-defense out of hand, but rather disputed that 
the imminence threshold was met on the facts of the case. And, more recently, the 
Bush administration seriously considered an anticipatory self-defense rationale as 
its principal ground for the Second Iraq War. The British ultimately persuaded the 
United States that an argument based on enforcement of pre-existing UN Security 
Council resolutions provided a sounder international legal basis.
On the other hand, application of the Caroline test to the specific facts of the 
North Korean case today points strongly in the direction of illegality. The North 
Korean rhetoric about using its nuclear missiles against the United States has been 
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strident. However, the North Koreans have not taken any direct hostile action 
against U.S. military forces for four decades. This is particularly significant because 
the North Koreans have engaged South Korean military forces on numerous 
occasions during that time, including pitched naval battles in 1999 and 2002, and 
the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010, with the loss of 46 
sailors. North Korea had also forcefully abducted Japanese nationals on multiple 
occasions in the 1970s and 1980s.
With respect to “choice of means” and the possibility of deliberation, the 
present North Korean overtures indicate at the very least that diplomacy and a 
negotiated peace are still available alternative options. Three summit conferences 
between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may 
have yielded no negotiated settlement, but the North Koreans did pause long-range 
ballistic missile tests for two years. And even the most recent announcements by 
Kim have left open the possibility of future negotiations. Moreover, according to 
press reports, North Korea does not have the technology at the present time to 
mount a nuclear warhead on a long-range ballistic missile and manage successful 
reentry of the warhead. The lack of current capacity militates against the “instant 
necessity” for action the Caroline test calls for. 
Finally, it seems worth considering, as part of the necessary deliberation, 
the policy prudence and the precedent that would be established. No nuclear state 
has actually used anticipatory self-defense as a basis for attacking another nuclear 
state. To be the first to do so seems particularly risky at a time where U.S. power is 
declining, and other nuclear powers, most notably China, are on the rise.
In sum, the case for an international legal basis for a limited U.S. military 
strike on North Korea is stronger than some commentators acknowledge given 
North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, development of long-range ballistic 
missiles, and hostile relations between the two countries. Those who hold the view 
that such a strike would be illegal emphasize the phrase “if an armed attack occurs” 
in Article 51 and tend to construe any anticipatory right of self-defense narrowly. In 
so doing, however, they gloss over gaps in the Charter’s coverage and downplay the 
importance of customary international law in giving content to the modern jus ad 
bellum, and the potential scope of the anticipatory self-defense ground as against 
nuclear missiles. But, at the same time, whether premised on possession with 
hostile intent, or the incidence of unarmed missiles splashing down in Japanese 
waters or overflight of Japanese territory, the legal case at present is weaker than 
proponents of military strikes have asserted.11 Diplomacy seems a viable option; 
and North Korea, for all its rhetoric, has not used armed force against the United 
States for a very long time, despite its willingness to use force against South Korea 
in recent decades. Perhaps most important, there is no clear evidence that North 
Korea has yet achieved the necessary technology to launch a nuclear ballistic 
missile successfully at the territory of the United States.
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USE OF FORCE AS A RESPONSE AGAINST OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS
The application of the law of war to cyber operations is in great flux at the present 
time. But the United States and most countries accept that international law 
applies to cyberspace and there is agreement on some principles. First, cyber 
operations that cause physical damage that would be considered a use of force if 
caused solely by traditional means would constitute a use of force prohibited by 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Second, cyber operations that coercively intervene 
in the core functions of another state, such as its ability to hold an election—are 
also prohibited. But beyond that, there seems to be no broad consensus about 
the relevant rules; for example, there is no consensus on the scope of the non-
intervention principle.
Press reports indicate that China and North Korea are two countries with 
significant offensive cyber capabilities. What would the United States do if one or 
the other country were to engage in cyber operations that amounted to a use of 
force, which the United States views as equivalent to an Article 51 “armed attack”, 
thus triggering the U.S. right of self-defense? In large part, the analysis would track 
the analytical framework described above with respect to kinetic armed attacks. 
That assumes, however, that such an attack could be attributed to China or North 
Korea, which may be difficult in practice. Attribution thus adds an additional 
wrinkle into the international legal analysis when we are dealing with cyberspace. 
Moreover, many current offensive cyber operations typically “hop” between 
networks and servers in many different countries, making attribution even more 
difficult. If the United States is the target, press reports indicate that it would 
be more than likely that at least one “hop” will occur within the United States, 
implicating U.S. domestic laws like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that 
may be more stringent and specific than any applicable international law. Most 
of the debate in cyber law, however, involves cyber operations that do not rise 
to the level of a use of force or interference in sovereign functions: what are the 
international law rules governing these operations? Press reports indicate that the 
United States has increased its operational tempo in this space, seeking to “defend 
forward.” It may, accordingly, announce rules to govern this area in the near future.
CHINA AND TAIWAN
The United States has not committed to collective self-defense of Taiwan, although 
there is some ambiguity on the point. First, the United States has acknowledged the 
Chinese position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. 
The United States has not actually endorsed the specific proposition that Taiwan 
is part of China; rather, it has merely confirmed that view as the Chinese position 
on Taiwan—an artful dodge, but a dodge nonetheless. The United States has also 
recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate government of 
China. At the same time, the United States continues to sell weapons to Taiwan, 
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despite Chinese protest, which would likely be a violation of international law 
if Taiwan were actually a part of China. It has also announced its opposition to 
any non-peaceful unification of Taiwan and the mainland. Moreover, the Taiwan 
Relations Act of 1979 provides that the United States will consider:
any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, 
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the 
Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.12 
But that statute is now forty years old, and the United States has not made any 
similar statements recently. Additionally, the United States has been careful about 
engaging in military exercises or any active, obvious form of military cooperation 
with Taiwan that China might perceive as an imminent threat of armed attack.
What would the United States do if China invaded Taiwan or gave clear, 
incontrovertible evidence of an imminent attack? Are there any international law 
arguments for the use of force in self-defense, particularly at Taiwan’s request? This 
is not an inconceivable scenario if local elections in Taiwan bring a regime to power 
that pursues a separatist policy. 
First, the United States may send military forces if needed to evacuate  
U.S. nationals, thousands of whom may be on the island. Although such operations 
used to be deemed humanitarian intervention, they are now commonly justified as 
self-defense. 
How about the harder question: would the United States invoke collective 
self-defense if Taiwan requested military assistance in response to a Chinese armed 
attack? A definitive answer seems impossible to give at the present time. On the 
one hand, Article 51 of the UN Charter refers to an “armed attack” against “a 
member of the United Nations,” which Taiwan is not. Moreover, U.S. endorsement 
of the “one China” position coupled with recognition of the PRC as the legitimate 
government of China combine to suggest that Taiwan cannot claim to be a 
sovereign state that could make a request for collective self-defense assistance from 
the United States or qualify to give consent to the use of force under international 
law. At the same time, Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and by all functional 
indicators, it is a fully independent sovereign state with exclusive political control 
over its territory for over seventy years. Consequently, to the extent that consent 
and the right to collective self-defense are grounded in customary international law 
and not limited to the strict language of UN Charter Article 51, Taiwan could very 
reasonably seek to invoke one or the other as grounds, even if it is not formally a 
member of the United Nations.
In summary, in terms of legal analysis, there may be enough to argue for 
legality of U.S. military intervention in collective self-defense of Taiwan under 
customary international law, even though Taiwan is not a “member of the United 
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Nations” as the UN charter specifies. This does not mean, of course, that the United 
States would do so, given the current political circumstances.
ISLAND DISPUTES
The two island disputes in Northeast Asia that would seem to present the greatest 
risk of hostilities are the disputes between South Korea and Japan over Dokdo/
Takeshima Island and between China and Japan regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands. South Korea currently exerts administrative control over Dokdo, although 
Japan asserts “shadow” jurisdiction with an administrative apparatus purporting to 
extend to the island. Japan currently has administrative control over the Senkaku 
Islands, although China similarly asserts shadow jurisdiction. 
What would the United States do in the event of an armed attack on either of the 
islands? Both cases would implicate U.S. alliance treaty obligations. Article III of 
the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea13 
provides that:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of 
the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, 
or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the 
administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace 
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.
And Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides that:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the 
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own 
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger 
in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.14
In the event of a Chinese attack on the Senkaku Islands, Article V of the Japan-U.S. 
Treaty would seem to apply, since Japan has administrative control. At the same 
time, the treaty obligation is to “act to meet the common danger in accordance 
with its constitutional provisions and processes.” Self-defense is not explicitly 
mentioned, even though it is mentioned in Article V of the NATO Treaty of 1949 
which provides that:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and 
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, 
in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized 
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or 
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Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the 
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.15
The natural conclusion is that if China were to attack the Senkaku Islands, the 
United States could invoke collective self-defense to use military force to aid Japan 
in repelling the attack, so long as the use of force was taken “in accordance with” 
U.S. domestic “constitutional processes.” Article XI of the NATO Treaty provides 
that the Treaty “shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.” Consequently, the NATO 
Treaty also provides that any acts taken in collective self-defense must be consistent 
with U.S. constitutional processes, and so it appears that the legal analysis would 
be identical to that under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, despite the difference in 
language between the two treaties. 
In the event of a Japanese attack on Dokdo, Article V of the U.S.-ROK 
Security Treaty would seem to apply, but there are three additional wrinkles not 
present in the Senkaku Islands scenario. First, that provision refers to territory 
“lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other.” Accordingly, if the 
United States were to determine that South Korea did not “lawfully” bring Dokdo 
under its administrative control, then Article V would not apply. Second, the U.S. 
promise is to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
processes.” It is not clear that Japan would pose a “common danger” for the United 
States since it is also an ally, in contrast to China vis-à-vis the Senkaku Islands. 
Third, although both U.S. security treaties with Japan and Korea (and the NATO 
Treaty) authorize use of force in collective self-defense consistent with domestic 
“constitutional processes,” the operation of the common provision is complicated 
in the event that South Korea would seek U.S. military assistance as against a 
Japanese attack on Dokdo. It seems reasonable to presume that U.S. “constitutional 
processes” would include compliance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty because it 
is a constitutionally ratified treaty of the United States. Although there is no specific 
provision in that Treaty that explicitly prohibits the United States from attacking 
Japanese forces in the exercise of collective self-defense authorized by another 
treaty, it would seem contrary to the object and purpose of the U.S. Japan Treaty. 
Hence, it is almost certain that the United States would not intervene in a military 
conflict between Japan and South Korea over Dokdo/Takeshima.
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Conclusion
This Essay has sought to provide a summary overview of the diverse issues 
implicating the international law of self-defense facing the United States in 
Northeast Asia at the present time. I hope that it provides insight to public 
international lawyers and policymakers in dealing with these challenges. 
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Introduction 
The year 2014 was a dramatic turning point in Japanese security policy with the 
United States. In April, President Barack Obama officially reaffirmed that the United 
States would maintain its longstanding commitment to defend Japan under the 
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and that such commitment covers the Senkaku Islands.1 
Three months later, the Japanese government led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
unprecedentedly adopted a cabinet decision to enable Japan to exercise the right of 
collective self-defense to “strengthen mutual cooperation with the United States.”2 
In 2015, the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation3 and the 
adoption of Japan’s new security legislation, which entered into force on March 29, 
2016, enabled a more effective and robust implementation of this decision.
All of these actions represent Japan’s strong determination to seek a more 
equal alliance with the United States and to bring an end to the past unilateral and 
imbalanced nature of the alliance, under which Japan had merely granted the United 
States the right to station its troops in Japan in return for its security commitments. 
However, Japan’s use of force in self-defense is still restrained to a large extent by 
complicated constraints at both domestic and international legal levels, which could 
cause serious gaps of perception and understanding between the two countries. It 
would be preferable for the U.S. government officials to bear in mind these potential 
gaps to better plan and implement future U.S-Japan joint operations.
In light of the foregoing circumstance, this paper aims to offer an overview of 
applicable constraints on Japan’s self-defense under international law and Japanese 
law. It also sheds light on the question of when, to what extent, and how Japan has 
become allowed to use force to defend the United States at a legal level in the face 
of diversifying security threats and a shifting world order. Although Japan also has 
various options to protect the United States with forcible measures other than the 
use of force,4 this paper confines itself to the issue of Japan’s use of force within the 
context of international law centered on Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
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Self-Defense as a Notion  
of International Law and the  
Constitutional Approach 
Although the U.N. Charter permits the use of force by its member states when 
authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII, the Japanese Constitution 
limits Japan’s use of force to the case of self-defense against armed attack. However, 
there is no mention of the term “self-defense” in the Constitution, which suggests that 
the established notion of national self-defense in Japanese law is not independent of 
that in international law. In the government’s view, there is no significant difference 
in nature between these two distinct bodies of law.5 The Constitution’s approach 
to national self-defense acts as a domestic constraint on Japan’s exercise of “the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” as provided in Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter.6 Therefore, individual and collective self-defense are defined as 
follows:
It is generally understood that, under international law, “the right to 
individual self-defense” is the right of a State to repel armed attack against it 
by using force. “The right to collective self-defense,” on the other hand, is the 
right of a State to repel armed attack against its closely associated foreign 
State by using force, notwithstanding it is not being attacked directly.
Thus, it is the government’s view that both rights should be sharply distinguished by 
whether or not the purpose is to respond to the attack directed against itself.7
When applied to the context of the defense of the United States, the relevant 
framework of Japan’s individual and collective self-defense can be divided into two 
categories: one is defense within Japanese territory, and the other is defense outside 
Japanese territory.
The Individual Self-defense  
Framework: Defending the United States  
within Japanese Territory 
ATTACK ON U.S. ARMED FORCES STATIONED IN JAPAN
As of March 31, 2019, there are 78 U.S. military facilities and sites in Japan.8 
The use of those facilities and sites by the United States is based on the 1960 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Status of Forces Agreement.9 Yet, this does not 
change the fact that they are located within Japanese sovereign territory. As long 
as they are stationed in Japan, any attack on those areas by a foreign state could 
be considered as an armed attack on Japanese territory, triggering Japan’s right of 
individual self-defense.10
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JOINT DEFENSE MECHANISM UNDER THE 1960 JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY TREATY
U.S. Armed Forces in Japan rely for their protection not only on concepts of Japan’s 
individual self-defense, but also on the concept of U.S. collective self-defense of “the 
territories under the administration of Japan,” in accordance with Article V of the 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Yet, the question is what requirements need to be met 
for the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. The two countries’ views are 
split over whether a declaration of an armed attack and request for assistance by an 
attacked state are necessary preconditions for an assisting state to exercise a right 
of collective self-defense. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua 
case found that “there is no rule in customary international law permitting another 
state to exercise the right of collective self-defense on the basis of its own assessment 
of the situation.”11 While Japan has shown a high deference to the ICJ’s conclusion 
and supports its opinion,12 the United States strongly challenges it.13
However, Japan’s consistent position has been that the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty only authorizes the United States to use force in collective self-defense when 
Japan exercises its right of individual self-defense. This is not inconsistent with the 
customary international law requirements that a victim state first declares an armed 
attack and requests assistance.14 Thus, even when protecting U.S. Armed Forces 
in Japanese territory, Japan must determine the occurrence of an armed attack 
and issue a request for assistance to the United States through the treaty-based 
consultation mechanism15 before the United States may engage in collective self-
defense of Japan. Admittedly, there remains the possibility that the United States 
may alternatively invoke its inherent right of individual self-defense solely to protect 
its forces in Japan, claiming that it is outside the regulatory scope of the treaty.16 But 
the Japanese government would insist on the joint and coordinated determination of 
armed attack in consultation with one another under Article V of the treaty insofar 
as they are stationed in Japanese territory. This is why the United States needs to 
know how Japan interprets the notion of armed attack.
JAPAN’S UNDERSTANDING OF ARMED ATTACK
Importance of an Opponent’s Intent 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter stipulates an “armed attack” as the precondition for 
any state to exercise its right of individual or collective self-defense. The Japanese 
government has consistently defined an “armed attack” in this context as meaning “an 
organized, planned use of force against a state.”17 As the term “planned” suggests, it 
views the hostile intent of an opponent as the most crucial element in determining the 
occurrence of an armed attack, not the criteria of “scale and effects” applied by the ICJ 
in its Nicaragua decision18 (however, scale and effects may serve as evidence of intent 
as was implied by its 2003 Oil Platform decision—“specific intention of harm” may 
be found depending on the gravity of the use of force19). This view stems from Japan’s 
strict defense-only constitutional policy that it shall not use force for an aggressive 
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purpose.20 It is unclear whether hostile intent is required for the determination of 
an armed attack in a strict legal sense, but the government has always referred to 
the opponent’s subjective intent as the key factor in the determination. Such intent 
is to be evaluated based on “comprehensive assessment of international situation, 
demonstrated intent of the state using force, and the means and patterns of attack.”21
Rejection of an Imminent Threat of Armed Attack
In Japan’s view, actual harm is not necessary for armed attack to occur as the 
concept also includes its initiation phase. For example, there is no need to wait 
until the attack hits the target when a ballistic missile directed at Japan is being 
fueled.
However, the initiation of armed attack must be distinguished from an 
imminent threat of armed attack, a notion of anticipatory self-defense which 
the Japanese government has consistently rejected. In the government’s 
longstanding interpretation of the U.N. Charter, “the mere likelihood or threat 
of armed attack does not authorize the exercise of the right to self-defense. 
In other words, neither preemptive strikes nor preventive acts of war are 
permissible.”22 Hence, Japan is unlikely to respond with the use of force until 
it determines that an armed attack has been, in fact, initiated.
Armed Attack by Non-State Actors
The Japanese government recognizes that acts of violence by non-state 
actors outside Japan could constitute armed attack,23 while the ICJ currently 
appears to be cautious about this concept. The issue arises when Japan 
is confronted with protecting its citizens abroad in rescue operations, as 
illustrated by the Israeli “Operation Entebbe” in Uganda in 1976 and the U.S. 
“Operation Eagle Claw” in the Iran hostage crisis in 1980. The government 
first seemed to hold a negative opinion on whether any act of violence by a 
non-state actor against Japanese citizens abroad could constitute an armed 
attack on Japan.24 However, since the 9/11 attacks, it has maintained that an 
armed attack on a state may also be conducted by non-state actors, at least “a 
quasi-state organization.” It defines the term as “although not a state per se, 
those who, as an equivalent thereof, may qualify as a party to an international 
dispute,”25 citing as examples the Taliban26 and the remnants of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime aiming at its resurgence.27 Such cases could partially satisfy 
statehood requirements—a defined territory; a permanent population; and a 
government.28
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The Collective  
Self-defense Framework:  
Defending the United States  
Outside Japanese Territory
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
When an armed attack occurs against the United States outside Japanese 
territory, the collective self-defense framework comes into play in Japan’s use 
of force. In contrast to the duty of the United States to defend Japan under the 
bilateral treaty, currently Japan has no comparable treaty obligation to defend 
the United States by using force. Yet, it has the inherent right to do so within 
applicable legal constraints.
As already discussed, the Japanese government supports the ICJ’s 
Nicaragua decision, finding that the declaration of an armed attack and 
request for assistance by an attacked state are necessary preconditions for 
Japan to engage in collective self-defense. However, even if Japan has met 
these international legal constraints, domestic legal requirements further 
constrain its ability to engage in collective self-defense operations, which 
limits its exercise of international legal rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
Japan’s Approach to Collective Self-Defense:  
An Expanded Version of Individual Self-Defense?
The Japanese Constitution had formerly been understood as prohibiting 
under all circumstances the exercise of the international legal right of 
collective self-defense. The government’s view had long been that the war-
renouncing clause (Article 9) of the Constitution29 permitted only the use 
of “minimum necessary force” in self-defense of Japan for the protection of 
its nationals’ “right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (Article 13). 
Hence, the right of collective self-defense of other states, although granted 
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, would be considered as exceeding this 
constitutional limitation.30
The constitutional ban on collective self-defense was lifted by a 
Cabinet decision in 2014,31 which led to a dramatic and groundbreaking 
shift in Japan’s official position. It was made possible not by revising the 
Constitution, but by reinterpreting the “minimum necessary force” principle 
under Article 9, leaving the sanctified war renunciation language untouched. 
However, even the 2014 Cabinet decision has not changed “the basic logic of 
the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution” since its first formulation 
in 1972, because “[i]n certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” 
permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on 
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the right of collective self-defense.”32 Due to the retention of the “minimum 
necessary force” principle, Japan’s collective self-defense of other states must 
be strictly associated with the defense of Japan and the protection of its 
citizens’ “right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”33
In this sense, Japan’s doctrine of collective self-defense does not permit 
the pure defense of another state. It reflects Japan’s firm belief that defending 
the United States and other partner states must be closely related to the 
survival of Japan and its people in a significant changing security environment 
at both regional and global levels. This idea underlies the following three 
constitutional requirements for the exercise of collective self-defense.
Existential Crisis Situation (Survival-Threatening Situation)
First, to qualify for collective self-defense, a situation must pose an existential 
crisis to Japan. Article 2 of the Armed Attack and Existential Crisis Situations 
Law, modified in 2015, defines the standard as “an armed attack against a 
foreign state that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and, as a result, 
threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn 
its nationals’ right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.” The foreign state, 
including one having no diplomatic relations with Japan,34 is expected to be 
“a country which shares a common interest in responding to an armed attack 
from outside as a common danger and expresses the intention to do so jointly 
with Japan.”35 This requirement is intended to ensure consistency with the 
“basic logic of the interpretation of Article 9”—i.e., that Japan’s use of force 
is constitutional solely when it is exercised for the purpose of protecting its 
citizens’ right to live in peace.
The Japanese government further explains that an existential crisis 
could include “a situation in which a clear danger of the occurrence of an 
armed attack [on Japan] is imminent” or “the tense situation in which an 
armed attack [on Japan] is anticipated.”36 Examples include armed attack 
against U.S. vessels transporting Japanese nationals37; armed attack against 
U.S. warships conducting ballistic missile surveillance in the vicinity of 
Japan38; or armed attack against Guam,39 where the U.S. military bases critical 
for Japan’s security in East Asia are located. The legislation also allows for 
exceptional cases in which an attack is neither imminent nor anticipated but 
could still constitute an existential crisis.40 A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, 
a critical energy lifeline to Japan, was one cited example.41
Furthermore, the Japanese government has expressed its view on cyber 
armed attacks.42 It has made clear that not only “a cyberattack carried out as 
part of an armed attack,”43 but even a “cyber-only attack”44 could constitute 
an armed attack and trigger an existential crisis within the meaning of the 
doctrine.45
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Whether an existential crisis exists shall be determined “in an 
objective and reasonable manner”46 based on a comprehensive assessment 
of all information available to the Japanese Cabinet (a decision which will 
be subject to prior or subsequent approval of the legislature, depending 
on the circumstances).47 Such a complicated and multi-layered approach 
to a situational determination would require institutionalized facilitating 
procedures between an assisting state and an attacked state. To enable Japan 
to practically engage in collective self-defense with the United States, the two 
countries have established a joint defense mechanism called the “Alliance 
Coordination Mechanism” (ACM)48 based on the Japan-U.S. Guidelines. As 
this suggests, Japan’s collective self-defense is tailored and limited to the 
defense of the United States, Japan’s only ally. It is worth noting that this 
would not include a request to assist in anticipatory self-defense against an 
imminent threat of armed attack; as already discussed, Japan has rejected 
that doctrine as a matter of international law.
Necessity to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People
Even if an existential crisis exists, a second condition must be met: there must 
be no other appropriate means available to repel the armed attack on Japan’s 
ally, to ensure Japan’s survival, and/or to protect the Japanese people. This 
condition is less controversial than other requirements and has not been a 
source of substantive debate. But it should be distinguished from the necessity 
requirement under international law that non-use of force be insufficient—it 
does not go so far as to require that force be the only available response to 
an armed attack. Under Japan’s constitutional constrains, satisfaction of this 
element of the doctrine must be judged from the viewpoint of whether the use 
of force is required to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.
Minimum Necessary Force and Geographical Limitations
Third, Japan is constitutionally authorized to use force only to the minimum 
extent necessary to achieve the foregoing purpose.49 This condition concerns 
the “means, forms and degree” of Japan’s self-defense under the Constitution 
and must be assessed together with the two other constitutional requirements. 
It is entirely distinct from “the proportionality requirement for the exercise 
of the right of self-defense under international law that permits a self-
defense operation comparable in degree to an ongoing armed attack from 
an opponent.”50 Therefore, geographical limitations on overseas deployment 
of Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF) are particularly relevant in determining 
whether this condition is satisfied.
The government’s position has been that Japan’s use of force in any 
territory of another state exceeds the minimum-force restriction, even if such 
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state consents. It has emphasized that this stance will continue to apply to the 
new policy on collective self-defense.51
Nevertheless, the government has suggested two possible exceptions 
to this limitation. The first one is minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz. 
Such an operation could be conducted in the sovereign territory of Oman 
or Iran,52 but it would fall within the constitutionally permissible scope of 
minimum necessary force because it secures safe navigation for vessels.53 In 
addition, a surgical missile strike on an enemy base overseas could be lawful 
if the alternative would be “boots on the ground.” However, the government 
emphasizes that this latter exception is theoretical, because Japan lacks the 
capabilities, such as suppression of enemy air defenses and long-range missile 
systems, to carry out such an attack.54 Thus, minesweeping by Japan’s SDF in 
the Strait of Hormuz is “the only exception”55 in practice.
It should be noted that the third requirement does not limit Japan’s use 
of force in collective self-defense in areas with no sovereign control, because 
of its link to the territorial sovereignty of other states. Therefore, the primary 
operating domains of Japan’ collective self-defense of the United States could 
be on the high seas and, depending on future circumstances, in cyberspace 
and in outer space.56
Conclusion
Japan has the inherent right to use force in individual or collective self-
defense under international law. While Japan’s individual self-defense covers 
the U.S. Armed Forces and their military bases stationed in Japanese territory, 
its exercise of collective self-defense also plays a significant role in the 
defense of the United States outside its territory. To make these frameworks 
operational, Japan and the United States have established a close bilateral 
coordination mechanism to enable both countries to jointly exercise its rights 
of self-defense in a feasible way. Given the background of lifting the ban on 
Japan’s ability to exercise collective self-defense, the current framework is 
uniquely tailored to the joint defense of the United States.
That said, the United States needs to understand that there exists a 
significant potential gap between the two countries in their legal approaches 
to the exercise of self-defense. This is most evident in the interpretations of 
armed attack and the requirements for the exercise of the right of collective 
self-defense under international law. Furthermore, Japanese constitutional 
constraints limit and complicate Japan’s engagement in collective self-defense 
with the United States. A more workable and legally consistent basis for the 
Japan-U.S. alliance requires constant legal dialogue between Japanese and 
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U.S. government officials. Such dialogue should aim at narrowing or closing 
the potential gaps in the relevant legal interpretations applied to various 
specific circumstances. 
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by going to the victim State’s assistance, be 
also, and in addition to other requirements, 
in some measure defending itself. There 
should even in ‘collective self-defence’ be 
some real element of self.” Nicaragua Case, 
supra note 11, at 545.
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田文雄外務大臣答弁) [Answer by Foreign 
Minister Fumio Kishida], Dai 189-kai Kokkai 
第189回国会衆議
院我が国及び国際社会の平和安全法制に関す
る特別委員会議録第10号) [Proceedings of the 
189th Diet H.R. Spec. Comm. Meeting on 
Peace and Security Laws of Japan and the In-
ternational Community No. 10], at 29 (2015), 
available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SEN-




su Sonritsu kiki jitai ni kansuru shitsumon ni 
参議院議員水野賢一君
提出存立危機事態に関する質問に対する答弁
書) [Reply to Questions Regarding Existential 
of Councillors], Naikaku San-shitsu 189 dai 
内閣参質189第202号） [Cabinet 
House of Councillors Answer 189, No. 202] 





する質問に対する答弁書) [Reply to Questions 
Regarding Changes in the Interpretation of 
the Constitution allowing the Exercise of 
Collective Self-Defense by Mr. Katsuya Oka-
内閣衆質188第1号） [Cabinet H.R. 




sonritsu kiki jitai ni okeru wagakuni no heiwa 
to dokuritsu narabini kuni oyobi kokumin no 
Attack and Existential Crisis Situations Law], 
Law No. 79 of 2003 (Japan), arts. 2(2)–(3).
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倍晋三内閣総理大臣答弁) [Answer by Prime 
第189回国会
参議院会議録第34号) [Proceedings of the 
189th Diet No. 34], at 6 (2015), available 
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangi-
in/189/0001/18907270001034.pdf#page=6. 
that even an attack on a merchant vessel 
state: “[W]hen a private or government ship 
or an aircraft of its nationality is attacked on 
the high seas, as a matter of international 
law, a State is in principle in a position to 
repel the attack as the exercise of the right 
of individual self-defense.” Answer by Ichiro 
Komatsu, supra note 24, at 21, translated in 
Mikanagi & Ogi, supra note 4, at 369.
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防衛大臣答弁) [Reply by Def. Minister Naka-
第190回国会参議
院外交防衛委員会会議録第5号) [Proceedings 
of the 190th Diet House of Councillors For-





(小野寺五典防衛大臣答弁) [Answer by Def. 
Minister Itsunori Onodera], Dai 193-kai Kok-
第193回国会衆議院安全保障委員会議
録第9号) [Proceedings of the 193rd Diet H.R. 
Sec. Comm. No. 9], at 11 (2017), available 
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugi-
in/193/0015/19308100015009.pdf#page=11.
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Activities for Foreign Troops, etc., Imple-
mented by Japan in the Event of a Joint In-
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42   As a member of the Group of Seven 
(G7), Japan joined the declaration on cyber-
security in 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, G7 Principles and Actions on Cyber 
1 (2016), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/
some circumstances, cyber activities could 
amount to the use of force or an armed 
attack within the meaning of the United 
Nations Charter and customary internation-
exercise their inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense -
cle 51 of the United Nations Charter and in 
accordance with international law, including 
international humanitarian law, in response to 
an armed attack through cyberspace.”).





to Questions Regarding Requirements for 
Certifying a Cyber Attack as an Armed Attack 
Situation by Mr. Tsutomu Okubo, Member, 
House of Councillors], Naikaku San-shitsu 
内閣参質189第221号） [Cab-
inet House of Councillors Answer 189, No. 







Abe & Def. Minister Takeshi Iwaya], Dai 
第198回国会衆議院本会議録第24
号) [Proceedings of the 198th Diet H.R. 




(中谷元防衛大臣答弁) [Reply by Former 
Def. Minister Nakatani], Dai 189-kai Kokkai 




ings of the 189th Diet House of Council-
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supra note 37, at 7.
47   Armed Attack and Existential Crisis 
Situations Law, supra note 36, art. 9(4)(6)(7); 
Resolution Supplement to the Peace and Se-
curity Bills, supra note 40, ¶ 2. The resolution 
requires the government to obtain prior ap-
proval of the Diet unless the existential crisis 
situation/the survival-threatening situation 
simultaneously amounts to the armed attack 
on Japan, and in case of emergency. See also 
Cabinet Decision, supra note 2, at 7–8, ¶ 3.
48   See Ministry of Def. of Japan, Diplomat-





弁) [Answer by Yusuke Yokohama, Cabinet 
wagakuni oyobi Kokusai shakai no Heiwa 
第189回国会衆議院我が国及び
国際社会の平和安全法制に関する特別委員
会第4号) [Proceedings of the 189th Diet 
H.R. Spec. Comm. Meeting on Peace and 
Security Laws of Japan and the International 
Community No. 4], at 5 (2015), available 
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugi-
in/189/0298/18905280298004.pdf#page=5.
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参議院議員水野賢一君提出個別
的自衛権の地理的要件などに関する質問に対
する答弁書) [Reply to Questions Regarding 
Geographical Requirements of the Individual 
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Member, House of Councillors], Naikaku 
（内閣参質189第
201号） [Cabinet House of Councillors An-






る答弁書) [Reply to Questions Regarding the 
Exercise of Collective Self-Defense and Retal-
iation Attacks by Kiyomi Tsujimoto, Member, 
内閣衆質186第271号） [Cabinet H.R. Reply 
186, No. 271] (2014), available at http://www.
shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/
html/shitsumon/b186271.htm.
53   Sangiin giin Haku Shinkun-kun teishutsu 
参
議院議員白眞勲君提出外国の領域における武力
の行使に関する質問に対する答弁書) [Reply to 
Questions Regarding Use of Force in Foreign 
Territories by Mr. Shinkun Haku, Member, 
House of Councillors], Naikaku San-shitsu 
内閣参質190第105号）[Cab-
inet House of Councillors Answer 190 No. 
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ings of the 189th Diet House of Council-
lors Spec. Comm. Meeting on Peace and 
Security Laws of Japan and the International 
Community No. 10], at 17 (2015), available 
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangi-
in/189/0192/18908190192010.pdf#page=17.
56   See Masahiro Kurosaki, Japan’s 
Evolving Position on the Use of Force in 
Collective Self-Defense, Lawfare (Aug. 
23, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
japans-evolving-position-use-force-collec-
tive-self-defense. It was also reported that 
the applicability of the right of collective 
self-defense to outer space for the purpose 
of the defense of foreign partners, such as 
the United States and the European Union. 
Kenkai (宇宙でも集団的自衛権　防衛相が見
解) [Collective Self-Defense Right in Space: 
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Introduction
The U.S. Constitution’s allocation of military authority has adapted over time to 
major shifts in American power and grand strategy. This paper explains, with a 
focus on U.S. military actions in East Asia and possible scenarios of special joint 
concern to the United States and Japan, that the president in practice wields 
tremendous power and discretion in using military force. Although formal, legal 
checks on the president’s use of force rarely come into play, Congress nevertheless 
retains some political power to influence presidential decision-making. The 
president’s powers are also constrained by interagency processes within the 
executive branch, and alliance relations often feed into those processes.
This paper is mostly focused on U.S. domestic law issues. It also touches, 
however, on a few key questions of international law, especially as they relate to 
presidential power to interpret international law and to possible crisis scenarios of 
current concern.
The Constitutional  
Framework
Drafted in the late 18th century, the U.S. Constitution divided responsibility for 
military affairs between Congress and the president, providing several checks on 
presidential uses of force. The Constitution vests “executive power” in the president 
and designates him “commander in chief ” of military forces. But it assigns to 
Congress responsibility for creating, maintaining, and funding those military 
forces, and gives Congress the power to “[d]eclare war.” The constitutional framers 
generally wanted to give the president unified, tactical control over military forces, 
but they wanted Congress to retain primary control over decisions to go to war. The 
framers were also sensitive to political opposition to large, standing military forces, 
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which many Americans associated at the time with repression and a proclivity 
toward war.
Even from the start, this division of constitutional authority left ambiguous 
whether and under what circumstances the president could unilaterally engage 
in military activities. Although early presidents were usually hesitant to use much 
military force without explicit congressional backing—particularly since standing 
U.S. military forces were small and the president therefore relied on Congress to 
provide continuing financial support for them—over time a practice accumulated 
of unilateral presidential deployments and limited uses of military force short of 
all-out war in the absence of legislative prohibitions. 
During the first half of the 19th century, for example, presidents 
authorized punitive raids and shows of military force in Sumatra and Pacific 
islands, typically to protect American commercial interests. In the 1850s, the 
president ordered Commodore Matthew Perry to lead a Navy squadron on a 
diplomatic mission, using a show of military force, to open trade and other 
relations with Japan. On several occasions during that decade, presidents sent 
small military forces to defend U.S. interests in China, and likewise in Korea 
during the decades that followed. In 1900, the president dispatched about 5,000 
troops to China, as part of a multinational expeditionary force responding to 
the “Boxer Rebellion.”1 Especially after the United States gained territories in 
Asia following the Spanish-American War—one of only five declared wars in 
American history, though many other military operations have been authorized 
by Congress—presidents frequently directed armed forces to intervene in that 
region to protect American interests. 
As Louis Henkin explains in his treatise of U.S. foreign relations law:
By repeated exercise without successful opposition, Presidents have 
established their authority to send troops abroad, probably beyond effective 
challenge, where Congress is silent, but the constitutional foundations and 
the constitutional limits of that authority remain in dispute.2
Nevertheless, through the first half of the 20th century, it was still widely agreed 
that, except in cases of repelling an attack against the United States, only Congress 
could take the nation to full-blown war (as opposed to much more limited uses of 
military force, even if they involved some combat).
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Post-World War II  
Presidential Powers
Several interrelated factors in the years immediately following World War II 
combined to dramatically increase the president’s power to use military force. 
These factors include more expansive constitutional theory regarding presidential 
powers, the formation of mutual defense treaties, and the establishment of a 
permanent, large-scale military force.
First, presidents during most of the Cold War asserted very broad 
prerogatives to use even relatively large-scale force without congressional 
authorization. Executive branch lawyers adopted an expansive view of presidential 
foreign relations and military powers, and Congress largely acquiesced. The Korean 
War, which was never expressly authorized by Congress but lasted more than three 
years and cost the lives of over 33,000 U.S. troops, stands out as a turning point. 
It marked the largest unilateral military action abroad by a president to date and 
was justified by vigorous and expansive executive branch claims of constitutional 
power.3 As Arthur Schlesinger describes the ascendancy of an “imperial presidency” 
at that time:
The menace of unexpected crisis hung over the world, demanding, it was 
supposed, the concentration within government of the means of instant 
decision and response. All this, reinforcing the intellectual doubt about 
democratic control of foreign relations, appeared to argue more strongly 
than ever for the centralization of foreign policy in the Presidency.4
Since the Korean War, successive presidential administrations have asserted  
that the president, by virtue of his power to manage foreign relations and his 
role as commander in chief, has broad authority to initiate military operations 
that he deems to be in the national interest. The Justice Department has 
acknowledged in recent years that some large-scale military operations might 
be of such size, intensity, and nature as to constitutionally require congressional 
authorization. This point could be important in legal debates about possible 
military action against North Korea, given the likely large magnitude of such 
action, but, as explained below, that legal threshold may not in practice be of 
much consequence.5
Second, the United States concluded a set of defense pacts around the world, 
including with allies in the Asia-Pacific region, and these alliances contributed 
to a growth of presidential powers. These pacts included the Philippines (1952), 
Australia and New Zealand (1952), the Republic of Korea (1954), the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (1954), the Republic of China (1955), and Japan (1960). 
In the Japan case, the security treaty provides that:
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Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the 
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own 
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger 
in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such 
armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be 
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and security.6
Defense pacts turned the traditional American aversion to “entangling alliances” 
on its head; whereas for most of its history, American strategic thinking rested on 
the idea that the alliances might draw the United States into unnecessary wars, 
post-war thinking rested on the idea that alliances were necessary to prevent wars 
that would engulf the United States. These defense pacts meant that presidents 
could, in effect, rely on a pre-commitment of public support for military action to 
defend these allies. Presidents also justified expansive unilateral power to use force 
on the need to preserve the credibility of American security guarantees. Bilateral 
and regional security treaties generally contain a provision specifying that 
mutual defense will take place in accordance with each party’s own constitutional 
processes. This allowed the executive and legislative branches to paper over 
differences about constitutional prerogatives during ratification, but in practice 
the executive branch has asserted authority to invoke these provisions unilaterally. 
In other words, whereas one might think of international law as a likely constraint 
on executive branch discretion to use force, presidents have repeatedly used 
multilateral or regional security agreements as a basis for defending broader 
executive power with regard to military force.7 As Mira Rapp-Hooper and I 
recently wrote:
Some of the president’s constitutional powers relevant to alliances—such as 
the power to direct military operations in war and to appoint ambassadors 
(subject to Senate confirmation)—have always been clear. Starting in the 
early Cold War, though, the centrality of alliances to U.S. foreign policy 
contributed to the vast accumulation of additional presidential powers—
some of them delegated by Congress and others established through 
executive branch practice over time. After nearly 70 years, presidential 
authority over U.S. security guarantees now appears to be almost entirely 
unilateral.8
A third major factor contributing to presidential powers to use force was that the 
United States maintained large, standing military forces after World War II, and 
the permanence of these forces diminished constraints on presidential power to 
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use them. Throughout most of its history, the United States had maintained very 
small or modest peacetime military forces. It mobilized wartime military forces to 
meet crises, and then it quickly demobilized them post war. With the advent of the 
Cold War, however, the United States never demobilized to the extent it had in the 
past. Large numbers of U.S. troops have for decades been stationed on bases in, for 
example, Japan and South Korea, in addition to a major U.S. naval presence in the 
Pacific at all times. Especially when combined with a nuclear arsenal, this large-
scale standing military power guarantees that a president, as commander in chief, 
has had permanently-ready forces at his disposal.
As a result of these and other factors, from the early Cold War onward the 
president has had wide latitude with regard to initiating force, and Congress has 
often played a reactive, sometimes even passive, role. For the purposes of this 
paper, one notable counter-example, in which the president showed significant 
deference to Congress, was President Dwight Eisenhower’s approach toward 
Taiwan (then Formosa) in 1955. In threatening to use force—possibly including 
nuclear weapons—to defend Nationalist China-controlled islands against 
aggression by Communist-China, Eisenhower sought and obtained explicit 
congressional approval to use whatever military means he deemed necessary. 
Even in seeking congressional approval, however, Eisenhower asserted that he 
had independent constitutional power to take some military measures anyway, 
and this case of seeking congressional approval for military intervention in 
advance stands out as more an exception than the norm.9 More typically, in the 
Vietnam War, for example, presidents slowly escalated U.S. military involvement 
before requesting and receiving very broad congressional authorization (in 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) to use military force to defend U.S. and allied 
interests in Southeast Asia. As public opposition to the war grew, Congress 
found it difficult to resist presidential requests for additional funds. Eventually, 
that opposition reached the point that Congress passed or threatened to pass 
legislative restrictions on the conduct of the war, pushing President Nixon to 
wind it down.10
Following the Vietnam War, Congress tried to adjust the balance of power 
among the political branches by enacting, over President Nixon’s veto, the 1973 
War Powers Resolution.11 Its stated purpose was to defend the constitutional 
framers’ original constitutional vision: that the “collective judgment of both the 
Congress and the president will apply to the introduction of United States Armed 
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities 
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in 
hostilities or in such situations.” 12 The War Powers Resolution stipulates that if the 
president sends U.S. forces into combat, he must withdraw them within 60 days 
unless Congress declares war or expressly authorizes the president to use force. 
Over time that law has been watered down in several ways, however, and Congress 
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has not proven willing to enforce it strictly by further exercising its legislative 
powers. 13
In practice, the president thus has broad unilateral discretion to engage 
U.S. military forces in hostilities abroad. Examples in the Asia-Pacific region since 
the Vietnam War include action to retake the captured merchant vessel Mayaguez, 
deployments to the Philippines during the 1989 coup attempt, and contribution to 
UN efforts to restore peace in East Timor.
Although this paper has mostly focused on U.S. domestic law related to 
use of force, another quick note about international law is important here and 
relates directly to these observations about presidential power: the president has 
wide latitude, domestically, in interpreting international law constraints on force, 
such as self-defense, and the provisions of security treaties (though usually that 
interpretive power is delegated to subordinate officers and exercised through 
interagency processes). Moreover, and as explained further below, the United 
States has adopted broader interpretations than most states, including close 
allies like Japan, of self-defense rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter.14 These 
include a broader understanding of anticipatory self-defense (though its scope  
is still a matter of ongoing internal debate) and the view that any use of force—
even a small one—against the United States under Article 2(4) could also 
constitute an “armed attack” triggering self-defense rights. Interpreting these 
international legal constraints on force is left to the president, with Congress 
playing little if any formal role and courts regarding international legal issues  
of force as non-justiciable. 
It is, in sum, generally understood that from the Korean War onward, the 
president has exercised vast unilateral powers to use military force. The sheer scope 
of this presidential authority to use force obviously contrasts sharply with Japanese 
government decision-making about force. Moreover, whereas Japan’s approach is 
generally premised on clear lines of what is or is not permitted in advance, the U.S. 
approach is premised on the idea that security contingencies are unpredictable, 
and it is better therefore to vest the government with substantial discretion as new 
issues arise.
Politics, Process, and Diplomacy of  
Presidential Decisions to Use Force
In some ways, the standard account of a post-WWII imperial presidency often 
actually understates the president’s power. That is because the actual deployment 
of forces into hostile situations is only one way in which he can use force. More 
often, the president wields the threat of force to deter or coerce certain conduct by 
others. With regard to East Asia, for example, the credible threat of U.S. military 
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force is a significant element of U.S. strategy for deterring Chinese and North 
Korean aggression, as well as reassuring other Asian powers of U.S. protection, 
to avert a destabilizing arms race.15 This includes explicit or implicit threats of 
force in response to specific crises or contingencies, such as during diplomatic 
confrontations with North Korea, in addition to more routine displays of force, 
such as free navigation exercises in the South China Sea. As I have argued:
Decisions to go to war or to send military forces into hostilities are 
immensely and uniquely consequential, so it is no surprise that debates 
about constitutional war powers occupy so much attention. But one of the 
most common and important ways that the United States uses its military 
power is by threatening war or force—to coerce, to deter, to bargain, to 
reassure—and the constitutional dimensions of that activity have received 
almost no scrutiny or even theoretical investigation.16 
There are no formal legal checks on the president’s power to threaten force and, 
given the size of the standing U.S. military arsenal, that power to threaten force is 
immense. 
There are, however, significant political checks on the president’s discretion 
to use military force, and these checks also affect how the president wields threats 
of force. As Jack Goldsmith and I have argued: 
The United States has a long history of presidential military initiative borne 
of responsibility and opportunity, and congressional acquiescence borne 
of irresponsibility and collective action hurdles. This historical pattern of 
executive unilateralism has not meant that the president is unchecked. It 
has simply meant that the checks were political, not legal, and were imposed 
by the threat of congressional retaliation if the president’s initiatives go 
terribly wrong, and by the U.S. public through electoral accountability.17
In recent years there has been a wave of political science scholarship substantiating 
these checks.
Douglas Kriner, for example, argues that although there has been much 
literature devoted to claims of an imperial presidency, Congress exerts significant 
influence over the use of force. Congressional politics affect both the frequency with 
which presidents use force abroad and the probability with which they respond 
militarily to crises. There are many ways in which Congress influences presidential 
uses of force, and presidents anticipate congressional reactions, such as introduction 
of legislation to authorize or curtail a use of force; congressional oversight hearings; 
and public debate over military policymaking.18 Congressional action or inaction also 
sends signals about domestic resolve to foreign parties—including adversaries and 
allies—thereby affecting the president’s calculus regarding force.19
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In their study of congressional efforts to constrain presidential war powers 
during the post-World War II era, William Howell and Jon Pevehouse “discover 
considerable evidence that checks and balances, though diminished, persist.”20 
Although they concede the president’s unilateral powers are very substantial, they 
argue that, under certain conditions, the congressional checks are constraining. 
Moves by members of Congress to introduce bills, pass resolutions, hold hearings, 
and make public declarations can increase political costs for presidents, and 
even sometimes impose legal limits on force.21 Like Kriner, they also find that 
congressional opposition to military force reduces the president’s ability to signal 
resolve to allies and influence public opinion.22 
Besides congressional political checks, internal process within the U.S. 
executive branch exerts significant influence on presidential use of force. The same 
post-World War II period in which constitutional practice shifted toward unilateral 
presidential power also included the creation and institutionalization of formal 
interagency deliberative processes for national security and crisis decision-making. 
The 1947 National Security Act created the modern Department of Defense, 
Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council (NSC). Although the 
NSC has evolved, and the details of its composition and organization vary from 
presidential administration to administration, it helps structure deliberation on 
possible uses of force to ensure participation of key departments and agencies, as 
well as the president’s principal military advisers.23 
It is also through these interagency processes that the executive branch 
interprets international law in this area. The recently published Department of 
Defense Law of War manual describes the process this way:
Jus ad bellum issues might raise questions of national policy that, in the 
Executive Branch, would be decided by the President. In U.S. practice,  
legal advice provided to national-level principal officials on such issues 
generally would need to be addressed through interagency discussions 
coordinated by the legal adviser to the National Security Council, including 
consultation and coordination among senior counsel of relevant U.S. 
departments and agencies.24
Alliance relationships also influence presidential uses of force and are 
among the considerations that inform executive branch deliberations. On the one 
hand, a general approach to defense planning that emphasizes military primacy 
has meant that the United States has great flexibility in wielding its armed might.25 
Moreover, the U.S. executive branch can make decisions on the use of force more 
quickly and dexterously than can allies with more cumbersome approval processes 
or, as in the case of Japan, stricter restrictions on what military forces can or cannot 
be called upon to do. 
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On the other hand, coalition building and maintenance is often an 
important strategic and political concern, constraining U.S. military actions or 
threats of military force. Military-to-military ties mean that allies’ interests will 
also generally exert constant, even if sometimes subtle or indirect, influence on 
executive branch deliberations through the departments involved in maintaining 
and exercising those relationships. This is a ripe area for further research, especially 
with regard to how different alliance relationships and structures feed into U.S. 
decision-making processes, particularly during crises.
North Korea and Taiwan Strait Tensions 
Recent tensions and negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
development, as well as concerns about China’s ambitions toward Taiwan, help 
illustrate many of the issues discussed above. 
As to North Korea, although each of the previous three presidents has 
reportedly considered military strikes against North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, 
president Trump was initially, and prior to his summits with Kim Jong Un, 
much more open about the possibility of such action than his predecessors. 
Some members of Congress publicly questioned or pushed back against Trump’s 
bellicosity, including suggesting that he lacks constitutional authority to take 
actions without congressional authorization, but Congress as a body showed little 
willingness or capacity to apply more than informal and diffuse political pressure 
against a possible rush to war.26
As to the international law dimensions of the North Korea situation, the 
Trump administration has been publicly reticent.27 At a 2017 Senate hearing, the 
Secretaries of Defense and State confirmed under questioning that the United 
States lacked international legal authority to strike North Korea absent an 
“imminent threat,” but they declined to clarify how they interpreted that standard 
in the North Korea context.28 President Trump’s advisors had—again, prior to the 
presidential summit meetings between the American and North Korean leaders—
emphasized that the window is closing for action before North Korea develops the 
capability to attack the continental United States with nuclear weapons. It seems 
likely that the current U.S. administration interprets “imminence” significantly 
more broadly than its East-Asian allies, especially Japan.
Besides the prospect of actual military intervention abroad, the North Korea 
situation also illustrates related presidential powers for managing alliances that 
can have signaling effects. As commander in chief who can deploy forces abroad, 
the president can also withdraw them. President Trump has hinted at his interest 
in bringing U.S. troops home from South Korea, though Congress recently passed 
a statute limiting his ability to do so (and the constitutionality of that restriction 
is uncertain). The president can also cancel or downgrade military exercises, as 
President Trump has done with U.S.-South Korean military exercises as part of his 
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diplomacy toward the peninsula.29 
The Taiwan Strait is another hotspot that highlights the vast scope of 
presidential powers, and especially the wide latitude presidents have to engage in 
demonstrative shows of force. Ever since the United States normalized relations 
with China in the 1970s, Congress has generally taken a hard line in favor of 
defending Taiwan, so there has not been much political or legislative constraint 
from Congress on strong executive action. In 1995, for example, after China 
engaged in missile tests and other actions to intimidate Taiwan, President Clinton 
ordered additional naval forces to the Taiwan area and sent some of them through 
the Taiwan Strait. The Trump administration has also used naval deployments to 
reinforce and signal American commitments to prevent Chinese military actions 
against Taiwan (as well as China’s assertions of control in areas of the South 
China Sea). As with South Korean military exercises, displays of force like this 
can reassure and bolster defense of partners, but they can also provoke escalatory 
responses. Such moves are almost exclusively within the president’s discretion, at 
least in the absence of direct legislative restrictions to the contrary.
Conclusion
However the U.S. constitutional system was originally intended to constrain 
formally the president’s military authority, the modern president in practice 
wields tremendous power and discretion to initiate military operations. The 
system has adapted over time to major shifts in American power and grand 
strategy. Although formal, legal checks on the president’s use of force rarely 
come into play, Congress nevertheless retains some political power to influence 
presidential decision-making, and internal bureaucratic processes also constrain 
presidential action. 
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Introduction
Japan is a small and densely populated country in an unstable security 
environment in Northeast Asia. If Japan were to be invaded and the invading 
country repelled, the consequence of the war would be disastrous. For Japan, 
winning the war is not victory. That is why deterrence is the first priority of Japan’s 
national security and defense policy.
However, deterrence is not guaranteed. Deterrence is ineffective if the 
deterring country does not succeed in communicating its intention correctly, 
inviting miscalculation on the part of the opponent. Communication between 
adversaries is not easy even if both of them are rational actors. This is particularly 
the case because of lack of correct information and difference of values, cultures 
and political institutions. Miscommunication is to an extent inevitable because 
of the anarchical nature of the international community. Furthermore, even if 
communication is successful, deterrence will not necessarily be effective. Once 
aggression takes place, the status quo ante cannot be restored by reprisal or 
punishment. So, reprisal or punishment after aggression may not be an effective 
solution. In addition, deterrence is invisible. All of us know from our experience in 
our daily life that threats to retaliate may be successful in preventing assault, but 
it is hard to know whether or not deterrence is working in a specific situation. The 
effectiveness of deterrence is a serious question in specific circumstances.
This question becomes more serious when a sovereign state has to depend 
on an alliance to achieve its national security. Deterrence is a tactic that prevents 
one’s opponent from taking action against one’s interests. Deterrence to prevent 
one’s opponent from taking action against the interests of a country other than the 
deterring power is called “extended deterrence”. A typical way to ensure extended 
deterrence is through an alliance.
It is easy to cast doubt on the credibility of the U.S. commitment to come 
to Japan’s aid in the event of an armed attack against Japan; one could ask, “Is 
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the U.S. willing to risk San Francisco and Los Angeles to defend Tokyo?” This 
argument sounds plausible. Complete trust cannot be expected, for, after all, allies 
are independent sovereign states. The answer to this question seemed relatively 
easy until recently, because of the magnitude of nuclear weapons and because of 
our experience with the mutual deterrence between the U.S. and the former Soviet 
Union in the Cold War days. The said question continued to be asked, and we had 
no reason to doubt the right answer.
However, today we have to think about a more fundamental issue: that of 
the American president’s view of the alliance. We should recall the remarks Defense 
Secretary James Mattis made in his resignation letter: “While the U.S. remains the 
indispensable nation in the world, we cannot protect our interests or serve that 
role effectively without maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those 
allies.”1 As suggested in the letter, its addressee does not understand the value of 
U.S. alliances although having allies is a great soft power. Although an alliance is 
mutual cooperation from which all of its members benefit, the U.S. president does 
not have a correct view on these points. Mutual cooperation does not necessarily 
mean that the alliance is symmetrical. A correct understanding of the division 
of roles and missions between the alliance partners is indispensable for the 
management of the alliance, as well as for maintaining and showing the robustness 
of the alliance. From this point of view, U.S. President Donald Trump’s remarks in 
his press conference in Osaka, Japan on June 29, 2019, in response to the question 
if he was thinking about withdrawing from the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is quite 
problematic.2 The question of extended deterrence has to deal with this new and 
more serious situation. That is the dilemma we confront right now.
Nonetheless, we ought to stop agonizing over this question. We should 
make a distinction between the words of the president himself and the actions of 
the U.S. government as a political institution. The distribution of power among the 
branches of the U.S. government, provided for by the U.S. Constitution, is at work. 
The Constitution is a guarantor for the U.S. president not to be a dictator. If the 
dilemma continues, we ought not to lament or criticize the situation, but rather to 
strengthen the alliance and to make the alliance commitment more effective. There 
is no alternative solution, as the alliance is the most reliable instrument of power-
balancing in the heavily armed and volatile Indo-Pacific region.
Another serious and related question is about the uncertainty concerning 
the rules-based liberal international order. This order is fragile for a number of 
reasons. First of all, it is basically a Western idea. It is easily exposed to the question 
of whether the order has become truly universal even in the post-Cold War era. 
In addition, the liberal order helps produce diversity of values and of ways of life, 
both nationally and internationally. It accelerates policy changes, for example, 
on migration and same-sex marriage. It erodes the stability of societies in which 
traditional values are dominant, and brings uncertainty and anxiety to the minds 
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of those who are not accustomed to such an enormous shift. Such uncertainty 
and anxiety raises doubts about the order. Furthermore, the idea of the rules-
based liberal international order reflects the American political system. Not all 
peoples necessarily like the American flavor, although Masataka Kosaka wrote 
near the end of the Cold War that if given the right to choose, the public tends 
to choose Americanism, citing Denis Brogan.3 Though fragile, the rules-based 
liberal international order contributes to the stability and growth of the world by 
connecting the actors more closely and making their behavior more predictable; 
thus its value cannot be underrated.
The question of how to address the challenges to the established rules of the 
international community is a major issue for Japan and the U.S., as both countries 
have benefited from the rules-based order for their survival and prosperity. As both 
countries are maritime nations and as the Indo-Pacific region is a huge maritime 
area, the task of upholding the international rules to govern the maritime commons 
should be critically important for the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the coming age. 
China’s maritime expansion in East Asia has caused many problems to the rules-
based regional order at sea.
No matter how Japan, the U.S. and other regional countries describe 
the region—the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific—the sea cannot be separated. 
As seagoing officers have kept saying, the sea is one.4 As the sea is one, the rule 
to govern the sea must be one. Otherwise, connectivity of the maritime space 
cannot be ensured. The importance of maritime transit for mass transportation is 
incomparable to land and air transit even in this high-tech age. As “Indo-Pacific” 
literally connects the world’s largest and third largest oceans, this term symbolizes 
the physical fact of the global ocean’s unity and the importance of the unity for the 
region much more explicitly than “Asia-Pacific,” which connects land and sea.
As the alliance is a traditional tool of balance of power, the first priority 
of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in East Asian (or Indo-Pacific) maritime security is to 
restore the regional balance of power, particularly at sea. The fact that China is 
more assertive against neighboring countries’ public vessels and fishing boats in the 
South China Sea than in the East China Sea indicates that difference of the balance 
of power matters. While Japanese and American military presence in Northeast 
Asia is robust, there is no permanent presence of the U.S. military in Southeast 
Asia, and the military capabilities of most of the Southeast Asian countries are 
very limited. The Japan-U.S. Alliance cooperation to enhance the presence of the 
alliance in the South China Sea and to extend their helping hands to Southeast 
Asian developing countries for maritime security capacity building is critically 
important.
However, a balance of power is just one factor to consider in international 
security even under the theory of realism. James Mayall is right in stating that 
international law is the bedrock institution on which the idea of an international 
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society stands or falls.5 Looking back into the interwar period, E.H. Carr stated, 
“Power is always an essential element of politics,” and “Power is a necessary 
ingredient of every political order,”6 but at the same time he also argued, “If, 
however, it is utopian to ignore the element of power, it is an unreal kind of realism 
which ignores the element of morality in any world order.”7 Even though morality 
and law are not the same, Carr’s view on morality can be applied to international 
law as well because, as he says, no political society can exist without law.8
Therefore, the authority of international law must be asserted. The Japan-
U.S. Alliance must cover international legal cooperation in order to effectively 
counter China’s influence operations related to maritime security in East Asia. The 
Government of Japan stated in the new National Defense Program Guidelines 
(NDPG) of December 2018, “The Japan-U.S. Alliance plays a significant role 
for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific 
region and the international community.” As the Alliance plays such a role, legal 
cooperation should be conducted in close coordination with political, diplomatic 
and military cooperation.
The South China Sea Issue
Japan has a number of reasons to be concerned about the maritime security of the 
South China Sea. The South China Sea is increasingly important, as it connects 
the Pacific and Indian oceans, which in total occupy two thirds of the world’s 
sea surface. China uses maritime law enforcement ships to control access to and 
from islands and other features in the South China Sea, nonviolently, daring 
other states to fire the first shot.9 In 2012, twelve maritime militia trawlers were 
netting tons of endangered species at Scarborough Shoal, and when a Philippine 
vessel boarded two of the trawlers, militiamen onboard radioed for help, and the 
China Coast Guard (CCG) rode to the rescue. According to Andrew Erickson, the 
Chinese researcher Zhang Jie of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences uses the 
phrase “Scarborough Shoal Model,” an indication of the premeditated tactics China 
has developed to increase its maritime control. Erickson also points out Zhang’s 
emphasis of the model being explored vis-à-vis Chinese gray zone incursions in 
Japan’s waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.10 Thus, the issue of the East China 
Sea, which is directly linked to the security of Japan, is closely connected to the 
South China Sea disputes.
The South China Sea issue is often discussed in relation to the principle of 
freedom of navigation. China questions if there is any problem with freedom of 
navigation in the South China Sea. Liu Xiaoming, China’s ambassador to the UK, 
wrote, “Amid recent hype about ‘freedom of navigation’ in the South China Sea, the 
U.S., an outspoken opponent of China’s ‘militarisation’, has been flexing its own 
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military muscle by sending naval vessels and aircraft carriers to the region.” The 
ambassador further asserted, “The reality is that more than 100,000 merchant 
ships pass through these waters every year and none has ever run into any difficulty 
with freedom of navigation.”11 I strongly wonder if this is a correct message. The 
international community is questioning whether the Chinese side respects the 
freedom of navigation in international waters. It appears China is talking about 
innocent passage through territorial waters, based on their own unilateral and 
unjustifiable claim of sovereignty. If China insists on its claim of the Nine-Dash 
Line, this would mean there are almost no international waters left in the South 
China Sea.
China will repeat the “100,000 ships” assertion again and again if it remains 
unrefuted. In fact, China’s Defense Minister General Wei Fenghe said in his speech 
at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2019, “The current situation in the South China Sea 
is generally stable and positive. It is attributable to the joint efforts of the countries 
in the region. However, there are always people trying to make profits by stirring 
up troubles in the region. … Who is threatening security and stability in the South 
China Sea? Over 100,000 ships sail through the South China Sea every year. None 
has been threatened. The problem, however, is that in recent years some countries 
outside the region come to the South China Sea to flex muscles in the name of 
freedom of navigation. The large-scale force projection and offensive operations 
in the region are the most serious, destabilizing and uncertain factors in the South 
China Sea.”12 China’s neighbors are aware of what has really happened in the South 
China Sea, but those far away from China may not be aware of the reality. Thus, 
Japan, the U.S. and other countries upholding the rules-based liberal international 
order at sea should continue to speak up unequivocally and with a single voice 
against China’s assertion.
With regard to the issue of freedom of navigation, James Kraska and Raul 
Pedrozo argue, “Chinese defense officials have repeatedly stated that freedom of 
navigation in the South China Sea is not at risk, and that the United States ‘should 
stop playing up the issue.’ These assurances are pointless because China interprets 
freedom of navigation as applying only to civilian or commercial ships.”13 They are 
right, but, as mentioned above, General Wei only said “100,000 ships.” He did not 
add “merchant,” whether intentionally or not. I assume that both Ambassador Liu 
and General Wei used the term “freedom of navigation” not as a legal term, but 
merely to express the peacetime situation in an imprecise way.
Incidentally, China has recently grown more silent about its claim of the 
Nine-Dash Line. Presumably it is because of the international community’s efforts 
to unite against the Chinese claim. In other words, we can reasonably assume that 
our legitimate views based on the good-faith interpretation of international law 
raised the reputation cost to China. This is a benefit of international law.14
A Chinese researcher, Zhang Junshe, expressed a view similar to that 
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of Ambassador Liu, writing, “It is ironic that the biggest rogue disregarding 
international law is pretending to be a flag-bearer in this term. Washington 
has a blemished record of contempt of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
and its decision in the 1986 Nicaragua vs. U.S. case. The ICJ ruled that the U.S. 
had violated international law by supporting rebels in Nicaragua and mining 
Nicaragua’s harbors. The U.S. refused to participate in the case and blocked the 
enforcement of the judgment by the United Nations Security Council. Despite the 
veneer of international law, the U.S. actually believes in nothing but ‘might makes 
right’. As a non-signatory of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
the U.S. groundlessly demands that China comply with the Convention. Although 
vowing to protect freedom of navigation from China, the U.S. cannot find one 
example of China blocking international waterways in the South China Sea.”15 This 
opinion shows that the U.S. refusal to participate in the ICJ case in the mid-1980s 
now militates against the U.S.. It is considered another example of reputation cost 
raised by not abiding by the rules of international law.16 As the U.S. did show up 
before the ICJ in the preliminary defense phase, the U.S. attitude toward the ICJ in 
the Nicaragua vs. U.S. case should not be considered the same as China’s attitude 
toward the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the South China Sea dispute, but the 
U.S. has to be aware that its attitude toward the ICJ in the past makes the position 
of the U.S. and other like-minded countries on the 2016 Award of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration less convincing.
The East China Sea Issue
The relationship between Japan and China is improving. Three meetings between 
Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and China’s President Xi Jinping in 2018, 
including the first official visit of Japan’s Prime Minister to China in the past seven 
years, epitomize the shift of the bilateral relation to a course of mutual cooperation. 
It is often said that this improvement is due to the confrontation between China 
and the U.S., but as Japan and China are eternal neighbors, a stable relationship 
should be established, regardless of the state of U.S.-China relations.
The apparent rapprochement notwithstanding, no major security issues 
involving the two countries have been resolved yet. In the Japan-China prime 
ministers’ meeting on October 26, 2018 in Beijing, Prime Minister Abe conveyed 
Japan’s understanding of the East China Sea issue based on the recognition that 
there will be no genuine improvement in the Japan-China relationship without 
stability in the East China Sea. This view was confirmed by Prime Minister Abe 
and President Xi when they met on the margins of the G-20 Summit Meeting in 
Buenos Aires on November 30, 2018. Politically, it is good that on this basis Japan 
and China now agree on the importance of making concrete progress in the area 
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of maritime security. However, no substantial progress has been seen so far, as 
Chinese public vessels’ operations in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands indicate.
As of July 15, 2019, Chinese public vessels had entered the contiguous zone 
around the Senkaku Islands every day for 64 straight days from April 12 to June 
14 and for 30 straight days from June 16 to July 15. More problematically, the 
frequency of Chinese public vessels’ intrusion into the Japanese territorial waters 
around the Islands shows a certain pattern. The statistical data of the past three 
years shows that from November 2016 to July 2017 the frequency of intrusions was 
three per month (except February 2017 when it was two), that from August 2017 to 
August 2018 the number decreased to two (except October 2017 when it was only 
one), that from September to November 2018 the number was one, and that there 
was no intrusion in December 2018. However, there were three intrusions every 
month from January to April 2019, four intrusions in May, two in June, and two 
between July 1 and July 15.17 It is highly possible that the Chinese government has 
been trying to accumulate faits accomplis through these regular intrusions, while 
showing some willingness to improve the overall relationship.
The U.S. Government has made it clear that Article 5 of the Security Treaty 
covers the Senkaku Islands, as per the remarks of President Donald Trump and key 
figures of his administration.18 However, China’s approach seems to be intended to 
achieve its territorial claim by circumventing the U.S. defense commitment.
Repeated intrusion of Chinese public vessels into Japanese waters 
surrounding the Senkaku Islands is not considered to be an exercise of the right of 
innocent passage. It is a violation of Japan’s sovereignty, yet it fails to amount to an 
armed attack against Japan.
In this case, it is obvious that Japan cannot exercise the right of self-defense 
based on Article 51 of the UN Charter. Then, how about the right of self-defense 
in customary international law? According to the ICJ’s decision of 1986 on the 
Nicaragua v. United States case, self-defense is only available against use of 
force that amounts to an armed attack under customary international law as 
well as under Article 51. A use of force of a lesser degree of gravity could justify 
proportionate counter-measures on the part of the victim state, according to the 
decision. It is clear in the decision that collective countermeasures cannot involve 
use of force, but the decision is not clear on whether the victim state itself can use 
force as individual proportionate counter-measures.19
The new NDPG states Japan’s response to “gray zone” situations, 
as follows: “SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies, 
immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate  
Japan’s sovereignty including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters.” 
This is just a general principle to guide the relevant organizations. As the 
essential role of the NDPG is to define the roles of Japan’s military defense 
capability and to establish the goal of defense force development, one cannot 
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expect more specific guiding principles in the NDPG for operational cooperation 
and coordination of the relevant organizations.
Nonetheless, the awareness of the necessity and urgency to address 
maritime gray zone situations is increasing among policy experts in Japan.20  
In addition, American experts have begun to take up this issue as a matter of 
Japan-U.S. Alliance cooperation. According to the CSIS report “More Important 
than Ever,” one of the challenges the alliance faces is that “military competitors 
are narrowing the allies’ military edge. China, in particular, has engaged in rapid 
military modernization and embraced ‘gray zone’ operations, which have reduced 
the gap between it and the United States, forcing the alliance to reassess its ability 
to deter and defeat aggression.”21 Based on this recognition, the report makes  
a recommendation: “the allies should consider involving U.S. forces earlier in  
so-called ‘gray zone’ incidents, which include aggression that occurs below the  
level of major conflict. This step would make clear that any acts of aggression  
would trigger deeper alliance cooperation, regardless of whether they cross the 
threshold of an armed attack under Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. 
Therefore, the allies should engage in more structured combined planning, 
pursuant to relevant legal restrictions.”22
The alliance cooperation does not necessarily have to entail the use of 
force. There are many things that can be done collectively to address “gray zone” 
situations. Japan and the U.S. should work together more extensively to address 
these serious challenges, and communicate strategically with China in international 
legal terms. As the basis for this effort to counter China, Japan and the U.S. should 
exchange candid views on the concept of “proportionate counter-measures.” 
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Introduction
There are few principles more central to the United Nations Charter than 
its prohibition on a state’s use of military force against another state without 
authorization of the Security Council or without the justification of self-defense. 
The UN Charter’s legal prohibition on the routine use of force has been lauded as 
a cornerstone of the post-World War II order.1 Yet, as this essay will suggest, strict 
adherence to that principle in managing the complex relations between China and 
Taiwan will actually encourage the aggressive use of military force by China against 
Taiwan and discourage outside powers such as the United States from intervening 
to prevent such military actions. 
The possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is quite real. In July 2019, 
China’s Ministry of National Defense issued a national defense strategy paper 
reiterating that it was prepared to use military force to prevent Taiwan’s secession 
from China.2
When China then followed up the paper’s release with military naval 
exercises off the northeastern and southwestern coasts of the island, it reinforced 
the view that China remains prepared to use military force against Taiwan to 
prevent formal independence.2
While China has been clear and consistent in its willingness to use military 
force against Taiwan, the attitude of Taiwan’s allies, especially the United States, 
has been less clear. The U.S. government has continued to sell arms to Taiwan to 
help it defend itself and has declared its opposition to coercive reunification of 
China and Taiwan. At the same time, the U.S. has studiously avoided recognizing 
Taiwan as an independent state and carefully sidestepped questions of whether it 
would use military force to support Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. U.S. 
administrations also have never ruled out such a military intervention.3 
Though U.S. analysts and observers have long debated whether the U.S. 
should use force to defend Taiwan in the event of a military invasion by China, few 
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of those analysts have considered the legality of such an action under international 
law.4 To be sure, international law may not be the most important factor shaping 
any decision by U.S. policymakers considering a military intervention over Taiwan. 
As some commentators have noted, the U.S. has been willing to use military force 
on numerous occasions when its legality was questionable.5 But the international 
lawfulness of such an act will, at the very least, shape the attitudes and actions of 
the United States and its allies.
Most scholars that have considered the international legality of defending 
Taiwan have focused on Taiwan’s contested international legal status. As a state 
lacking recognition from most countries in the world, some scholars have argued 
that the Chinese government is correct to treat a China-Taiwan conflict as a 
domestic conflict where foreign military intervention would be an unlawful act of 
aggression.6 Because the statehood question seems paramount, scholars seeking 
to defend the legality of foreign military action on Taiwan’s behalf have sought to 
bolster Taiwan’s claim to international statehood.7 
Because almost no states, including the United States and all of its military 
allies, recognize Taiwan as a nation-state, this road to international legality is likely 
a dead-end in the short term. Unless the U.S. abandons its long-standing approach 
to Taiwan, a U.S. military intervention into a Taiwan conflict is likely to rest on an 
“illegal but legitimate” justification such as that which supported U.S. strikes into 
Kosovo, Libya or Syria.8 
But this very shaky international legal foundation is still insufficient if one 
considers the importance of U.S. military allies in the region. As the host of the 
largest U.S. naval base in the Western Pacific, Japan’s role in any U.S. operation to 
defend Taiwan is likely to be significant. Because Japan’s domestic legal limitations 
on its use of military force are well known, a dispute over the international legality 
of a U.S. intervention in Taiwan could undercut a U.S. military response. The 
credibility of a U.S. defense of Taiwan is seriously weakened if key allies like Japan 
cannot endorse the international legality of U.S. actions. Since neither Japan nor 
the U.S. recognize Taiwan’s international legal status, both governments would 
have to overcome serious international legal obstacles in order to come to Taiwan’s 
aid in an action by China. 
In 2014, the Japanese Cabinet adopted a “reinterpretation” of the Japanese 
Constitution incorporating the concept of “collective self-defense” (CSD). 
While the meaning of CSD was a hotly debated issue within Japan, the broader 
international implications of applying CSD to U.S.-Japanese military cooperation 
has not received sufficient attention.9 Moreover, Japan’s own concept of CSD under 
international law is neither static nor universally shared. The U.S. has long adhered 
to a broader conception of both individual and collective self-defense rights under 
international law. 
This essay explores how the evolving concept of “collective self-defense” 
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affects the international legal basis for both U.S. and Japanese military intervention 
into a Taiwan-China conflict. It concludes that the U.S. and Japan adhere to 
different conceptions of individual and collective self-defense under international 
law. But Taiwan’s closest ally, the United States, cannot muster an effective legal 
theory of either individual self-defense or CSD that would apply to Taiwan, 
even under the capacious version of those legal doctrines followed by the U.S. 
Meanwhile, Japan’s narrow and extra-restrictive visions of individual self-defense 
and CSD also prohibits any theory of Japanese intervention into a Chinese-
Taiwanese military conflict. 
This legal vulnerability reveals a paradox: Taiwan has a strong legal 
incentive to formalize its independence from China in order to bolster its claim 
to the right to seek assistance from foreign states such as the U.S. and Japan. 
But while formalizing Taiwan’s independence would bolster its legal right to seek 
support from outside powers, formalizing Taiwan’s independence is also a likely 
casus belli triggering a Chinese invasion. In this way, the law of jus ad bellum is 
working to make an armed conflict more likely, rather than less. 
In Part I of this short essay, I review the murky international legal status 
of Taiwan as a quasi-independent state unrecognized by most nations and 
international organizations. In Part II, I discuss the international law governing 
the use of force between states and its preservation of a right of both individual 
self-defense and collective self-defense. In Part III, I explain how the existing 
understandings of collective self-defense, especially in Japan, means that both the 
U.S. and Japan would likely have to decide whether to violate international law if 
they acted to use force to defend Taiwan from a Chinese military action. 
Taiwan’s Murky  
International Legal Status 
The curious and contested international legal status of Taiwan has been the 
subject of numerous academic legal studies.10 Almost all of those studies have 
grappled with the difficulty of determining Taiwan’s legal status given its complex 
and disputed history. Although the international legal debate is fascinating and 
important, it is the lack of consensus on Taiwan’s international legal status that 
makes application of international laws on the use of military force so difficult and 
complicated. 
Taiwan began its long official association with the mainland of China in 
the mid-seventeenth century when the remnants of the dying Ming Dynasty in 
China expelled Dutch colonialists during their retreat to Taiwan as a refuge from 
their Qing Dynasty enemies. This Ming Dynasty in exile, however, eventually itself 
succumbed to a Qing invasion and that ruling dynasty, which had assumed control 
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of the rest of what is today understood as China, extended its administrative control 
to Taiwan. The Qing government imposed taxes, regulated the activities of local 
pre-Chinese indigenous groups, and controlled immigration from the mainland. 
During the period of Qing governance, which lasted until 1895, there were frequent 
rebellions against the Qing administration and some historians argue that the Qing 
exercised very little actual control of the island for much of this period. Indeed, the 
Qing government did not designate Taiwan as an official province until 1887, and 
that same government was shortly thereafter forced to cede Taiwan to Japan after 
China’s defeat in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War.11 
Japan occupied and administered Taiwan until 1945 when it relinquished  
all legal claims to sovereignty over Taiwan upon its surrender at the end of World 
War II. The Republic of China (ROC) government then in control of mainland 
China occupied and began exercising sovereignty over Taiwan. This exercise of 
sovereignty continued after the ROC moved its seat of government to Taiwan after 
its own defeat in the Chinese Civil War. It continues to exercise sovereignty over 
Taiwan today. 
Some scholars have noted that the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which 
formally ended the U.S.-Japan conflict in WWII, did not specify that Taiwan was 
part of China. Instead, it merely confirmed that Japan renounced any and all 
claims to Taiwan. On the other hand, in that same treaty, Japan did recognize the 
independence of Korea, whereas it did not recognize Taiwan’s independence.12 
The U.S., which recognized the ROC government as the legitimate 
government of all of China until 1979, has maintained a studied ambiguity on 
the legal status of Taiwan. When the U.S. entered into a mutual defense treaty 
with the ROC, it agreed that the treaty could be triggered by an armed attack on 
the “territories” of the ROC. Moreover, for the purposes of the treaty, the ROC 
“territories” falling within the scope of the defense treaty were defined in Article VI 
as “Taiwan and the Pescadores.” This strongly suggested that the U.S. government 
viewed Taiwan and the Pescadores (which Japan had renounced claims to in 1951) 
as part of the ROC and therefore part of China.13
But the U.S. took a more ambiguous stance when, establishing relations with 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, the U.S. merely “acknowledge[d]” 
that Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that Taiwan is part 
of China. It did not fully commit itself to recognizing Taiwan as part of China 
(although it has not opposed this concept either). Japan also adopted similarly 
ambiguous language about Taiwan when it re-established relations with China  
in 1973.14
In the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. committed itself to maintain 
relations with the “people of Taiwan.”15 It also promised to oppose “coercive action” 
and promised to oppose any non-peaceful reunification of the two sides. But it 
did not in any way refer to Taiwan as a state. Moreover, in recent years, the U.S. 
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government has also repeatedly stated its opposition to a referendum on Taiwanese 
independence. While this does not mean the U.S. has recognized Taiwan is part of 
China, it strongly indicates the U.S. government is opposed to any declaration by 
the government in Taiwan that it is formally independent of China.16
Since 1971, when the ROC was ejected from the “China” seat in the United 
Nations, Taiwan has become increasingly isolated on the international stage. 
Following the 1971 UN ejection and the 1972 U.S-PRC rapprochement, most 
countries recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China and 
ended official diplomatic relations with the ROC. While some countries maintained 
their diplomatic relations, that number has shrunk year by year so that the ROC 
maintains official diplomatic relations today with only 15 states, most of them tiny 
in both land size and population.17
International Law  
and the Use of Force
It is thus fair to say that Taiwan is not a separate nation-state in the eyes of most 
states and international organizations in the world today. This non-state status calls 
into question Taiwan’s ability to invoke the rights and protections of states under 
the United Nations Charter. Most importantly, it calls into question whether the 
UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of military force against another state would 
apply if China invaded Taiwan. 
THE LAW OF JUS AD BELLUM 
Although philosophers and theologians long debated the morality of war, the 
regulation of a state’s use of military force under international law only began 
during the 20th Century. This effort culminated in the adoption of Article 2(4) of 
the United Nations Charter in 1945, which prohibits all member states from the 
“threat or use of force” against the “territorial integrity or political independence”  
of any other state.  
Article 2(4) represents a clear legal prohibition on the “threat or use of force” 
but other sections of the Charter provide explicit exceptions. First, the Charter 
authorizes the Security Council to use force if it determines force is necessary to 
“maintain international peace and security.” Second, Article 51 makes clear that 
nothing in the Charter restricts the “inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.” 
THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE
Because formal UN Security Council authorizations for the use of force are 
rare, most states that have used force since the Charter’s adoption have sought 
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justification in a theory of self-defense. Because the Charter does not define 
self-defense and refers to an “inherent” right, the definition of the terms is not 
provided by the plain language of the Charter. This has led states, scholars, and 
international judicial bodies to offer various formulations to clarify its scope  
and meaning. 
Individual Self Defense
The classic form of self-defense found in traditional pre-Charter customary 
international law concerned the right of an “individual” state to exercise self-
defense. While all scholars agree that such an individual right exists, debates 
have arisen over when such a right might be invoked. In particular, debates have 
centered over what constitutes an “armed attack” that would trigger the right of 
self-defense. For instance, states and scholars have continued to debate whether 
and how a cyber-attack would fall within the meaning of an “armed attack” for 
purposes of Article 51. Debate has also flowed over the U.S.’s assertion of a legal 
right of self-defense to use force against terrorist groups not acting under the 
authority of a particular state. The United States has also sparked criticism and 
debate over its claim that its right to self-defense may also allow the preemptive 
use of force. In other words, the right of self-defense could be triggered even 
before an actual armed attack has occurred if that armed attack is imminent. 
States and scholars considering these issues have generally fallen into the 
“restrictivist” and “extensivist” schools.18 Restrictivists generally interpret the 
right of self-defense narrowly and restrictively. Thus, those in the restrictivist 
school have generally criticized the invocation of self-defense against non-state 
actors, arguing that the right can only be invoked against armed attacks by states. 
They have also sharply criticized the U.S. version of the “preemptive self-defense” 
argument. In both of these situations, restrictivists claim that their narrower 
reading of the Charter’s right of self-defense comports with the Charter’s overall 
stated goal of ending the “scourge of war.”19 While there is some force to their 
arguments, the practice of states has not always conformed to the strict reading 
advocated by restrictivists. Still, it is fair to say that the restrictivist view has 
strong scholarly support and also receives at least rhetorical support from  
many states. 
Collective Self-Defense
While the idea of an “individual” right of self-defense was not controversial at the 
framing of the Charter (even if its meaning has become contested in the decades 
since), the term “collective” self-defense seems to have more recent origins under 
international law. To be sure, states had long formed alliances of joint military 
cooperation and defense, but the term “collective” self-defense had not been widely 
in use until the middle of the twentieth century.20 
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Scholars generally point to World War II era negotiations between the U.S. 
and the states of Central and South America to create joint defense arrangements 
as the immediate pre-cursor to the insertion of “collective self-defense” into the 
UN Charter.21 A month before delegates convened in San Francisco to discuss and 
draft the Charter, a group representing almost all states in the Western Hemisphere 
signed the “Act of Chapultepec” providing pledges to provide mutual support, 
including the use of force, to meet threats or acts of aggression against other 
Western Hemisphere countries. Importantly, the Act of Chapultepec declared that 
an armed attack on one member state would trigger the self-defense rights of other 
states. The initial declaration was codified into the 1948 formal Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, later known as the Rio Treaty.
Historians and scholars have also typically credited U.S. concern with 
maintaining the legality of arrangements like the Rio Treaty for the pressure 
exerted on the Charter’s drafters to include a specific insertion of the language 
exempting “collective” self-defense from the Charter’s prohibition on the use of 
force.22 The original concern related to legalizing regional arrangements like the 
pending Rio Treaty, but the Charter’s final version endorsed a broad collective self-
defense right untethered to regional treaties or rights to regional self-defense. This 
broadened the collective self-defense right to any two states, whether or not they 
had a prior treaty for self-defense and whether or not they were nations concerned 
with regional security.23 
Thus, the only predicate for invoking the right of collective self-defense is 
the consent of the state that has sought assistance. Although some have argued that 
the assisting state must have some substantive interests affected by the attacking 
state’s actions, the majority view is that “[a]ny assisting state may act out of general 
interest in preserving international peace and security, and can do so without a 
formal treaty as long as the target state consents.”24 
The International Court of Justice explored the right of collective self-
defense under international law in the well-known decision involving challenges to 
U.S. support for rebel groups in Nicaragua. The U.S. had argued its activities could 
be justified under the doctrine of collective self-defense since its actions were taken 
in order to support the self-defense rights of Nicaragua’s neighbor El Salvador.25 
The ICJ recognized that the right of collective self-defense did indeed exist prior to 
the Charter and it further held that these principles were embedded in customary 
international law.26 
The ICJ outlined its view as to the legal requirements for a state to invoke 
CSD. First, it held that the target state that is seeking assistance must be able to 
legitimately invoke its own right of individual self-defense in order to legalize 
the assisting state’s use of force. There seems little disagreement among states 
or scholars on this point, or on the ICJ finding that the rules of necessity and 
proportionality governing the use of force under customary international law also 
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govern the use of force when used in self-defense. Additionally, the Charter requires 
a state invoking the right of CSD or individual self-defense to make a report to the 
UN Security Council.
But not all of the ICJ’s criteria for the invocation of CSD have been accepted 
uncritically.
For instance, the ICJ went so far as to require that the target state “will 
have declared itself to be the victim of an armed attack.”27 Other states, such 
as the United States, have accepted that the target state must have suffered an 
armed attack but have not accepted a “declaration” requirement. Indeed, the basis 
under customary law for the ICJ’s declaration requirement is uncertain. Recent 
scholarship surveying traditional sources of customary law, including state practice, 
has found support for the idea that a target state must make a formal request for 
assistance, but no evidence of a declaration-of-armed-attack requirement.28
This disagreement matters because the Nicaragua court relied heavily on the 
lack of a timely “armed attack” declaration by El Salvador, Honduras, or Costa Rica 
to conclude the U.S. had no right to exercise its own right of collective self-defense 
on those countries’ behalf. Although the ICJ accepted for the record evidence 
showing Nicaragua had supplied arms to rebels in those countries, the fact that 
none of those countries had declared that those supplies constituted an “armed 
attack” weighed heavily in the ICJ’s ultimate decision to find that no such armed 
attack triggering the right of self-defense had occurred. 
Critics have also taken issue with the Nicaragua court’s assessment that 
the supply of weapons by Nicaragua to rebel groups in neighboring countries did 
not reach the level of “gravity” necessary to satisfy the definition of armed attack 
in Article 51.29 This “gravity” requirement, critics have argued, also has no clear or 
obvious basis either in customary law or in the drafting of the Charter’s provisions 
on self-defense.30 
The U.S. refused to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Nicaragua 
case. It has never publicly accepted either the “declaration of an armed attack” or 
“gravity” requirements. But in other public statements, it does seem to accept that 
the CSD right can only be engaged with the consent of “a State that can legitimately 
invoke its own right of national self-defense.”31 In the view of the U.S., however, 
no explicit request is required much less a declaration of armed attack. It is worth 
noting, however, that other states, including close allies such as Japan, seem to have 
embraced the Nicaragua opinion’s definition of collective self-defense without the 
same reservations and limitations. 
The U.S. also has shown signs that it may consider invoking the right of 
collective self-defense on behalf of armed groups that do not constitute states under 
the UN Charter. Although there has been no official U.S. government statement 
on this question, the U.S. seemed to endorse this possibility in its actions in Syria 
during its ongoing war against the non-state group ISIS. In justifying its attack 
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against ISIS entities in Syria, the U.S. suggested it was acting on behalf of its anti-
ISIS allies in Syria that were also combatants in the Syrian civil war.32 There seems 
no textual or historical support for this legal argument, but it appears to have been 
invoked as a secondary argument in the U.S.-ISIS action, along with the U.S.’s 
own claim that it could invoke its individual right of self-defense against non-state 
groups like ISIS.
Conclusion
In sum, the right of CSD is well settled as part of customary international law 
recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter. The conditions for its invocation, 
however, depend on the target state’s own right of individual self-defense. The 
ICJ has endorsed further requirements for the exercise of CSD such as a formal 
declaration by a state suffering an armed attack and a formal request for assistance 
from a third state. Although there have been hints that the U.S. might seek to 
expand CSD to non-state actors, its official statements thus far have limited such 
CSD rights to the protection of other states, whether or not those states have made 
an explicit request for assistance or a formal declaration that they have suffered an 
armed attack. 
Collective Self-Defense  
and Taiwan
TAIWAN’S CONTESTED RIGHT OF INHERENT SELF-DEFENSE
As discussed above, Taiwan’s murky international legal status has denied it 
recognition as a state by most nations in the world as well as membership in the 
United Nations. As a non-state, non-member, Taiwan seems to lack the protection 
of Article 2(4) of the Charter. That provision prohibits the “threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” In this view, 
a Chinese military action against Taiwan would simply not fall within the purview 
of Article 2(4). Moreover, Taiwan would also presumably lack the “inherent right of 
self-defense” because Article 51 seems only to apply when an “armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations.” Taiwan has also repeatedly been denied 
the right to join the United Nations since it was ejected in 1971. 
China also has invoked the customary international law right against 
interference in its domestic affairs to justify its freedom to handle Taiwan as 
it pleases. In China’s view, this principle obligates other states to refrain from 
interfering to support a secessionist or independence movement in Taiwan. 
In this way, China is able to muster a plausible international legal argument 
that any outside support for Taiwan’s secession, especially military assistance, 
would violate international law. Taiwan’s lack of statehood and membership in the 
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United Nations combined with the widely accepted principle of non-interference 
would call into serious question the legality of any U.S. military intervention in 
a Taiwan military crisis. As I have argued elsewhere, the U.S. has a difficult and 
potentially impossible legal problem to justify a military intervention in favor of 
Taiwan against China.33 This does not mean the U.S. should not intervene to defend 
Taiwan, but it does mean the U.S will have to address and face the substantial legal 
obstacles facing such an intervention.34 
CSD AND THE UNITED STATES
As noted earlier, the U.S. appears to have been instrumental in ensuring the 
concept of CSD was incorporated into the United Nations Charter. Since that 
time, the United States placed itself at the center of the most expansive set of 
CSD treaty obligations in the world. The U.S. has by treaty entered into CSD 
relationships with NATO, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, 
Thailand, and most of the countries in South and Central America.35 It has also 
invoked CSD in a variety of circumstances to justify its use of military force. Most 
famously, the U.S. argued that CSD for Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador 
legally justified its support for military activities against the government of 
Nicaragua during the 1980s.36 
The U.S. CSD treaty with Taiwan ended in 1979 when it terminated that 
treaty and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. 
But it continues to maintain CSD treaty obligations with two of Taiwan’s closest 
geographic neighbors: Japan and the Philippines.
Under the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,37 the U.S. and the 
Philippines both have promised to treat an armed attack in the Pacific on either of 
its territories or either of its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific as 
“dangerous to its own peace and safety.” Both have also pledged that in the event of 
an armed attack, the other country would act to “meet the common danger.” In the 
past year, the U.S. has clarified that the scope of this defense guarantee extends to 
the Philippines’ activities in the South China Sea. This clarification was sought by 
the Philippines due to the ongoing territorial disputes and tensions with China over 
the land features and maritime rights in that region. 
The U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty imposes reciprocal obligations. 
Thus, it is conceivable that the treaty’s CSD obligations on the Philippines would 
be triggered by an attack on U.S. naval vessels or aircraft operating around 
Taiwan. As Taiwan and the waters around it would certainly constitute part of the 
“Pacific Area,” a Chinese-U.S. conflict in those waters would in theory obligate the 
Philippines to provide support under its own CSD obligations to the U.S.38
In addition to its conventional support for the principle of CSD through 
treaty obligations, the U.S. government has sometimes returned to its broader 
conception of CSD that it endorsed in the 1980s during its actions in Central 
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America. In 2014, the U.S., together with an international coalition, launched 
an attack on the self-declared Islamic State which had taken over large areas 
of Iraq and Syria. While Iraq had satisfied the traditional requirements of CSD 
by declaring itself under an armed attack and requesting international military 
assistance from the United States, Syria had not. Indeed, Syria’s government 
pointedly refused to give permission for U.S. military action on its territory directed 
toward Islamic State forces. Nonetheless, the U.S. sent both air and ground forces 
into Syrian territory. It justified those actions both on a theory of “individual self-
defense” against the Islamic State terrorist group but also on a theory of “collective 
self-defense” triggered by the threats the Islamic State posed to Iraq from its bases 
in Syrian territory.39
This broader invocation of CSD recalls the U.S. claims in the Nicaragua case 
that it had a CSD right to engage in military actions in Nicaragua’s territory due to 
the threat Nicaragua’s government posed to El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras 
through Nicaragua’s support of rebels in those latter three countries. Although 
ultimately rejected by the ICJ as discussed above, the U.S. has never accepted the 
ICJ’s definition of CSD or the requirements it imposed on CSD in the Nicaragua 
decision. It is likely that the U.S. government continues to adhere to this more 
expansive conception of CSD today. In such circumstances, the U.S. might treat 
the existence of hostile or dangerous military forces in a neighboring territory as 
triggering its CSD rights to act against that force inside such territory. In Nicaragua, 
the U.S. argued it could use force in Nicaragua to protect El Salvador, Costa Rica and 
Honduras from covert military aid to rebels emanating from Nicaragua. In Syria, the 
U.S. suggested it could use military force to suppress or eliminate threats to Iraq’s 
territory irrespective of the gravity of the threat against Iraq. 
This expansive legal conception of CSD has not been officially endorsed 
by the U.S. government in an authoritative statement. It seems likely that this 
conception is not shared by other nations, and it seems to fly in the face of the 
ICJ’s decision in Nicaragua. But the U.S. has not expressly disclaimed this broader 
conception of CSD and its actions in Syria tend to affirm it as well. 
CSD AND JAPAN
CSD is also an important principle for Japan. Indeed, Japan also has committed 
itself to one robust mechanism of collective self-defense in the form of its 
security treaty with the United States.40 Under that treaty, the United States has 
pledged to treat an armed attack in the territories “under the administration of 
Japan” as a danger to its own peace and security. In essence, the U.S. seems to 
have promised to provide Japan with assistance, including military assistance, 
in the case of an armed attack against Japan. Indeed, the U.S. pledge could be 
interpreted as broader than whatever Japan’s right of self-defense encompasses 
under the UN Charter since the defense guarantee encompasses “territories under 
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the administration of Japan” even if Japan’s sovereignty over those territories is 
disputed. Some of those territories, especially the Senkaku Islands, are also claimed 
by China and Taiwan. 
Moreover, unlike the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, Japan does 
not have fully reciprocal obligations with the United States. The CSD obligation 
found in Article 5 of the Security Treaty is triggered only by an “armed attack 
on either Party on the territories under the administration of Japan.” Unlike the 
Philippines’ CSD obligation to all U.S. forces in the “Pacific Area,” Japan has no 
CSD obligation under the treaty if U.S. forces suffer an armed attack outside the 
“territories under the administration of Japan”. 
This curious imbalance in CSD obligations is almost certainly a reflection 
of Japan’s domestic constitutional law constraints on the use of military force. 
After its defeat in World War II, Japan adopted a new constitution which contains, 
in Article 9, a renunciation of “war as a sovereign right” and “the threat or use of 
force to settle international disputes.”41 This provision has been interpreted by the 
Japanese government to limit Japan’s ability to use military force to the self-defense 
of its own territories and to prohibit Japan’s involvement in any type of military 
conflict outside of Japan’s territories.42 Japan thus has never sent military forces 
overseas to directly support U.S. military action other than rear-area assistance not 
involving the use of force (unlike other U.S. CSD treaty partners like Taiwan, Korea, 
Australia, and the Philippines). Not only does Japan lack any broad CSD obligation 
under its treaty with the U.S., but such actions have also been interpreted by 
scholars to violate Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.43
To be sure, Japan has interpreted Article 9’s renunciation of war to allow 
for what would be considered individual self-defense under international law. 
This justified Japan’s maintenance of robust “self-defense” forces in land, air and 
sea despite the constitutional prohibition on maintaining a military.44 In 2014, 
the Japanese Cabinet adopted a controversial “interpretation” of Article 9 that 
allowed Japan’s military to invoke the international law right of CSD. Under this 
2014 interpretation, Japan can use military force to support another country under 
armed attack consistent with Article 9 if three conditions are met: 
•  The attack on that country poses a clear danger to Japan’s survival or could 
fundamentally overturn Japanese citizens’ constitutional rights to life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness
•  There is no other way of repelling the attack and protecting Japan and its 
citizens
• The use of force is limited to the minimum necessary45
It should be noted that this interpretation limits Japan’s actions much more than 
the international law of CSD would require. Under international law, Japan could 
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use military force as long as another state suffered an armed attack of sufficient 
gravity and requested assistance. But Japan’s Article 9 interpretation limits any 
Japanese use of force to situations where Japan’s “survival” or the “constitutional 
rights” of its citizens are under “clear danger.” It further requires a determination 
that using force is a last resort to protect Japan and its citizens.
Nonetheless, the 2014 interpretation does make clear that the right of CSD 
can be invoked consistent with Article 9, albeit in a much narrower form. Prior to 
2014, it was not entirely clear CSD could be invoked at all by Japan to use force in a 
manner distinct from its own rights of individual self-defense. In other words, Article 
9 had always been interpreted to allow Japanese forces to defend Japanese territories 
against armed attack.46 The 2014 interpretation expands the right of Japanese forces 
to support foreign forces under armed attack if attack on those foreign forces posed 
severe threats to Japan’s survival or its people’s constitutional rights.
The 2014 interpretation was widely understood to be aimed at clarifying 
that Japan’s military cooperation was not strictly limited to operations in the 
territory of Japan.47 Japanese government guidance on the new interpretation 
suggests that Japan’s forces could act in a “situation in which a clear danger 
of the occurrence of armed attack is imminent” or a “tense situation in which 
armed attack [on Japan] is anticipated.”48 If, for instance, an attack on U.S. forces 
outside of Japan’s territories posed a clear danger to Japan’s survival, Japan’s 
military could take action to support those forces. An attack on U.S. naval forces 
operating in international waters near Japan might qualify for Japanese support 
if those forces were conducting actions necessary for the military defense of 
Japan. Even an attack on U.S. or South Korean forces in South Korea might 
qualify depending the scale of that attack and the nature of the threat that attack 
might pose to Japan. There is no clear geographic limitation on Japan’s collective 
self-defense rights under this interpretation. For instance, a threat to Japanese oil 
supplies from the Persian Gulf could, in theory, trigger Japan’s CSD rights under 
the 2014 interpretation. 
SUMMARY
Although CSD is a principle well grounded in customary international law and 
the United Nations Charter, it plays a very different role for Taiwan, the U.S. and 
Japan. Taiwan, under any classical definition of CSD, cannot avail itself of its legal 
rights or protections since it is neither a widely recognized state nor a member of 
the United Nations. The U.S. is probably the world’s most ardent and aggressive 
exponent of the CSD as a principle of international law. But the U.S. has seen its 
interpretation of CSD rejected by the ICJ and it has struggled to gain acceptance 
for its more expansive conception of this legal principle. Meanwhile, Japan not only 
adheres to the ICJ’s more restrictive conception of CSD, but it has also bound itself 
under its domestic constitution to an even more restrictive definition of CSD than 
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what would be permitted under international law. As the next section will point 
out, the practical result of this analysis is that CSD only operates to inhibit military 
support for Taiwan against a very real and credible threat of aggressive Chinese 
military action. 
CSD’s Impact on an Armed Attack 
on Taiwan by the Chinese People’s  
Liberation Army
While the People’s Republic of China regime has achieved near universal diplomatic 
recognition as the sole legal government of China, key states such as the United States 
and Japan have maintained ambiguity about their views on China’s claim that it has 
sovereignty over Taiwan. This contested legal status has also raised difficult questions 
about the international legality of any Chinese use of force to conquer Taiwan.
THE PROSPECT OF A MILITARY ATTACK BY CHINA AGAINST TAIWAN
The prospect of China’s use of force has always lurked in the background of  
cross-strait relations. China has pointedly never renounced its right to “re-unify” 
China using all means, including military force. Indeed, it legalized this right  
in 2005 when its legislature enacted the Anti-Secession Law.49 That law set forth 
China’s overall policy of seeking peaceful reunification through negotiations  
and consultations. But it also stated in Article 8 that the government “shall 
employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity” should Taiwan’s secession occur or other 
possibilities for peaceful reunification are exhausted. The refusal to take the 
use of force off the table was reiterated publicly as recently as January 2019 
when China’s leader Xi Jinping opened the New Year with a speech noting the 
importance of Taiwan and adding a clear warning.50 After noting that Taiwan 
“must and will” be reunified with China, he added that “[w]e do not promise to 
renounce the use of force.”51
The Chinese government has reinforced these threats by conducting military 
exercises in the seas near Taiwan as well as sending military jets to encircle the 
island’s airspace. As the U.S. Defense Department has noted, China has maintained 
and improved its military capacity to use force to harm, invade, and occupy 
Taiwan.52 At the same time, Taiwan’s military capabilities are not believed to have 
kept pace, thus shifting the military balance of power further toward China. 
The scenarios for the use of force against Taiwan range from long-range 
missile attacks of the kind demonstrated during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis to a 
naval blockade to outright invasion and occupation. While military experts have 
debated whether and how Taiwan’s military might resist such Chinese military 
actions, there are few military experts who think Taiwan would prevail in a long-
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term military conflict with China without substantial military assistance from other 
nations. The United States, which had previously offered a defense guarantee for 
Taiwan prior to its 1979 decision to recognize the PRC, has continued to pledge 
support for Taiwan and to oppose a coercive reunification. But it no longer offers a 
formal legal pledge to come to Taiwan’s defense if it suffers an armed attack, as it had 
done during the postwar period when the U.S. and Taiwan were parties to a mutual 
defense treaty. The outsized importance of the United States in any military conflict 
between China and Taiwan spotlights the importance of assessing the legal basis for 
such an intervention. The weak legality of such an outside intervention, for instance, 
could reduce the credibility of perceived U.S. support for Taiwan against China. 
THE U.S., CSD, AND TAIWAN
As discussed earlier, the U.S. terminated its formal mutual defense treaty with 
Taiwan in 1979. It replaced this international law framework with a much more 
ambiguous set of commitments under domestic legislation called the Taiwan 
Relations Act. Under that 1979 law, the U.S. government has declared that it 
opposes any unification between China and Taiwan “by other than peaceful means.” 
It also commits the United States to provide Taiwan with “arms of a defensive 
character” while also maintaining the “capacity of the United States to resist any 
resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the 
social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” 
In some ways, the U.S. legal commitment to Taiwan is deeper than its 
standard CSD treaty commitments. In those treaties, the U.S. typically promises 
to act in response to an “armed attack.” But in the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. 
policy is to oppose all forms of coercion and to provide defensive arms. On the 
other hand, unlike in its CSD treaties, the Taiwan Relations Act does not commit 
the U.S. government to act beyond continuing to sell defensive weapons. In a 
situation where there is “any threat to the security or the social or economic system 
of the people on Taiwan,” the President is directed to inform Congress and the two 
branches will decide together the appropriate response. 
This ambiguity as to the depth of U.S. commitment to the military support 
of Taiwan may also be affected by Taiwan’s uncertain international legal status. 
Under U.S. government definitions of CSD, the right to act under international 
law pursuant to CSD is triggered by an armed attack on another state. The U.S. 
government does not currently recognize Taiwan as a state so it cannot invoke CSD 
in such a circumstance based merely upon an armed attack on Taiwan. 
JAPAN, CSD, AND TAIWAN
As a fully-fledged member of the United Nations, Japan could invoke its individual 
right of self-defense. But could it claim that right arising out of a Chinese invasion 
of Taiwan? If it could legitimately do so, then the United States could invoke the 
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collective self-defense right to intervene in Taiwan on Japan’s behalf. 
It is clear that the text of Article 51 requires a member state to suffer an 
“armed attack” in order to invoke its right of self-defense. Yet it is less than clear 
that a state must suffer such an armed attack on its own territory in order to invoke 
its right of self-defense and its right to request assistance. In 2014, the Government 
of Iraq sought assistance from the United Nations and other countries to repel 
attacks by the Islamic State, a non-state actor operating on its own territory but 
also in Syria. Iraq specifically sought assistance for the United States to launch 
attacks on Islamic State groups operating inside of Syria.53 This request for 
assistance by Iraq served as one of the legal bases for the United States to justify  
its actions in Syria on the basis of collective self-defense. 
In the Iraq-Islamic State scenario, Iraq had suffered armed attacks inside its 
own territory. But it also claimed that the Islamic State’s existence across the border 
in Syria also constituted a threat to Iraq. Japan could, in theory, claim an attack 
on Taiwan constitutes an armed attack on itself or would trigger its own rights of 
individual self-defense. 
Although the main Japanese islands are nearly a thousand miles from 
Taiwan, Japan administers or has sovereignty over various island territories quite 
close to Taiwan’s northern coasts. Indeed, Japan’s westernmost inhabited island, 
Yonaguni Island, lies merely 67 miles from Taiwan’s east coast. Not only does the 
U.S. maintain a robust CSD treaty relationship with Japan, but it also has two of 
its largest military facilities in the region located in Japan’s Okinawa Island. U.S. 
bases on Okinawa are the geographically closest U.S. military facilities to Taiwan 
at barely 400 miles off Taiwan’s eastern coast. Japan claims sovereignty over the 
Senkaku Islands, which China also claims and which are also within 100 miles  
of Taiwan. 
A Chinese attack on Taiwan could arguably trigger Japan’s individual self-
defense rights in at least two ways. A Chinese occupation of Taiwan would place 
China astride one of the main air and sea routes for shipping between the Persian 
Gulf and Japan. Second, Japan’s territorial sovereignty over islands close to Taiwan 
would be endangered by China’s occupation of Taiwan. In particular, China’s 
domination of Taiwan would place even more pressure on Japan’s control of the 
disputed Senkaku Islands.
To make this argument work, the U.S. and Japan would have to seek acceptance 
for the very broad conception of CSD that the U.S. advanced in Iraq in 2014 and in 
Central America during the 1980s. This makes Japan and its response to a possible 
Chinese invasion of Taiwan a crucial factor in the outcome of any such conflict. 
There is an obvious objection to this rather aggressive approach to CSD.
As discussed above, Japan’s definition of individual and collective self-
defense is narrower than what could be permitted under international law. Japan’s 
definition of individual self-defense is traditionally limited to armed attacks on its 
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territory. Under the new interpretation of the Japanese Constitution, a Chinese 
attack on Taiwan would have to endanger Japan’s survival or the constitutional 
rights of its people for Japan to allow a Japanese invocation of a right of collective 
self-defense. But since Japan, like the United States, limits the right of CSD to 
support other states suffering armed attacks, it would not be able to apply this 
principle toward non-state Taiwan. 
Moreover, under the ICJ’s definition of CSD, Japan would have to publicly 
declare itself under an armed attack and publicly request assistance from the 
United States. Japan, and not the United States, would hold the key to determining 
whether or not U.S. forces could invoke CSD for Japan and Taiwan. Thus, while 
the U.S. has at times endorsed an expansive notion of self-defense and CSD under 
international law, it is Japan’s own views on these international law concepts 
that would govern. Unless Japan adopted a more expansive conception of the 
international law of self-defense to treat an assault on Taiwan as a threat to itself, 
and an expansive conception of CSD endorsed by the United States, it is unlikely 
that Japan could serve as a vehicle to legalize a U.S. military intervention on 
Taiwan’s behalf. 
Conclusion
The interpretation of the law of jus ad bellum remains hotly contested between 
states and commentators arguing for a “restrictivist” narrow approach and those 
that have endorsed a more “extensivist” conception. This divide exists both in the 
interpretation of individual and collective self-defense. Extensivists have argued for 
a broad right of individual right of self-defense that might include anticipatory self-
defense against both states and non-state actors. Extensivists have also argued for 
a right of CSD upon an armed attack even if that attack does not have the gravity 
required by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. 
No country has been more extensivist in its approach to both individual self-
defense and CSD than the United States. The U.S. has more CSD treaty obligations 
than any other single country in the world, and no country has invoked this 
principle to justify its use of military force more than the United States. It has most 
recently invoked this principle in the Middle East, at least in part, to justify its use 
of force in Syria. 
Yet even the United States would be hard-pressed to legally justify an 
intervention to defend Taiwan against a Chinese military assault. Even the United 
States has clearly limited its understanding of its CSD rights to other states. Taiwan 
is not, in the view of the United States, a sovereign state. It would not, therefore, be 
entitled to invoke CSD on behalf of Taiwan.
On the flip side, no country is more firmly in the restrictivist camp than 
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Japan. Japan’s domestic law definition of individual self-defense is arguably more 
restrictive than that permitted by international law. Japan has never endorsed the 
broad U.S. views of individual self-defense that would allow anticipatory action or 
self-defense against non-state actors. Japan has also endorsed a strict definition 
of CSD that would limit its rights beyond that imposed by even restrictivist 
interpretations of international law.
Japan’s position in the restrictivist camp severely restricts the options that 
could legally justify a U.S. military defense of Taiwan. If Japan altered its approach 
to move closer to the extensivist views of the United States, it might offer a path 
to legalize a U.S. defense of Taiwan. But in its current legal worldview, Japan can 
neither provide a legal basis for U.S. intervention through its own international 
legal rights nor fully support a questionably lawful U.S. intervention. 
There is a larger conclusion from this survey of CSD and the law of jus 
ad bellum. Taiwan’s lack of international legal status as a state creates a real 
vulnerability. China feels unconstrained by this law because it does not consider 
Taiwan a state. The U.S. and Japan cannot invoke CSD to defend Taiwan because 
neither country considers Taiwan a state. While the law of jus ad bellum may 
operate to constrain the use of armed force by states, paradoxically, its limitations 
could actually encourage the use of force in the contested Taiwan Strait. Even 
more paradoxically, Taiwan’s legal vulnerability as a non-state without any right to 
seek foreign assistance against a military invasion suggests Taiwan should declare 
formal independence. But formal independence is exactly one of the actions that 
would be most likely to trigger China’s resort to military force.
The law of jus ad bellum is ultimately designed to deter the use of military 
force, including by preserving the right of nations to deter the use of force through 
collective self-defense arrangements. In the strange and unusual context of 
Taiwan’s military confrontation with China, the law of jus ad bellum works against 
this overarching goal in surprising and potentially tragic ways. While international 
law does not necessarily control the decisions of policymakers, the Taiwan case 
study suggests that ignoring the international law of jus ad bellum is sometimes a 
better choice than adhering to it. 
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Introduction
The use of military power is a controversial issue in Japan, primarily because 
of the “war renunciation clause” of the Japanese Constitution. Article 9 of the 
Constitution imposes restrictions on the extent to which the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces (SDF) can operate overseas.1 The issue of Japan’s use of armed force raised 
a public furor in 2015 when the new security bills were introduced as an attempt, 
ostensibly, to authorize the SDF to act in “collective” self-defense as a means to 
strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance.2 Despite the public outcry, the new security 
legislation was enacted on September 30, 2015 and came into force on March 29, 
2016. The new legislation aimed to enable Japan to take a “seamless response” 
to any international security situation that might arise.3 In accordance with the 
“proactive contribution to peace” policy adopted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
the 2015 security legislation has achieved an overhaul of the Japanese security law 
regime that had, over time, developed as a patchwork of technical amendments and 
special legislation. Nevertheless, the security law of Japan still contains many legal 
gaps and uncertainties that prevent Japan from harnessing the full potential of the 
re-interpretation of Article 9 in the contemporary security environment.4
Since the entry into force of Japan’s new security legislation, tensions in 
Northeast Asia have significantly increased as the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (North Korea) conducted aggressive missile and nuclear tests in 2017, while 
the U.S. President Donald Trump continued to post provocative messages alluding 
to the possibility of resorting to military action. Any eruption of hostilities on the 
Korean Peninsula—whether it be a small-scale “bloody nose” attack or full-blown 
warfare—will test Japan’s legal readiness under its overhauled security law regime, 
as well as its defense capabilities and the robustness of its emergency planning. 
This paper examines how the U.S.-Japan alliance operates within the legal 
framework for the use of force in terms of both international law and Japanese 
security law, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. 
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After providing a brief review of the legal and political developments relevant to 
tensions on the Korean Peninsula, this paper outlines the legal framework for the 
use of force by the SDF. It then critically examines Japan’s legal readiness to engage 
in combined security operations with U.S. forces, non-combatant evacuation 
operations, and maritime security operations in the event of hostilities on the 
Peninsula. 
Legal and Political Developments  
relating to Security Tensions  
on the Korean Peninsula
Security tensions on the Korean Peninsula have primarily evolved around two 
inter-related military concerns: (i) the development of North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons; and (ii) North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities. North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program has been an international concern since the country’s 
announcement of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons in 1993.5 Given the potential of ballistic missile systems to 
deliver nuclear, chemical or biological payloads,6 the level of global concern has 
increased considerably since July 2006 when North Korea began engaging in 
multiple ballistic missile launches. 
Condemning the nuclear test conducted on October 9, 2006 as “a clear 
threat to international peace and security”, the UN Security Council demanded 
that North Korea suspend and abandon all activities related to its ballistic 
missile program and all nuclear weapons programs in a complete, verifiable and 
irreversible manner,7 imposing sanctions in relation to specific items.8 On June 
12, 2009, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 calling upon all states 
to inspect vessels on the high seas, with the consent of the flag state, in the event 
that vessels are suspected of violating the obligations imposed under the sanctions 
regime.9 A series of UN Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements 
have subsequently been issued each time North Korea conducted a nuclear test or 
a ballistic missile launch, reaffirming the obligations imposed upon North Korea in 
the previous resolutions and occasionally reinforcing the sanctions regime that has 
been built against it.10 
The cause of tensions on the Korean Peninsula is not limited to armament 
issues alone. The hostile relationship between North Korea, the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea) and Japan continues to pose a threat to the region. On May 
27, 2009, North Korea announced that it would no longer be bound by the 1953 
Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War. Even though the announcement 
was not considered sufficient to give rise to a resumption of an armed conflict,11 
it heralded a period of renewed hostilities. North Korea allegedly launched an 
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attack on March 26, 2010 which led to the sinking of the South Korean Navy 
vessel Cheonan with the tragic loss of 46 lives.12 In November 2010, the island 
of Yeonpyeong near the disputed maritime border was bombarded, leaving two 
civilians and two soldiers dead. In August 2015, South Korea accused North Korea 
of planting land mines that injured two South Korean soldiers, which triggered an 
exchange of artillery fire in the demilitarized zone. 
In addition, the humanitarian crisis facing North Korea has been a 
growing concern, with chronic malnutrition and systematic, widespread and grave 
violations of human rights drawing the attention of the international community.13 
The crisis presents a precarious situation for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
because of the possible mass influx of refugees across the border into the PRC 
in the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. For Japan, the repatriation 
of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea remains an important political 
consideration. 
Tensions escalated rapidly in 2017 when North Korea was reported to have 
been edging close to acquiring the capability to launch a nuclear attack against 
the U.S. and President Trump threatened to unleash “fire and fury” against North 
Korea. The crisis was defused when North Korea made a historic commitment 
in 2018 to work towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.14 
However, the situation remains precarious due to the sluggish and difficult process 
of political negotiations, with the persistent risk that a breakdown in negotiations 
could potentially lead to military confrontation.
The Legal Framework for the  
Use of Force by the Self-Defense Forces
The operation of the SDF is subject to constraints under international law as 
well as Japanese domestic law, in particular under Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution. The use of force or threat of force is prohibited under international 
law,15 which is reflected in Article 9(1) of the Constitution. There are two exceptions 
to this principle under international law: (i) the authorization of the use of force 
by the United Nations; and (ii) the exercise of the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense. 
While the Japanese Constitution does not explicitly recognize these 
exceptions, the “war-renunciation” clause must be interpreted in light of the 
applicable rules of international law, including the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States,16 as prescribed 
under Article 98(2) of the Constitution.17 This means that notwithstanding the 
constitutional commitment not to maintain land, sea, and air forces, or other war 
potential under Article 9(2) of the Constitution, the clause must be read to allow 
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the SDF to engage in the use of force under United Nations authorization or in 
the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, so long 
as such force is limited to the minimum extent necessary to implement the UN 
mandate or to repel armed attacks. In other words, Article 9 of the Constitution 
does not entirely deprive Japan of justifications for the use of force available under 
international law, but rather limits the way in which, and the extent to which, the 
nation may engage in the use of force. 
Under Japanese domestic law, the legislative bases for resorting to the use 
of armed force are restricted due to Article 9 of the Constitution. The primary 
legislative basis for resorting to the use of armed force is codified in Article 76 of 
the Law concerning the Self-Defense Forces (SDF Law),18 which authorizes the 
prime minister to direct deployment of SDF units in the event of an armed attack 
against Japan (i.e., an exercise of national defense power). Amendments introduced 
by the 2015 security legislation have expanded the scope of Japan’s national defense 
power in cases where an armed attack occurs against a country that has a close 
relationship with Japan and, as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear 
danger that fundamentally undermines the lives and freedoms of its nationals and 
their right to pursue happiness (i.e., when there is an existential threat to Japan).19 
In exercising the national defense power, the prime minister may authorize 
the SDF to use armed force to the extent necessary to defend the nation in 
accordance with Article 88 of the SDF Law.20 The Defense Against an Armed 
Attack Law establishes procedural requirements that must be met in order for the 
prime minister to exercise this national defense power.21
The official Japanese government position that has traditionally been 
adopted is that an overseas deployment of SDF units for the purposes of the use of 
force in a foreign territory, its territorial sea or the airspace above it, is prohibited 
under the Constitution.22 This is because such action generally goes beyond the 
minimum level of force necessary for self-defense.23 Prime Minister Abe reaffirmed 
this official position at the Budget Committee of the House of Counsellors on 
August 24, 2015, stating that the SDF’s participation in combat operations in a 
foreign territory would amount to an overseas deployment prohibited under the 
Constitution.24 This excludes the SDF’s participation in the theater of combat in 
and around the Korean Peninsula in the exercise of the right of self-defense when 
hostilities have erupted.
This does not mean, however, that Japan is constitutionally prohibited from 
defending or assisting U.S. forces in the exercise of the right of collective self-
defense. Upon the adoption of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 the official 
position of the Japanese government was essentially that Japan had the right of 
collective self-defense, but its exercise involving the use of force to defend other 
countries on foreign soil would exceed the minimum level of force necessary for 
self-defense.25 In other words, Article 9 of the Constitution does not necessarily 
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prohibit Japan from exercising the right of self-defense as the legal basis for 
justifying SDF action in and around Japan to defend the U.S. and its interests when 
an armed attack occurs against the latter. The minimum level of force required 
for self-defense is not a static concept, but evolves over time as the geopolitical 
climate and technological capabilities change. In situations where the defense 
system of two nations is integrated to the extent that the survival of either nation 
is interdependent on the other’s defense capabilities, it naturally follows that the 
line between individual and collective self-defense becomes blurred. Thus, the 2015 
security legislation aimed to clarify that the SDF is not precluded from engaging in 
the use of force to defend and assist U.S. forces, including on the high seas—which 
are outside the jurisdiction of any foreign state. 
Also, in cases where UN Command is engaged with a resumption of 
hostilities on the Korean Peninsula,26 the Constitutional restriction does not 
prevent Japan from authorizing the deployment of the SDF. Japan indeed enacted 
special legislation to provide support activities in the Indian Ocean for military 
operations in Afghanistan and to engage in humanitarian and reconstruction 
support activities in Iraq.27 
Prior to making such a decision, however, questions might arise as to 
whether the U.S. assets in Japan can be deployed without prior consultation with 
Japan under the terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.28 Notwithstanding 
Japan’s official position ostensibly to the contrary, there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the U.S. does not believe prior consultation is required for the use 
of its military facilities and equipment in Japan, in the event of hostilities on the 
Korean Peninsula.29 In any event, neither party to a bilateral treaty can be bound 
by any particular interpretation unless the other party is fully aware of such an 
interpretation and has accepted it as the shared understanding of the relevant 
treaty term.30
In addition, the SDF is authorized under the SDF Law to use “weapons” 
in limited circumstances. This authorization for the use of “weapons” does not 
constitute a “use of force” as an exercise of national defense power as far as 
Japanese domestic law is concerned, even though it might constitute a “use of 
force” that requires legal justification under international law. For example, the use 
of weapons is authorized when it is necessary to:
• destroy ballistic missiles directed at Japan;31
•  protect Japanese nationals and other designated foreign nationals in a 
foreign country;32
• protect individuals under the SDF’s control during a transport operation;33
• protect SDF’s defense assets;34 and
•  protect the defense assets of U.S. forces or other countries that contribute to 
the defense of Japan35 
In these situations, the legitimate use of weapons is permitted only to the 
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extent reasonable under the attendant circumstances and must not cause death or 
injury unless it can be justified as self-defense or necessity under Articles 36 and 
37 of the Criminal Code of Japan.36 Amendments introduced by the 2015 security 
legislation have expanded the scope within which the SDF personnel are authorized 
to use weapons. They are now allowed to protect not only themselves but also 
other individuals under their control or in the same compound, when engaging in 
support activities under grave circumstances affecting Japan’s peace and security 
(e.g., when Japan might be subject to an armed attack if the situation were left 
unattended, but the SDF may operate only outside combat zones).37
The decision as to which of these legislative bases might actually be used in 
the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula ultimately depends on the Japanese 
government’s assessment of the attendant circumstances and various political 
considerations. This political decision will inform the SDF of the relevant legal 
framework for action. However, as will be explained below, each of these legislative 
bases is tightly regulated due to the constitutional limitation on the use of force and 
the controversies related thereto. 
Legal Challenges in the  
Event of Hostilities on the  
Korean Peninsula
COMBINED SECURITY OPERATIONS
It is generally understood among security experts that key to the maintenance and 
enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance is Japan’s legal readiness to effectively 
use the technological capabilities it has in a combined security operation to track 
missiles launched by North Korea.38 Under the 2015 security legislation, there are 
three different legislative bases for the protection of U.S. forces by the SDF: 
1.  the protection of U.S. defense assets, with the limited use of weapons to the 
extent reasonable under the attendant circumstances;39
2.  the protection of individuals within the SDF’s control during support activities 
under grave circumstances affecting Japan’s peace and security (e.g., when Japan 
might be subject to an armed attack if the situation were left unattended, but the 
SDF may operate only outside combat zones);40 and
3.  the authorization of the use of force in situations where an armed attack 
occurs against a country that is in a close relationship with Japan and, as a 
result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger that fundamentally 
undermines the lives and freedoms of its nationals, and their right to pursue 
happiness (i.e., when there is an existential threat to Japan).41
The first two legislative bases allow SDF personnel to use weapons to a limited 
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extent within the law enforcement paradigm. This means that weapons can only be 
used to the extent reasonable to execute their mission (e.g., the protection of U.S. 
defense assets), and such use of weapons must not result in injury or death unless 
it is justifiable as self-defense or necessity under Articles 36 and 37 of the Japanese 
Criminal Code.42 On the other hand, the third legislative basis triggers the SDF’s 
action in situations of national self-defense, with authority to use armed force to 
the extent necessary to repel armed attacks.
The first possible scenario where Japan might participate in a combined 
security operation with the U.S., in the event of hostilities on the Korean 
Peninsula, is when Japan recognizes itself as being subject to an armed attack 
or, in accordance with the new security legislation, when facing an existential 
threat resulting from an armed attack against the U.S.. Indeed, Prime Minister 
Abe observed during the 2015 Diet debate that the new security legislation would 
extend to the protection of U.S. Navy vessels from a missile attack launched by 
North Korea when those vessels form an integral part of Japan’s missile defense 
system.43 This statement indicates political readiness to invoke the national defense 
power under Article 76 of the SDF Law when hostilities on the Korean Peninsula 
threaten Japan’s missile defense system and U.S. defense assets that form an 
integral part thereof. The decision might cause domestic controversy as to whether 
the missile attack amounts to an armed attack directed against Japan or whether 
the launch poses an existential threat to Japan, but in such a scenario, it can 
legitimately be justified as an exercise of the right of national self-defense under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
The alternative scenario could arise if Japan authorizes the SDF, in 
accordance with the Law Concerning Grave Circumstances, to undertake support 
activities for armed forces of other countries that are contributing to Japan’s peace 
and security or to international peace and security. Operating within the law 
enforcement paradigm, the SDF’s actions must comply with stringent regulations 
governing the use of weapons and are prohibited in areas where combat activities 
are taking place.44 Nevertheless, during the Diet debate in August 2015, then 
Defense Minister Nakatani indicated that the SDF could defend a U.S. Navy vessel 
engaged in a combined security operation from an incoming missile attack by 
using a defensive missile under the new legislation concerning grave circumstances 
affecting Japan’s peace and security.45 
Under international law, however, such action clearly constitutes a use 
of force that requires justification based on the right of self-defense or UN 
authorization. It is widely accepted that force may be used in law enforcement 
provided that such force is unavoidable, reasonable and necessary for the purpose 
of effecting the objects of law enforcement such as boarding, searching, seizing and 
bringing into port a suspected vessel.46 Defending a foreign warship goes beyond 
the strict limitation imposed upon the use of force in maritime law enforcement 
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under international law and can only be justified as an exercise of the right of 
collective self-defense or as an action under UN authorization. 
An attempt to justify the SDF’s actions to defend U.S. Navy vessels based on 
the Law Concerning Grave Circumstances thus creates a legal paradox—it is a law 
enforcement action under Japanese domestic law, but the same conduct constitutes 
a use of force under international law that requires justification as an exercise of 
the right of collective self-defense. Even though the public debate concerning the 
2015 security legislation focused on the constitutionality of the right of collective 
self-defense, the actual scope of the use of force newly authorized is so narrowly 
confined that it does not support a clear case of collective self-defense.
NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO) 
Prior to and in the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, Japan and the U.S., 
among many other countries, will be involved in rescue and evacuation operations 
for the relocation to a place of safety of designated non-combatants, namely their 
own nationals and other designated foreign nationals residing in South Korea. 
Although each state is responsible for the development and execution of its own 
national evacuation plan, multiple states are likely to coordinate their rescue efforts 
according to their own legal framework and operational capabilities. Coordination 
with other states will help optimize limited assets available for the evacuation of 
foreign nationals. However, the requirement of consent as the legal basis for the 
SDF’s deployment within South Korean territory would necessarily constrain the 
SDF’s ability to facilitate and carry out rescue and evacuation operations.
Japan’s legal position is that rescue and evacuation operations must be conducted 
with the consent of South Korean authorities or, alternatively, under UN 
authorization.47 In other words, the SDF’s overseas rescue missions are strictly 
prohibited without consent of the host state or UN authorization. Also, its ability 
to use weapons necessary to perform rescue and evacuation operations is restricted 
to areas where no combat is taking place.48 The United States, on the other hand, 
merely requires that “the NEO planners are aware of sovereignty of other foreign 
nations and the constraints and restraints on violating the sovereignty”.49 Under 
international law, the legality of the use of force by a state to protect its own 
nationals in a foreign state without consent of the latter is far from established, due 
to inconsistent and equivocal state practice.50
The use of force necessary to protect Japanese and foreign nationals from 
attacks or the effects of attacks is one of the critical areas in which the SDF’s ability 
to facilitate rescue and evacuation operations will be restricted unless South 
Korean authorities are prepared to provide an express consent thereto. This is a 
particularly acute area of concern for political reasons (e.g., the territorial dispute 
over Dokdo/Takeshima, among others), as well as historical reasons (e.g., Japan’s 
occupation of the Korean Peninsula and forced labour during World War II). Due 
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to these concerns, South Korea would likely be reluctant to allow the SDF to engage 
in any military operation on its soil. 
During a rescue and evacuation operation, any engagement between the 
SDF and members of North Korean forces, militia or voluntary corps, or anyone 
acting under the direction and control of the North Korean regime, would 
constitute hostilities in an international armed conflict. In such a situation, the 
SDF would be required to comply with the full range of rules under international 
humanitarian law, including the law of targeting, and would not be able to 
circumvent its obligations by asking other states to intervene. It follows that the 
SDF are under the obligation to verify legitimate military targets, to exercise all 
feasible precautions to minimize collateral damage, and to refrain from or stop 
executing an attack if it is reasonably expected to cause excessive collateral damage 
relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.51 Furthermore, 
Japan will be required to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian 
law,52 arguably with the positive obligation to take action when the SDF have the 
capabilities and opportunities to prevent or stop war crimes being committed.53 
As such, the SDF cannot disregard relevant rules of international law applicable to 
an international armed conflict, even if they participate in rescue and evacuation 
operations with the consent of South Korean authorities. These rules apply in 
parallel to Japanese domestic law regulating the conduct of the SDF and within 
the parameters of the consent provided by South Korean authorities. These legal 
complexities, as well as associated legal risks, must be carefully assessed before the 
deployment of the SDF to complex operational environments that are expected to 
develop during rescue and evacuation operations.
MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS
The maritime domain is likely to be another major theater in which the SDF must 
operate. In the event of hostilities, civilians and defectors are likely to flee hostilities 
in large numbers by seeking refuge through maritime routes or by crossing the 
border into the PRC. Among those fleeing could be North Korean operatives on a 
covert mission to sabotage search and rescue operations at sea or infiltrate South 
Korean or Japanese territories. Depending on how the PRC and Russia engage with 
such hostilities, their navy vessels could be present in the vicinity of the maritime 
routes used by asylum seekers. These factors complicate the maritime conditions 
under which SDF vessels might be required to operate in facilitating the evacuation 
of Japanese and foreign nationals or their protection from hostilities.
First, the SDF could face a situation where the obligation to assist people in 
distress arises under the law of the sea or international human rights law. Japan has 
ratified the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1974 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, which requires the master of a ship to 
render assistance to persons in distress.54 Japan is also a party to the International 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which arguably imposes on it positive 
obligations to protect the right to life at sea within its jurisdiction.55 Depending on 
how wide the scope of jurisdiction is interpreted for the purposes of applying the 
Covenant, the SDF may be required to protect the human rights of any individuals 
with whom it comes into contact at sea, for example, those on board any ships 
which SDF personnel visit and search to verify their nationality.56 These obligations 
include non-refoulement when there are substantial grounds to believe that the 
relevant individuals would face a real risk of being persecuted or subject to torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment upon return. 
Second, further complication might arise when hostile actors, with the 
intent to engage in subversive activities and disrupt evacuation operations, disguise 
themselves as asylum seekers or civilians on merchant vessels. SDF vessels may be 
authorized to inspect foreign-flagged ships, with the consent of the flag state, when 
the situation is recognized as constituting grave circumstances affecting Japan.57 
Alternatively, the SDF may be authorized to use armed force in the exercise of 
national defense power under Articles 76 and 88 of the SDF Law in response to 
an armed attack directed against Japan or its close ally. Yet, the application of 
national defense power to maritime security operations in such a scenario depends 
upon whether subversive activities form part of the larger context of the armed 
attack to which the SDF are responding. Likewise, the applicability of international 
humanitarian law in such a scenario also depends on whether the subversive 
activities form part of the larger context of hostilities. When their identity or link 
to the larger context of hostilities is unclear, the SDF would face a legal “grey zone” 
due to uncertainty as to which body of international law applies to the use of force 
(including weapons) and to the treatment of hostile actors who are captured.58 
Third, Article 9 of the Constitution restricts the ways in which the SDF 
may engage in hostilities in the maritime context. The explicit denial of the right 
of belligerency in the second paragraph of the war-renunciation clause imposes 
not only stricter requirements on the justification for the use of force (under jus ad 
bellum) but also precludes Japan from engaging in certain types of belligerent acts 
that are traditionally permitted for the navy (under jus in bello). Therefore, without 
prejudice to any UN-authorized maritime enforcement operations, there are 
constitutional limitations on the extent to which the SDF may participate in naval 
operations such as naval blockade, interdiction of neutral ships, seizure of enemy 
ships, or employing naval mines in foreign territorial waters.59
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Conclusion
In the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, there will be many scenarios 
where Japan is required to consider use of force options—such as defending U.S. 
navy vessels engaged in combined security operations, protecting Japanese and 
foreign nationals during rescue and evacuation operations, and engaging in various 
maritime security operations—either by stretching the meaning of an existential 
threat or by an expansive reading of the permitted use of weapons during support 
activities within the law enforcement paradigm. The benefit of such an attempt 
to stretch the legislative grounds for justifying specific use of physical force 
must be weighed against its political, diplomatic, constitutional and operational 
ramifications. As examined above, the constraints of the legislative framework limit 
Japan’s legal options to justify the use of force in prosecuting various missions in 
the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. 
Even though the 2015 security legislation aimed to enable Japan to adopt a 
“seamless response” to contemporary security threats, it did not go far enough to 
address the inherent gap in Japan’s security law regime so as to allow the SDF to 
employ armed force as necessary in a variety of settings. This problem is not unique 
to SDF’s operations in and around the Korean Peninsula, but applies equally to 
hostilities in Taiwan and other parts of Asia. For the U.S.-Japan alliance to remain 
as the anchor of regional security in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. and Japanese defense 
agencies will have to work together to develop a mutual understanding of legally 
defensible options for each country in a wide range of operational scenarios that are 
expected to arise in the event of hostilities in the region. 
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Introduction
The U.S.-Japan Alliance, rooted in the 1952 Security Treaty Between the United 
States and Japan and reinforced by amendment through the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security, is built upon presumptions of clarity in international 
law. Implicitly these foundations embrace Westphalian concepts of sovereignty, 
jurisdiction, and geography and presuppose that clear lines exist between peace 
and war. More directly, the treaties accept that the use of force and armed attack, 
as reflected in the United Nations Charter and international law, are prohibited, 
widely understood, and applicable to the types of security concerns most relevant to 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance. 
However, it is not at all clear that these assumptions are valid in cyberspace 
or that Japan’s developing security ambitions will allow the government to remain 
tethered to the physical territories of Japan or legal archetypes bound by geography. 
Japan is actively exploring its future role in the global commons.1
 This move may be driven by the realities of the increasingly globalized 
security environment and political necessity as regional threats are manifesting at 
sea, in space, and in cyberspace.2 Yet whatever the cause, the Japanese government 
seems to be weighing whether cyberspace presents conditions that deviate from the 
order envisioned in the Charter, Alliance treaties, and Japan’s Constitution. There 
appears to be real interest in assessing whether international law may provide room 
to maneuver towards a more “proactive” cyber security posture and, if so, whether 
Japan’s domestic laws might permit such an approach.
While embracing the applicability of international law to cyberspace 
operations,3 the U.S. government has determined that a great deal of freedom 
exists in the domain—particularly when acting on the international plane in 
individual or collective self-defense. After spending years building infrastructure 
and cyber operations teams,4 military commanders have now been granted broader 
authorities at lower levels to conduct cyber operations.5 What precisely this means 
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in practice is hard to determine outside of highly classified environments. Still, a 
clear shift in the United States’ approach to cyber operations has occurred, and 
that shift is organized to a great degree towards more persistent operations and 
defensive activities.6
Japan has embarked on a broader transformation of its historically 
inward-looking, peace-seeking security posture. For nearly a decade, the Japanese 
government has been working to enhance coordination and optimize efficiencies 
within the nation’s national security architecture, and much attention has been 
given to Japan’s role in cyberspace. However, the lack of consensus about how 
international law applies in the cyber context has left the Japanese government 
questioning how to best adapt to cyber threats while still comporting with Japan’s 
international and domestic legal obligations.
This essay explores contemporary understandings of international law and 
cyberspace operations through the lens of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Part I presents 
cyber operations as an instrument of national power and highlights the “defend 
forward” posture of the U.S. government as well as the Japanese government’s 
move to a more proactive role in cyberspace. Part II outlines the international legal 
framework applicable to cyber operations and gaps therein and presents contested 
subjects such as sovereignty and notice of countermeasures. Part III describes at 
a high-level how the United States and Japan might partner in defensive cyber 
scenarios. It explores the possibility that malicious cyber operations not rising to 
the level of use of force directed against the United States and Japan may present 
more frequent, and perhaps more substantial, occasions for U.S.-Japan Alliance 
forces to conduct “self-help and mutual aid.”7 
DEFENDING FORWARD AND PROACTIVE SECURITY
“Globally, the scope and pace of malicious cyber activity continues to rise.  
The United States’ growing dependence on the cyberspace domain for nearly  
every essential civilian and military function makes this an urgent  
and unacceptable risk to the nation.”
—U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY (2018)8
“In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of 
security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone.”
—DEFENSE OF JAPAN WHITE 20199
It is not difficult to identify the gravity of threats faced by the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 
the cyber domain. China, North Korea, and Russia have been repeatedly identified 
as malicious actors in cyberspace that exist in geographic proximity to Japan 
and to U.S and Japanese forces operating in the region.10 Their presence in the 
cyber domain is even closer at hand, with evidence that they and those working 
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on their behalf have already established placement and access in commercial and 
governmental systems and networks and are the most active among U.S.-Japan 
Alliance cyber adversaries.11 
Much has been made of Russia’s cyber operations directed at the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election and of Russia’s continuing misinformation campaigns. The 
production and rapid dissemination of false or misleading facts and narratives 
is certainly an issue worthy of attention, particularly when such occurrences 
negatively impact national security, economies, or political independence.12 Yet 
constant changes in the cyber domain require routine reassessment of the realities 
of the realm. Threat assessments and descriptive devices—whether addressing 
technologies, activities by states and non-state actors, or the legal and policy 
regimes at play—have exceedingly limited shelf lives. 
The United States is particularly concerned about cyber threats from China, 
Russia, North Korea, and Iran.13 This threat landscape may be due in no small part 
to the propensity of states to deliberately operate in the “grey zone”14 and employ 
“hybrid warfare” tactics.15 The Defense Department asserts that states are “deterred 
from engaging the United States and [its] allies in an armed conflict” and, instead, 
“are using cyberspace operations to steal [its] technology, disrupt [its] government 
and commerce, challenge [its] democratic processes, and threaten [its] critical 
infrastructure.”16 The targets of these threats are spread across public and private 
institutions.17 
What may be most concerning about the operational environment is not the 
actors themselves as this cast has changed little in recent years, but the cumulative 
effects of their persistent cyber campaigns and the increasing technological 
proficiency, reach, and impact of states, non-state actors, and those who would 
act on their behalf.18 Impacts from attacks against critical infrastructure remain 
of utmost concern.19 These challenges are exacerbated by methods of obfuscation 
and deliberate efforts to limit the ability of states to act decisively in their defense. 
Timely attribution has long been a challenge in cyberspace, notwithstanding recent 
advancements in technology and attribution methods,20 as states continue to 
leverage technical and legal ambiguity to avoid accountability.21 
Japan shares many of these concerns and faces unique cyber challenges of 
its own.22 Japan has faced tens of billions of cyber attacks in a single year.23 China, 
North Korea, and Russia are the Japanese government’s leading concerns.24 Yet 
“Japan’s [cyber defenses] remain underdeveloped compared to the country’s 
great reliance on information and communications technology.”25 Cyber attacks 
in 2011 and 2015 were especially impactful—both to their targets and politically 
in Japan26—leading the “reluctant cyberpower” to spend much of the past decade 
adjusting its approach to cyberspace.27 
The Japanese government has made clear that cybersecurity is central to 
its national security—implementing a series of legislative, strategic, and structural 
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changes focused on defense of the cyber domain28 and embarking on an active 
campaign of cyber diplomacy.29 Public-private partnerships are strengthening, and 
Prime Minister Abe’s push for “Proactive Contribution to Peace” is manifesting in 
work underway to enhance the U.S.-Japan Alliance in cyberspace.30 
As the U.S. and Japanese governments implement their respective 
cyber initiatives, the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (the 
“Guidelines”) have focused military planners on specific national security goals. The 
Guidelines explain: 
The United States Armed Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will:
• maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems; 
• share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity; 
• e nsure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve 
mission assurance; 
• contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and 
•  conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity 
in all situations from peacetime to contingencies.31
Furthermore, the Guidelines describe in general terms plans for responding to 
“cyber incidents against Japan” and “serious cyber incidents that affect the security 
of Japan”:
In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical 
infrastructure and services utilized by the United States Armed Forces in 
Japan and the Self-Defense Forces, Japan will have primary responsibility 
to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States 
will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will 
share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of 
serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that 
take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will 
consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.32 
Note, however, that by their terms these response plans, which were built in the 
framework of a greater post-World War II defense strategy, would be entirely 
reactive. 
But the U.S.-Japan Alliance is adjusting. As the U.S. and Japanese 
governments continue to discuss threats, capabilities, legal interpretations, 
and opportunities to partner in the future, there are additional measures being 
undertaken. For example, in 2018 U.S. Cyber Command reset its strategic concept, 
moving from “cyber response” to “cyber persistence”33 and cyber forces began 
“defending forward.”34 In Japan, the government is working to “secure Japan’s 
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resilience against cyberattacks and increase Japan’s ability to defend the state 
(defense capabilities), deter cyberattacks (deterrence capabilities), and be aware 
of the situation in cyberspace (situational awareness capabilities).”35 Furthermore, 
in 2019 U.S. and Japanese officials moved to deepen the Alliance in cyberspace 
and other cross-domain operations—a commitment recognizing that much could 
be done in the grey zone, that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty does not prohibit 
cooperative activities in the absence of armed attack, and that it is not in the 
interests of the U.S.-Japan Alliance to wait for harmful cyber incidents to occur.36 
General Paul M. Nakasone summarized the need for change: “Our naval 
forces do not defend by staying in port, and our airpower does not remain at 
airfields. They patrol the seas and skies to ensure they are positioned to defend our 
country before our borders are crossed. The same logic applies in cyberspace.”37
The United States
In 2018, the United States updated its National Cyber Strategy38 and Department 
of Defense Cyber Strategy39, which collectively set forth new ambitions and 
approaches for the U.S. government in cyberspace. The policy documents 
addressed the importance of cyber strength and resiliency for the United States, its 
allies, and partners. They were shaped by realities of the “day-to-day competition” 
in the cyber domain, of constant contact initiated by adversaries seeking to access, 
disable, or otherwise malign U.S. systems and networks.40 They also outlined 
important measures being undertaken to ensure “a prosperous cyber future.”41 
Significantly, the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy committed to 
preparing for “crisis or conflict” and “defending forward.”42 It envisions sustained 
operations across cyberspace, primarily outside of armed conflict and below the 
use of force.43 As General Nakasone would later explain, this new approach was 
required because “the locus of struggle in the revived great-power competition has 
shifted toward cyberspace and … decisive action can occur below the level of armed 
conflict.”44 Thus, as a practical matter, the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 
expresses the urgency for more robust, persistent cyber intelligence and defense 
operations. 
This shift in approaches was possible because the Defense Department 
had spent years building U.S. military cyber architecture and forces. Because 
substantially more military cyber forces were in place than in years prior and 
because cyber forces were better organized, trained, and equipped, the Defense 
Department was able to adjust its mission to “move beyond the blue”45 and start 
“imposing costs” on cyber adversaries.46 The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 
set forth the following areas of focus: 
• c onduct cyberspace operations to collect intelligence and prepare military 
cyber capabilities; 
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•  defend forward to halt or disrupt malicious cyber activity at its source, 
including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict; 
• strengthen the security and resilience of networks and systems; 
•  collaborate with interagency, industry, and international partners; and 
employ offensive cyber capabilities.47
Further to the goals of moving more swiftly and effectively in cyberspace, in 2018 
the Trump Administration issued National Security Presidential Memorandum-13, 
“United States Cyber Operations Policy” (NSPM-13).48 NSPM-13 “allows for the 
delegation of well-defined authorities to the Secretary of Defense to conduct 
time-sensitive military operations in cyberspace.”49 The primary effect of NSPM-
13 was to replace prior administrations’ more deliberate, interagency review of 
cyber proposals at the highest levels of government—particularly outside of armed 
conflicts—with a broader delegation of authorities to the Defense Department. 
This design attempted to combat better the depth, breadth, and speed of actors in 
cyberspace. 
The shift was not driven exclusively by the Executive Branch. U.S. 
federal law has also embraced the “need for speed”50 and a more robust Defense 
Department cyber posture. Existing law that permitted defensive cyber operations51 
was augmented by clear Congressional policy statements and requirements 
pertaining to cyberspace, cybersecurity, cyber warfare, and cyber deterrence.52 The 
principal message from Congress was that “the United States should employ all 
instruments of national power, including the use of offensive cyber capabilities, 
to deter if possible, and respond to when necessary, all cyber attacks or other 
malicious cyber activities of foreign powers that target United States interests.”53
Japan 
Although Japan is taking a more deliberate and seemingly less aggressive approach 
to defending cyberspace than the United States, nevertheless, there has been a 
significant move by the Japanese government in recent years to implement a more 
“proactive” and less isolated cybersecurity posture. The rationale behind the Abe 
administration’s approach is explained in the 2013 National Security Strategy: 
The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable 
international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats. It is 
thus necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security 
environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive 
role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity of the international 
community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of 
international cooperation. 
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… Japan must have the power to take the lead in setting the 
international agenda and to proactively advance its national interests, 
without being confined to a reactionary position to events and  
incidents after they have already occurred.54
The new tone and focus of the 2013 National Security Strategy were followed 
by substantial transformation efforts across Japanese national security policies, 
programs, and law.55 Japan’s National Security Council was established and charged 
with streamlining and unifying efforts across the government.56 The Diet enacted 
legislation and interpretations that would permit the Self-Defense Force to expand 
its role in peacekeeping operations, asset protection, and logistics support, and 
potentially exercise a broader form of collective self-defense.57 National Defense 
Program Guidelines were updated to expand defense roles and partnerships, as 
well as the domains in which Japanese forces will operate.58   
These advancements set the stage for progressive cyber moves as well. The 
government recognized cyberspace as a “frontier for creating infinite value” and 
committed to “us[ing] all means under its disposal to undertake cybersecurity 
initiatives in order to ensure that cyberspace remains [‘free, fair and secure’].”59 
Japanese cyber forces have been growing in size and responsibilities.60 The 
Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Force have been preparing a cross-
domain architecture to address cyber operations as part of a new, streamlined 
joint operations system.61 A new “Multi-Domain Defense Force” is tasked with 
integrating cyber capabilities into operations across all domains.62 National 
Defense Program Guidelines now directly link national defense objectives to 
“deep[er] … operational cooperation and policy coordination with the United 
States” in cyberspace.63 Preparation for the 2020 Olympics has fast-tracked 
even more cybersecurity initiatives that have been developing under the Abe 
administration. Over time the aggregate impact of these measures should include 
improving national resilience, enhancing deterrence, and strengthening cyber 
situational awareness.64
Might this proactive security approach grow into a Japanese version of 
defending forward? The Japanese government’s renewed attention to action65 
echoes messages of its United States ally.66 Still it seems unlikely that Japan’s 
role in cyberspace will fundamentally transform the nation’s restrained approach 
to national security. It may be true that “national security reforms under Abe, 
in the aggregate, constitute a significant and historic shift for Japan,”67 but 
many observers believe that the government’s “proactive security” posture still 
only extends so far as Japan is directly impacted or, at the most, to operations 
through which there is little chance of drawing Japan into armed conflict or 
requiring Japanese troops to use force.68 Even the ground-breaking 2014 Diet 
reinterpretation permitting collective self-defense under the Japanese Constitution 
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is qualified by three substantial domestic legal conditions, including the existence 
of an existential threat.69 Efforts to maintain Japan’s peace and security may 
become less inward-looking and reactionary, but substantial historical, cultural, 
and legal barriers prevent Japan from changing into something other than the 
pacifist state that the Japanese Constitution envisioned.70
Ultimately, the more interesting questions may be how far Japan is willing 
to extend into or “beyond the blue” of the cyber domain, how quickly it can bring 
tools and talent to bear in cyber operations, and what Japan’s role will be in 
relation to other states that Japan may partner with in cyberspace operations. 
The Abe administration has promoted Japan’s image as a “commons’ guardian” 
and “effective ally and partner to the U.S. and other democracies.”71 But will 
the guardian’s roles72 be limited to diplomacy, information sharing, capacity 
building, supply chain security, and other measures that might be accomplished 
without deliberately—and directly—confronting the “great-power competition” 
in cyberspace?73 Or will increasing cyber situational awareness, deepened 
partnerships, the push for proactive security contributions, and constant contact 
with adversaries in and through cyberspace result in Japanese cyber forces bearing 
more profound responsibilities for the U.S.-Japan Alliance? 
The Japanese government does not hide the fact that it must turn to 
broader cooperative security arrangements to preserve its security interests, and 
that foremost among such protections is the U.S.-Japan Alliance. The reality that, 
in cyberspace, “it is not possible for Japan to secure its peace and stability only 
by itself ” underscores the importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.74 Yet questions 
remain about how far the Japanese government will allow its forces to venture into 
the cyber domain over time. 
In theory, Japan’s interest in proactive security and the United States’ 
defend forward posture could converge under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security (the “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty”). Those provisions of the U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty that do the work—primarily Articles III, IV, V, and VI—
acknowledge the importance of individual and collective preparatory measures to 
“resist armed attack,” agree to collective self-defense in the event of armed attack, 
and allow for staging U.S. forces in Japan for such purposes.75 The Articles are 
concise instruments of constraint, collaboration, and accountability. Yet because 
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is largely a bare bones document—reflecting Articles 
2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter and providing mechanisms for coming 
to the defense of the other party but deferring most other matters to implementing 
arrangements and the inter-workings of the governments—the most relevant 
security provisions are significant in the event of armed attack but matter little 
when facing conduct that does not rise to the level of using force.76 
Consequently, Japan’s Constitution, implementing security legislation, other 
cyber-related laws, and Cabinet interpretations are particularly important. While 
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the United States maintains one of the most expansive state views of self-defense, 
Japan sits close to the other end of the spectrum. Government interpretations of 
the Japanese Constitution’s war-renouncing clause, found in Article 9, generally 
prevent the use of force except when defending Japanese nationals’ “right to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” and even then only through the use of 
minimum force necessary.77 
This is a restrictive approach—understandable in light of Japan’s “exclusively 
national defense-oriented policy”78 but certainly more constraining than what 
international law permits under individual or collective self-defense doctrine.79 Still 
these constraints may not matter much in cyberspace as a matter of law. 
II. International Law and Cyberspace 
“International law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable 
and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, 
stable, accessible and peaceful [information and communications technologies] 
environment.”
—UN GGE 2015 REPORT80
It is not a question of “if ” but “how.” 
International law applies to states’ actions in and through cyberspace—the 
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, Brazil, Egypt, 
Estonia, the Netherlands and numerous (but not all) other states have said so.81 
Yet even those states agreeing that international law applies in cyberspace82 readily 
acknowledge that there is great uncertainty about how international legal norms, 
rules, and principles apply in the cyber domain.83 
Today there is no comprehensive treaty addressing international law in 
cyberspace. Customary international law for cyberspace is still developing. General 
principles of law are contested vigorously—including within the U.S. government. 
And most states—even those actively engaged in discussions about international 
law and cyberspace—have not articulated governmental positions with much 
specificity or consequence.84 
Some scholars speak with great clarity and optimism about the application 
of international law to cyberspace.85 Certainly strong interest exists within the 
international community in building consensus on substantive legal issues. Cyber 
diplomacy has been shaping states’ understanding of critical topics and unsettled 
areas while promoting responsible behavior.86 Noteworthy contributions have been 
made in the field. States are making progress on “norms of behavior of responsible 
states” in cyberspace.87 The Budapest Cybercrime Convention88 and the European 
General Data Protection Regulation89 are major international agreements 
addressing subjects of relevance to security issues in cyberspace. The Tallinn 
Manual and Tallinn 2.0 are thoughtful, detailed works that provide a great deal 
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of insight about international law but, read carefully, underscore the uncertainty 
prevalent in the area.90 
Discussions among the aforementioned groups are unlikely to bring near-
term clarity on matters that have long been debated among international lawyers, 
such as sovereignty, non-intervention, and coercion. These vigorously debated 
issues seem even more complex than ever in cyberspace, with states offering 
seemingly irreconcilable views.91 It has also been emphasized that “[i]nitiatives by 
non-governmental groups like those that led to the Tallinn Manual can be useful 
to consider, but they do not create new international law, which only states can 
make.”92 Ultimately, with limited, macro-level exceptions, states have yet to agree 
to how international law applies to cyberspace and opinio juris remains a work in 
progress. 
This leaves the U.S.-Japan Alliance in an apparently awkward position 
where the certainty envisioned in the UN Charter and the U.S.-Japan Security 
Treaty is inconsistent with the scarcity of consensus among states as to how 
international law applies in the cyber context. 
Yet viewed through the light of international law as it exists today, for better 
or worse, the Alliance actually shares great freedom in cyberspace.93 Ultimately 
much of what the U.S. and Japanese governments must decide with regard to their 
cyber operations will be governed more by domestic considerations and “policy 
prudence” than by international legal prohibition.94
The State’s Right 
“How do we apply old laws of war to new cyber-circumstances, staying faithful to 
enduring principles, while accounting for changing times and technologies?”
—HAROLD HONGJU KOH 
LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2012)95
When the U.S. State Department Legal Adviser posed the question above at 
U.S. Cyber Command in 2012, he offered a very important, thoughtful, and 
problematic question. Koh’s interrogative was important because it framed a 
broader conversation in which the U.S. government clearly laid out its position 
on ten important—and specific—cyber law questions.96 It was thoughtful because 
it reflected a commitment to values imbued in law and commitments of the U.S. 
government, while looking prospectively at emerging technologies and the conflicts 
that would grow across cyberspace over time. The question was problematic 
because it slid into the trap that has ensnared countless persons working in 
national security—by its terms, the question cast cyberspace as a domain 
necessarily governed by the “laws of war.” 
Very few cyber activities could reasonably be considered to have risen to the 
level of armed attack. Even those that have approached the use of force threshold 
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would be hard to label as violating Article 2(4)97 or implicating Article 5198 of the 
United Nations Charter without significant disagreement among the international 
community. In reality, cyber operations most frequently occur outside of armed 
conflict and are rarely of a character as to create a close call about whether 
they implicate use of force or armed attack provisions of the UN Charter or, by 
extension, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. 
Consequently, jus ad bellum may be appropriate to analyze as a preliminary 
matter—under the UN Charter, against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, in relation 
to domestic law and implementing arrangements—and jus in bello may guide the 
conduct of hostilities of armed conflict—even in cyberspace—but jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello are rarely of much legal significance for cyber operations.
Why would states “apply old laws of war to new cyber-circumstances” 
outside of armed conflict and when the use of force is not at issue?99 Perhaps such 
efforts would be made in an attempt at analysis by analogy or as a limiting policy 
choice,100 but such methods are of little utility in preparing authoritative opinions 
on the legality of cyber operations.101 Unfortunately, in their conversations many 
states and scholars continue to default to suggesting the law of war be applied to 
cyber operations irrespective of whether armed conflict or force are involved.102 
Uncertainty about what legal obligations may exist in cyberspace, and 
the relative ease of applying well-established law of war rules and principles, are 
resulting in a blurring of the lines between what is legally required and that which 
is prudent policy. Consequently, some states that focus on ensuring the rule of 
law extends to cyberspace and that the domain is not a “law-free zone”103 seem to 
have reverted to select application of the laws of war for the time being. This has 
produced great confusion about which international law regimes apply, and when 
and how they apply. 
Meanwhile, “sub-use-of-force” cyber activities have propagated, and 
international law has done little to reign in such conduct.104 States and non-state 
actors have taken advantage of legal ambiguity and ineffective (or non-existent) 
accountability mechanisms while many states have been reluctant to defend 
forward or impose costs due to the absence of clear agreement on how to apply 
legal regimes to cyberspace.105
However, all is not lost. Cyber operations have not fractured the entire 
international legal order nor have they made the UN Charter and the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty irrelevant. Prohibitions against the threat or use of force and 
armed attack remain enduring safeguards against state aggression. Cyber norms 
are shaping states’ understanding of their existing and potential future legal 
obligations, such that opinio juris may follow over time.106
In the interim, malicious “sub-use-of-force” cyber operations directed 
against the United States and Japan may present more frequent and perhaps more 
substantial occasions for Alliance forces to leverage their respective capabilities 
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unilaterally or combine efforts as they conduct “self-help and mutual aid.”107 
Legal considerations normally applicable to defending against the use of force or 
armed attack may have significantly less influence over “sub-use-of-force” cyber 
operations.108 
Despite much uncertainty, what is clear is that defaulting to decision-
making bound by the laws of war and standards repeated in agreements but not 
applicable to facts-at-hand could be unnecessary and self-defeating.109 The gray 
zone will likely continue to be an arena in which proactive security measures face 
few directly applicable international legal prohibitions, and where the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance may enjoy states’ rights that support their cyber strategies. The risk of 
inaction deriving from legal uncertainty in cyberspace is very real. It is a problem 
that the U.S. and Japanese governments know well and that the allies are working 
to overcome.
Rules and Principles of International Law
Much of the uncertainty about applying international law to cyberspace reflects 
the scarcity of constraints directly applicable to the domain. States consider 
certain areas to be largely settled—among them, that the UN Charter’s protections 
generally apply and that state responsibility attaches to state cyber activities. There 
are also specific subjects governed by international agreements that regulate cyber 
conduct by states parties. Examples include the Constitution and Convention of the 
ITU, the Budapest Convention, and the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation. 
Still “states may face a general international legal prohibition on the 
initiation of armed conflict, subject to certain exceptions, but they do not face a 
similar general international legal prohibition against all uses of state or military 
power.”110 “Sub-use-of-force” cyber operations employed defensively are generally 
permissible under international law, so long as they do not violate specific 
international legal prohibitions such as prohibitions on the use of force or unlawful 
coercion.111
Generally, rules and principles of international law in cyberspace can be 
divided into two categories: (a) those aspects of international law for which general 
consensus exists among states as to their applicability in cyberspace, including 
limitations against state action; and (b) unresolved international legal questions 
bearing on cyber operations. The sections that follow are framed by remarks 
recently made by U.S. Department of Defense General Counsel, Paul C. Ney, Jr. and 
relevant “rules” drawn from Tallinn 2.0.
The author follows Ney’s choice of topics because of the subject matter’s 
relevancy to this paper, because his remarks present existing U.S. Defense 
Department views that will shape U.S.-Japan Alliance planning and (at least) U.S. 
cyber operations and because these remarks present more specific application of 
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key international legal principles to cyberspace than any public positions presented 
by the Government of Japan to date. Additionally, prominent speeches by senior 
U.S. government attorneys in recent years have often been utilized to make clear 
or reinforce U.S. positions while hinting at other issues that may be contentious or 
unsettled but are important matters on which the government is working.
Tallinn 2.0 “Rules” are then quoted and discussed to highlight analysis 
already performed by experts in the field. Although the author has found some of 
the experts’ work to mischaracterize lex ferenda as lex lata, Tallinn 2.0 provides 
ample quality analysis and context, captures many disagreements among the 
volume’s collaborators, and shines light on some of the more significant points of 
contention. Thus, it is a useful instrument through which to examine settled and 
unsettled issues of law in this area.
GENERALLY SETTLED 
“It continues to be the view of the United States that existing international law 
applies to State conduct in cyberspace. Particularly relevant for military operations 
are the Charter of the United Nations, the law of State responsibility, and the law of 
war.”
—HONORABLE PAUL C. NEY, JR. 
GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2020)112
The UN Charter’s applicability to cyberspace is widely accepted within the 
international community. “States’ adherence to international law, in particular 
their UN Charter obligations, is an essential framework.”113 The U.S. and Japanese 
governments are leading contributors to this viewpoint.114 Of particular importance 
is the consensus opinion of states that Article 2(4)’s general obligation to “refrain 
… from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations” applies in the cyber domain.115 
Strong evidence indicates that states generally agree that state responsibility 
attaches to state conduct undertaken in or through cyberspace. Rule 14 of Tallinn 
2.0 speaks to the law of state responsibility under the label “internationally 
wrongful acts” and explains, “A State bears international responsibility for a 
cyber-related act that is attributable to the State and that constitutes a breach of 
an international legal obligation.”116 Although states have debated whether draft 
articles of state responsibility should guide state conduct or be transformed into 
a more permanent convention, the broader assessment that the laws of state 
responsibility apply in cyberspace is widely accepted.117 In fact, the 11 “voluntary, 
non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour” recommended in the 2015 
UN GGE report are expressions of support for applying state responsibility to 
cyberspace. Recent remarks by representatives of the governments of the United 
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States and Japan offer strong evidence of the allies’ commitment as well.118
The third generally settled area—the laws of war—is a bit more complicated. 
Following the deliberate, progressive developments under the UN GGE process, 
including publication of the group’s fourth report in 2015, a fifth UN GGE was 
commissioned. Its conclusions were expected to promote further the rule of law 
and emerging norms in cyberspace.119 Instead, among other difficulties, the “UN 
GGE did not reach a consensus on whether or not international humanitarian 
law applies to cyber operations, thereby shaking one of the very cornerstones 
of the whole discourse of cyber law, something that has been affirmed by the 
[International Court of Justice (ICJ)] and was thought to be beyond challenge.”120 
Observers considered this a shocking result with one scholar noting that the “issues 
that … divided the GGE were objectively legal soft-balls.”121 
Two of the topics contributing to disagreement among states should not 
have been all that surprising: the right to respond to internationally wrongful acts 
and the right to self-defense.122 These matters have long been contentious among 
states—and not just in cyberspace. The complexities of cyberspace and concerns 
about state responses made it even less likely that a consensus understanding 
would be reported by the UN GGE in 2017.
But the third issue—the applicability of jus in bello to cyberspace—was 
viewed by some as settled law about which the group would provide a clear 
consensus statement at least for those operations conducted as part of an armed 
conflict. Notwithstanding, Cuba, Russia, and China were among the states that 
would not commit to applying jus in bello to cyberspace.123 While Russia and China 
were conspicuously quiet at the time, Cuba argued that “the supposed applicability 
in the context of [information and communications technologies] of the principles 
of International Humanitarian Law … would legitimize a scenario of war and 
military actions in the context of ICT.”124 
Professor Michael Schmitt, Director of the Tallinn 2.0 Project, expressed his 
dismay:
This assertion runs counter to the long-standing acceptance of 
[International Humanitarian Law (IHL’s)] application to new means and 
methods of warfare. Indeed, China, Russia and Cuba are Party to Additional 
Protocol I, Article 36 of which obliges them to review new weapons 
and methods of warfare for compliance with IHL. It is unclear how this 
obligation would not attach to cyber operations during an armed conflict 
that could, for instance, injure or kill individuals.
States cannot simply wish away their legal obligations under IHL treaty and 
customary international law. The Cuban contention that the mere applicability of 
IHL “legitimizes” war confuses the jus in bello with the jus ad bellum. The former, 
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which encompasses IHL, governs how armed conflict is to be conducted. It applies 
irrespective of whether a party to the conflict has violated the prohibition on the 
use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary law. Applying IHL 
to cyber operations during an armed conflict has nothing to do with the legality or 
legitimacy of a conflict.125
Despite Cuba’s assertions and the lack of a consensus UN GGE opinion 
about jus in bello resulting from the fifth session, Schmitt is entirely correct on 
these points. At least in the context of armed conflict,126 jus in bello applies to cyber 
operations—especially when considering those cyber operations that would create 
effects comparable to effects that other means and methods of warfare would 
produce. Schmitt also properly frames the distinction between jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello and how they should be considered in relation to cyber operations.127 
These are well established matters in international law.128
There may be validity in raising concerns over the potential for further 
blurring of the lines around when and how jus in bello applies during competition 
between states in cyberspace. However, that does not alter the easy conclusions that 
jus in bello applies to at least some forms of state conduct in cyberspace and that 
jus ad bellum remains a binding body of international law against which state cyber 
conduct can be measured.
UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
“We recognize that State practice in cyberspace is evolving. As lawyers operating in 
this area, we pay close attention to States’ explanations of their own practice, how 
they are applying treaty rules and customary international law to State activities in 
cyberspace, and how States address matters where the law is unsettled.”
— HONORABLE PAUL C. NEY, JR. 
GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2020)129
The number of unresolved questions that might arise when applying international 
law to cyberspace is limited only by one’s imagination and ability to predict future 
developments in technology and global security. In the interest of cabining the 
paper to particularly important and challenging issues, this paper addresses four 
important but unsettled topic areas: (i) sovereignty, (ii) use of force and armed 
attack, (iii) non-intervention and coercion, and (iv) countermeasures.
Sovereignty 
“The principle of State sovereignty applies in cyberspace.”
—TALLINN 2.0 – RULE 1: SOVEREIGNTY (GENERAL PRINCIPLE)130
At least four noteworthy and competing views of sovereignty in cyberspace have 
been embraced by states featuring prominently in the domain and the international 
dialogue. The United States, British, Chinese, and Dutch views present a range 
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of widely divergent positions shaped by competing conceptions of sovereignty in 
cyberspace.131 The United States Department of Defense asserts sovereignty as a 
guiding principle.132 Britain takes a similar position, opining that sovereignty is not 
a rule itself in cyberspace but is given life in the context of the non-intervention 
principle.133 China regards sovereignty as an instrument of the state.134 The 
Netherlands applies sovereignty as a primary rule.135 Furthermore, the Japanese 
government seems inclined to work towards a view of sovereignty that best 
balances the competing interests of free expression and innovation against the need 
for cybersecurity.136 
Whatever commonality exists among state positions on sovereignty appears 
to reside in sovereignty’s internal characteristics. The general principle expressed 
about internal sovereignty in Tallinn 2.0 reads, “[a] State enjoys sovereign 
authority with regard to the cyber infrastructure, persons, and cyber activities 
located within its territory, subject to its international legal obligations.”137 This 
comports with the public U.S. position and seems to align with the views of the 
Japanese government and most states on record.138 It also may be why the UN GGE 
was able to agree to a voluntary, non-binding norm designed to protect critical 
infrastructure in 2015. Again, there is little reason to believe that new international 
agreements or consensus opinio juris will emerge on cyber sovereignty in the near 
future.
But the lack of clarity about sovereignty’s overall standing under 
international law, including how it applies externally, presents an interesting point 
of inflection for states and international lawyers. As presented by Rules 3 and 4 of 
Tallinn 2.0: a state is “free to conduct cyber activities in its international relations, 
subject to any contrary rule of international law binding on it” but also “must not 
conduct cyber operations that violate the sovereignty of another State.”139 If the 
Tallinn Manual’s framing of Rules 3 and 4 is correct,140 what then if sovereignty in 
cyberspace is unsettled as a matter of international law?141
An obvious area of consideration is intelligence collection or espionage. 
As U.S. and Japanese forces work to enhance their situational awareness across 
cyberspace, Alliance forces would benefit from early detection and identification of 
malicious cyber activities. It might also be advantageous to know where prospective 
cyber targets are as well as what their access routes and vulnerabilities might be in 
the event that defensive measures are required. These seem like necessary measures 
in a world of advanced, persistent cyber threats. 
Therefore, to the extent that cyber forces could reach across the cyber 
domain to identify threats or perhaps establish placement and access to facilitate 
future responsive measures,142 it could be important to understand whether 
sovereignty operates as a legal prohibition to cyber intelligence collection. 
Here the U.S. Department of Defense’s perspective on sovereignty as a guiding 
international law principle pertains.143 “[I]t does not appear that there exists a rule 
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that all infringements on sovereignty in cyberspace necessarily involve violations 
of international law.” Like their British colleagues, the American viewpoint 
accepts that there is “no per se international legal prohibition” on intelligence or 
counterintelligence activity.144
So far it is unclear what position Japan will take on the sovereignty question. 
To date, Japanese government officials have been supportive of state responsibility 
and due diligence obligations during UN GGE sessions, but no publicly available 
remarks provide an official, detailed position on the cyber sovereignty question. 
Japan shows no inclination of supporting China’s state-centric sovereignty stance. 
Meanwhile, the differences between the United States and British “sovereignty as 
a guiding principle” and the Dutch “sovereignty as a primary rule” positions may 
seem subtle, but they are strategically and tactically significant. Both positions 
accept that certain cyber operations could violate sovereignty, but much more room 
exists to maneuver “proactively” under the U.S. model.145 Moreover, in the absence 
of consensus among states, the U.S. position seems to be the most likely to guide 
activities within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
Japan’s plans to increase cyber situational awareness and information 
sharing would benefit from the Japanese government adopting the “sovereignty 
as a guiding principle” position. This viewpoint would still require considering 
sovereignty when conducting cyber operations, and it could help to preserve 
Japan’s standing as a promoter of, and adherent to, the rule of law. Yet treating 
sovereignty as a guiding principle in the cyber context would also provide Japan 
with considerable freedom to decide when and how to conduct cyber operations. 
USE OF FORCE AND ARMED ATTACK
“A cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable 
to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”
 —TALLINN 2.0 – RULE 69: DEFINITION OF USE OF FORCE146
As with sovereignty, states take differing views on what constitutes a use of force or 
armed attack in cyberspace. Yet the general consensus does seem to center on the 
proposition that “Whether a cyber operation constitutes an armed attack depends 
on its scale and effects.”147 This issue is of particular interest to the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance since the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty focuses so heavily on armed attack as 
the standard triggering much of the cooperative arrangement.148 Understandings 
articulated by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the 
French Ministère des Armées149 are illustrative of states’ diverging viewpoints. 
Then State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh first firmly established 
the U.S. government’s position in 2012, explaining that “[c]yber activities that 
proximately result in death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be viewed 
as a use of force.”150 Koh cited as examples: “(1) operations that trigger a nuclear 
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plant meltdown; (2) operations that open a dam above a populated area causing 
destruction; or (3) operations that disable air traffic control resulting in airplane 
crashes.”151 At a high level, this U.S. position is largely unchanged.152 However, 
the Department of Defense more recently has expressed the standard without 
presenting such extreme examples. Recently U.S. Department of Defense General 
Counsel, Paul Ney, Jr., announced, “DoD lawyers consider whether the operation 
causes physical injury or damage that would be considered a use of force if caused 
solely by traditional means like a missile or a mine.”153 
The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France have presented opinions 
that have some common foundations but also offer important distinctions. The 
United Kingdom’s position has been presented in language that reflects the UN 
Charter closely, speaking to the prohibition on the threat or use of force and 
describing armed attack via cyber operations as those that “result in, or present 
an imminent threat of, death and destruction on an equivalent scale to an 
armed attack.”154 The Netherlands makes case-by-case determinations based on 
“how serious and far-reaching the cyber operation’s consequences are, whether 
it is military in nature, and whether it is carried out by a state” with, again, 
primary focus on “when the effects of the operation are comparable to those of a 
conventional act of violence covered by the prohibition.”155
France takes an effects-based test like the others, but it does not require 
physical effects to find a use of force—turning instead to a non-exhaustive list 
of criteria to be considered, including: “the overall circumstances surrounding 
the operation, the origin of the operation and the nature of the attacker (i.e., the 
military character of the operation), the degree of intrusion, the effects intended 
or achieved by the operation and the nature of the target.”156 Additionally, France 
distinguishes between uses of force and armed attack. “Only those operations which 
are comparable to an armed attack by conventional means would fall under Art. 
51 UN Charter. This, in turn, depends on the gravity of the effects caused by the 
cyber operation, their reach and reversibility.”157 There are criteria to be considered 
for armed attack, as well.158 Finally, France argues that an “accumulation of events” 
is also a basis for concluding that an armed attack has occurred, meaning that the 
cumulative effects of events that would not otherwise themselves constitute armed 
attack could nevertheless cross the threshold collectively.159
The distinction that France draws between the use of force and armed attack 
is an understanding under international law espoused by many states (not just in 
cyberspace, but generally). Japan agrees that international law draws a distinction 
between lesser forms of the use of force and armed attack160 as reflected in the 
International Court of Justice’s Nicaragua161 decision. 
Furthermore, for Japan armed attack means the “organized and 
premeditated use of force against Japan.”162 The Japanese government has also 
commented that a “cyberattack carried out as part of an armed attack” and a 
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“cyber-only attack” could both themselves rise to the level of armed attack, but it 
has not expounded on this view publicly or offered public comment on applying 
effects-based tests in the cyber context. Presumably, Japan would continue 
to focus on organization and premeditation as leading elements of the state’s 
analysis.163 To the extent that collective self-defense might be implicated, there 
would also be reason to analyze the Cabinet’s relatively recent move to reinterpret 
Article 9 and the potential for that reinterpretation to allow Japan to “use force 
in response to infringements of Japanese sovereignty that do not amount to an 
armed attack.”164 
The U.S.-Japan Alliance Security Consultative Committee’s Joint Statement 
in April 2019 indicated that the procedures utilized by the U.S.-Japan Alliance to 
review such matters remain largely unchanged. “The Ministers also affirmed that a 
decision as to when a cyber attack would constitute an armed attack under Article 
V would be made on a case-by-case basis, and through close consultations between 
Japan and the United States, as would be the case for any other threat.”165 This 
suggests that the United States and Japan, in the context of the Alliance, like other 
states will consider such circumstances as they arise and that they should have an 
opportunity to share perspectives and potentially make joint declarations about 
adversaries’ cyber operations. It also presents an opportunity for Japan to disagree 
with U.S. viewpoints—possibly characterizing incidents as more or less severe or 
differing on the propriety of response options.166
It may be most advantageous for the Japanese government to withhold 
presenting a detailed position on what, precisely, constitutes armed attack or use 
of force in the cyber context until such circumstances arise. Acknowledging that 
cyber operations can manifest as armed attack or use of force has been helpful 
in advancing international law and establishing expectations for state conduct. 
However, the self-interests of the United States and Japan weigh in favor of 
maintaining flexibility in future legal policy decisions—of waiting to assess the 
gravity of cyber incidents, the circumstances prevailing at some future time, and 
how such choices will impact interests of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. This approach 
should also permit the allies, in the interim, to move forward with proactive 
security measures in and through cyberspace and to consider carefully how best to 
stay below the use of force threshold while protecting “beyond the blue” and across 
the gray zone.
Non-intervention
“A State may not intervene, including by cyber means, in the internal or external 
affairs of another State.”
—TALLINN 2.0 – RULE 66: INTERVENTION BY STATES167
Although the principle of non-intervention is widely recognized under 
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international law,168 its application is very much contested. The lines between 
sovereignty and non-intervention are often blurred.169 The parameters of unlawful 
coercion, an element of the principle, are unsettled even outside of cyberspace,170 
thereby making it exceedingly difficult for states to agree—internally or externally—
on how the principle might apply to cyberspace.171 Furthermore, among other 
factors, the geopolitical implications of Russian misinformation campaigns, 
Chinese hacking and broader information warfare, and the United States’ generally 
active role on a number of fronts in cyberspace have turned discussion about non-
intervention into more of a political arena than a true consensus building initiative 
or legal discourse.
Arguably, coercion is the most important element of unlawful 
intervention.172 International law does not define coercion and its application to 
matters of national security has long been debated. Still, coercion is generally 
understood as involving an element of compulsion (i.e., compelling a state to take a 
certain action or act in a certain way, or to refrain from taking action in a particular 
context).173 Furthermore, “the coercion must take place in relation to ‘matters of an 
inherently sovereign nature’, i.e. those over which the state has exclusive authority, 
including a state’s political, economic, social and cultural systems.”174
Tallinn 2.0 demonstrates difficulties in building consensus around the 
element of coercion within the broader non-intervention principle—even among 
scholars. While recognizing that “[c]oercion sufficient to support a finding of 
unlawful intervention may take either a direct or indirect form,” the group of 
experts could not agree on a number of points regarding unlawful coercion as an 
element of intervention.175 Issues that were debated but ultimately not resolved 
involved causality, knowledge of the operation creating the effects, protection of 
nationals abroad, and humanitarian intervention.176
Additionally, coercion, in and of itself, is insufficient to find unlawful 
intervention. Unlawful intervention is generally understood to require both 
coercion and interference into another state’s domaine réservé. Thus, a second 
element of intervention is whether the cyber operations interfered with “matters 
in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide 
freely.”177 
Despite the absence of international consensus on a number of details, the 
Netherlands provides a useful summary of the non-intervention principle and its 
importance in cyberspace:
The development of advanced digital technologies has given states more 
opportunities to exert influence outside their own borders and to interfere 
in the affairs of other states. Attempts to influence election outcomes 
via social media are an example of this phenomenon. International law 
sets boundaries on this kind of activity by means of the non-intervention 
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principle, which is derived from the principle of sovereignty.
…Intervention is defined as interference in the internal or external affairs 
of another state with a view to employing coercion against that state. Such 
affairs concern matters over which, in accordance with the principle of 
sovereignty, states themselves have exclusive authority. National elections 
are an example of internal affairs.
…The precise definition of coercion, and thus of unauthorised intervention, 
has not yet fully crystallised in international law. In essence it means 
compelling a state to take a course of action (whether an act or an omission) 
that it would not otherwise voluntarily pursue. The goal of the intervention 
must be to effect change in the behaviour of the target state.178
  
France’s position goes a bit further, explaining that a cyber operation “interfering 
in its internal or external affairs constitutes prohibited intervention if it is likely 
to affect the French political, economic or social system.” This statement generally 
aligns with the concept of France’s military and economy falling within the state’s 
domaine réservé as a matter of international law.179 
In summary, discussions about non-intervention are colored by states’ 
concerns about the perceptions of allies and partners, as well as the potential for 
adversaries’ reciprocal conduct.180 Most public remarks by states fail to offer much 
clarity on non-intervention beyond vague attestations to the principle’s importance 
and political statements about issues like election interference. Nevertheless, this is 
clearly a topic of great importance. 
It is a subject that will likely lend itself to contesting the United States’ 
defend forward posture, and perhaps Japan’s more proactive approach, depending 
on how such policies manifest themselves. Japanese government officials interested 
in ensuring that Self-Defense Force cyber units have sufficiently forward-looking 
authority to protect Japan’s political, economic, social and cultural systems might 
consider bolstering National Defense Program Guidelines and Guidelines of U.S.-
Japan Defense Cooperation with legislation that focuses more directly on sub-use 
of force activities threatening Japan’s domaine réservé. Additionally, the rule of non-
intervention should be expected to continue to provide the allies with a basis to 
decry as illegal such coercive cyber activities that intervene in the domaine réservé 
of the United States and Japan. 
138     Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance
COUNTERMEASURES: COLLECTIVE RESPONSES AND NOTICE
“A state may be entitled to take countermeasures, whether cyber in nature or not, in 
response to a breach of an international legal obligation that it is owed by another 
State.”
—TALLINN 2.0 – RULE 20: COUNTERMEASURES (GENERAL PRINCIPLE)181
In May of 2019, the President of the Republic of Estonia offered a low-key but 
potentially significant announcement before the international community. 
Speaking at the opening of CyCon 2019, President Kersti Kaljulaid declared:
Estonia is furthering the position that states which are not directly injured 
may apply countermeasures to support the state directly affected by the 
malicious cyber operation. … International security and the rules-based 
international order have long benefitted from collective efforts to stop 
the violations. … The threats to the security of states increasingly involve 
unlawful cyber operations. It is therefore important that states may 
respond collectively to unlawful cyber operations where diplomatic action is 
insufficient, but no lawful recourse to use of force exists. Allies matter also in 
cyberspace.182
Estonia’s on-record support for the proposition that states could conduct 
countermeasures in response to acts affecting other states flew in the face of 
established views of international law on countermeasures. 
Countermeasures, of course, are “actions or omissions by an injured State 
directed against a responsible State that would violate an obligation owed by the 
former to the latter but for qualification as a countermeasure.”183 Furthermore, 
it has been understood that countermeasures must follow very specific 
criteria.184 Among those requirements, “[o]nly an injured State may engage in 
countermeasures, whether cyber in nature or not.”185 Admittedly, rumblings have 
existed for years about whether there might be ways around this limitation.186 
But Kaljulaid chose instead to tackle the topic head on. She couched 
Estonia’s position in terms that were pragmatic, embracing mutual defense 
precedent and reflecting the interconnected nature of the contemporary world. 
Although it is too soon to know whether other states might embrace (or reject) this 
position, a movement to overcome the classic understanding that countermeasures 
are limited to the injured state could be useful for the U.S.-Japan Alliance’s plans 
for increased and enhanced cooperation in cyberspace.
Another aspect of countermeasures worth monitoring is the issue of 
notification. In his March 2020 remarks at U.S. Cyber Command, the Department 
of Defense General Counsel commented: 
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In the traditional view, the use of countermeasures must be preceded by 
notice to the offending State, though we note that there are varying State 
views on whether notice would be necessary in all cases in the cyber context 
because of secrecy or urgency. In a particular case it may be unclear whether 
a particular malicious cyber activity violates international law. And, in 
other circumstances, it may not be apparent that the act is internationally 
wrongful and attributable to a State within the timeframe in which the 
DOD must respond to mitigate the threat. In these circumstances, which we 
believe are common, countermeasures would not be available. 187
The United Kingdom Attorney General offered a similar perspective in 2018:
The one area where the UK departs from the excellent work of the 
International Law Commission on this issue is where the UK is responding 
to covert cyber intrusion with countermeasures. In such circumstances, we 
would not agree that we are always legally obliged to give prior notification 
to the hostile state before taking countermeasures against it. The covertness 
and secrecy of the countermeasures must of course be considered necessary 
and proportionate to the original illegality, but we say it could not be right 
for international law to require a countermeasure to expose highly sensitive 
capabilities in defending the country in the cyber arena, as in any other 
arena.188
To emphasize the point, notice of countermeasures in cyberspace is a contentious 
issue. The large majority of states and scholars would likely consider the 
requirements of countermeasures to be well-settled law outside of the cyber 
domain. Yet many would still deem the countermeasures requirements to apply in 
cyberspace as well.
Nevertheless, there are certainly aspects of cyberspace that are 
fundamentally different than other domains, and due consideration should be 
given to the uniqueness of the environment as it pertains to the applicability of 
international law. If Japan wishes to engage in necessary, temporary responsive 
measures sufficient to subdue cyber threats (or to ask for assistance from others on 
its behalf, whether under the Estonian collective countermeasures position or other 
legal justifications), speed and discretion will be key to successful cyber defenses.
As General Nakasone explained, ultimately, “in cyberspace it’s the use of 
cyber capabilities that is strategically consequential. The threat of using something 
in cyberspace is not as powerful as actually using it because that’s what our 
adversaries are doing to us. They are actively in our network communications, 
attempting to steal data and impact our weapons systems. So advantage is gained 
by those who maintain a continual state of action.”189
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On this issue Japan would clearly benefit from supporting Estonia’s view 
that collective countermeasures can be necessary and lawful in the cyber context. 
Japan might also want to endorse the U.S. and U.K. government views that notice 
of countermeasures is not feasible or legally required in certain circumstances. 
Both of these positions could be of great importance to mutual defense within the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance.
Scenarios 
Part III of this paper considers the foregoing principles in the context of three 
scenarios involving hypothetical, adversarial action in and through cyberspace. It 
addresses each by considering how international law might shape the use of cyber 
capabilities by the United States and Japan as well as broader actions that the U.S.-
Japan Alliance could take in response.
The scenarios presented herein are: (1) an armed attack conducted 
through cyberspace and causing significant physical injury and damage; (2) cyber 
operations resulting in minimal physical injury or damage but that might still be 
considered a use of force; and (3) persistent, malicious cyber operations below 
the use of force threshold. These fact patterns are analyzed through the lens, 
mechanisms, and objectives of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. 
This section embraces a generalized notion of the United States’ defend 
forward posture and an emerging vision of Japanese proactive cyber defenses, 
allowing for the possibility of combined operations and perhaps a mutually reliant 
defensive cyber architecture to be developed over time.190 Furthermore, it assumes 
an operational environment in general terms as described throughout this paper. 
U.S. and Japanese cyber forces will be dealing with sophisticated, persistent cyber 
threats across all three scenarios irrespective of whether so stated within individual 
fact patterns. 
As a preliminary matter, it should also be noted that the author’s 
commentary assumes that some amount of U.S. and/or Japanese government cyber 
intelligence collection will occur throughout the scenarios and that establishing 
placement and access in foreign systems and networks prior to the incidents 
described in the scenarios may be necessary to facilitate cyber intelligence 
collection and defensive measures.191 This framing relies to an extent on the U.S. 
and U.K. governments’ position that international law does not specifically prohibit 
intelligence collection and that espionage is left to states to criminalize.192 It also 
reflects Japan’s 2019 National Defense Program Guidelines for the Self-Defense 
Force to “conduct on a steady-state basis persistent monitoring as well as collection 
and analysis of relevant information.”193 However, this section does acknowledge, 
where appropriate, states’ competing conceptions of cyber sovereignty and the non-
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intervention principle as well as how those views bear on the facts presented.  
The author also takes into account the U.S.-Japan Alliance’s concept of 
operations for cross-domain operations194 and its stated goals for cooperation in 
cyberspace.195 This section attempts to give credence to the Defense Cooperation 
Guidelines’ focus on “flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to 
each situation.”196 Of greatest significance, the scenarios that follow accept the U.S. 
and Japanese governments’ basic plan for responding to “cyber incidents against 
Japan” and “serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan.”197 
Ultimately this section focuses on the ability of U.S. and Japanese cyber 
forces to conduct defensive measures consistent with international law198 and 
treaty obligations, their respective domestic legal regimes, and implementing 
arrangements for the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In particular, the scenarios should test 
the extent to which Japan and the United States might more effectively defend 
their computer systems and networks unilaterally or bilaterally and how the 
aforementioned settled and unsettled areas of international law weigh on legal 
policy choices that will be made during the implementation of the defend forward 
and proactive defense strategies. 
Scenario 1
Japan suffers large-scale cyber operations against its commercial and governmental 
infrastructure, relying on placement and access established in cyberspace over the 
preceding years. These cyber operations cause a meltdown in a Japanese nuclear 
plant. The meltdown causes substantial loss of life, physical damage, and economic 
harm. To cause a meltdown appears to have been the intent of the perpetrators of the 
operations. These events occur following a period of high tensions with State A, which 
is unhappy with Japan’s persistent public opposition to its ballistic missile program.
Scenario 1 will likely be considered an armed attack conducted through cyberspace. 
The Japanese government has stated that “cyberattack carried out as part of 
an armed attack” and “cyber-only attack” could both themselves rise to the 
level of armed attack; however, Japan has otherwise not specified its views on 
what constitutes armed attack in or through cyberspace. Nevertheless, the facts 
presented in Scenario 1 suggest significant organization and premeditation199 and 
align directly with examples provided by the U.S.200 and U.K. governments.201 
Furthermore, the same conclusion would almost certainly be drawn under the 
factors embraced by the Dutch and French and outlined in Tallinn 2.0. The 
deliberate initiation of a nuclear meltdown in one state by another, whatever the 
means, would be a grave use of force. The Japanese government would have to take 
an extremely conservative position to conclude that these cyber operations do not 
rise to the level of armed attack.202 
Any response would need to consider the issue of attribution.203 With what 
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degree of confidence and how quickly could the cyber operations be attributed to 
State A? Would State A acknowledge that it conducted the cyber operations? If 
State A disavowed its role in the operations, could the denial be challenged publicly 
and by convincing means? Two prevailing views exist on what is required for 
attribution prior to taking action against an offending state. One view holds that 
attribution requires certainty; the other takes the position that attribution must 
be reasonable and based on facts available at the time of response.204 The United 
States takes the latter position:
“[A] State acts as its own judge of the facts and may make a unilateral 
determination with respect to attribution of a cyber operation to another 
State. Absolute certainty is not—and cannot be—required. Instead, 
international law generally requires that States act reasonably under the 
circumstances when they gather information and draw conclusions based on 
that information.”205
The relevance of this position to the U.S.-Japan Alliance should not be 
underestimated. Attribution of cyber operations can be a complex and uncertain 
endeavor. Yet it is also necessary and often times quite feasible. Speed of attribution 
can be a challenge—particularly when working to combat ongoing activities and 
develop response options and legal justifications—but it, too, can be achieved in 
many instances. If the Japanese government was to instead turn to a more onerous 
standard of certainty in attribution, it seems likely that responding in self-defense 
in a timely manner, if ever, could prove challenging.206 
Assuming that the operations are attributable to State A, State A’s cyber 
operations would violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and implicate Article 
51 of UN Charter and Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The Japanese 
government would be expected to notify the UN Security Council of the armed 
attack, seek assistance, and consult with the U.S. government.207 Consultation 
with the U.S. government would be consistent with the Guidelines for U.S.-
Japan Cooperation based upon “serious cyber incidents that affect the security of 
Japan.”208 
It is unclear whether the Japanese government would wait for UN Security 
Council action or, instead, respond immediately and perhaps in partnership with 
the United States in light of the gravity of the attack and presumably the necessity 
of taking immediate action in self-defense.209 Self-defense under international law 
would permit the use of necessary and proportional force, including lethal force, in 
response.210 International law would not require a response to be conducted in or 
through cyberspace. 
Other questions that might be raised—perhaps further into the future—
include how State A was able to conduct this attack and whether its cyber 
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placement and access in the years leading up to the attack constituted violations 
of sovereignty or the prohibition against unlawful intervention. Here competing 
international law perspectives of states might inform the review. It might be 
difficult for British or U.S. officials to conclude that the placement and access, 
in and of itself, constituted violations of international law since both states view 
intelligence collection and some degree of nonconsensual entry as historic state 
practice not prohibited by international law. Perhaps identification of some coercive 
activities might give rise to unlawful intervention even under these views. On the 
other hand, certain other states might suggest that both sovereignty and the non-
intervention principle were violated.211  
However, as a practical matter, questions about sovereignty and non-
intervention might be of little consequence in this scenario relative to the 
conclusion that the cyber operations constitute armed attack. The armed attack 
determination would provide legal justification for the most significant potential 
response that Japan might make, whether individually or in partnership under the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance.212
The consequences of Scenario 1 weigh in favor of robust and proactive 
cybersecurity measures that do not wait for armed attack to manifest in or through 
cyberspace. Not every cyber operation can be prevented, and it is unclear whether 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance could have prevented or detected the placement and access 
gained by State A even had the Alliance been defending forward in an aggressive, 
collaborative, and cost-imposing posture. Yet certainly some degree of risk can be 
mitigated through the more proactive approaches the allies are instituting. Taking 
positions that would view sovereignty as an international law principle in the cyber 
context and that would permit collective countermeasures, even without giving 
notice to the offending state in certain circumstances, could lead to significant 
improvements in cyber situational awareness and information sharing, enhanced 
cyber deterrence, and necessary responsive actions, thereby mitigating the risk of 
Scenario 1 unfolding. 
Scenario 2
State B, seeking to refine its tactics and measure effects in advance of the next 
phase of its cyber campaign targeting U.S. elections, initiates cyber operations 
targeting Japanese media platforms and public transportation. 213 Servers are taken 
offline, Tokyo trains stop running, and emergency communications networks in 
three Japanese cities are temporarily degraded or disabled. It is unclear whether 
any physical injury or damage resulted directly from the cyber operations, but 
preliminary reports suggest that any physical injury or damage was “minimal.” 
Meanwhile, false information about Japanese government officials, which has been 
filling social media for weeks, has begun to appear in the form of scrolling banners at 
the bottom of television stations that appear to be real news updates presented by the 
144     Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance
television stations. However, State B makes a major error in its tradecraft and these 
activities are quickly attributable (i.e., while State B’s cyber operations continue). 
Prominent Japanese government officials are questioning whether State B’s actions 
constitute armed attack and whether there may be implications under the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty.
Scenario 2 is not likely to be considered armed attack. Nevertheless, it 
is possible that the Japanese government would determine that State B’s cyber 
operations violate the use of force prohibition under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
The Japanese government also would have a reasonable basis to conclude that 
these activities constitute an unlawful intervention in Japan’s sovereign affairs, 
thereby providing legal justification to resort to countermeasures if necessary. 
Japan could respond in or through cyberspace, by other means not involving cyber 
operations, or through some combination of the two.
When analyzing whether the facts presented constitute armed attack 
through cyberspace, other states’ views are informative in the absence of a more 
detailed public statement of the Japanese government position.214 Scenario 2 
does not reach the baselines for armed attack (or use of force) that the U.S. State 
and Defense Departments have explained publicly and that were reviewed under 
Scenario 1.215 The cyber operations did not “proximately result in death, injury, 
or significant destruction” or cause “physical injury or damage that would be 
considered a use of force if caused solely by traditional means like a missile or a 
mine.”216 
The Japanese government also could look to other views on armed attack in 
cyberspace. The Dutch position is particularly interesting under Scenario 2 because 
it asserts that if “a cyber-attack … prevents the government from carrying out 
essential tasks such as policing or taxation … it would qualify as an armed attack.”217 
This may be the most expansive state view on cyber armed attack, presenting a lens 
through which the Japanese government might consider effects on the Japanese 
government itself—which might be significant because emergency communications 
networks, servers, and railways were interrupted. 
Embracing this approach could have profound implications for the U.S.-
Japan Alliance. Most directly, while a conclusion that an armed attack has occurred 
does not require injured states to respond with force, such a determination 
would trigger Article V of the U.S. Japan Security Treaty, lead to the initiation of 
consultations between the allies, and create a justification for response.218 This 
would give Japan greater freedom to respond to State B’s cyber operations, but 
it might also serve as precedent for other states that might want to characterize 
future cyber operations as armed attack. For example, might North Korea argue 
that operations targeting its ballistic missile program “prevent the government 
from carrying out essential tasks”? Could China take a similar position over 
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cyber operations that interfere with the state’s internal control over information 
content?219 
There may be a better legal policy choice to be made—and a stronger case 
under international law—that State B’s cyber operations violate Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter. Japan is one of the many states that recognize a substantive difference 
between armed attack under Article 51 and use of force under Article 2(4). Such 
views tend to rely on the Nicaragua judgment—reserving the concept of armed 
attack to only the “most grave” uses of force and accepting that certain “scale and 
effects” of operations can, in the aggregate, still rise to the level of violating Article 
2(4).220 In cyberspace, this proffered distinction between armed attack and use of 
force is not insignificant. 
Tallinn 2.0 attempts to apply this reasoning to cyberspace, suggesting “[a] 
cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable 
to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”221 Furthermore, this 
general approach is not merely a concept embraced by a group of experts. The 
Netherlands and France are among the states that would apply their own factors to 
use of force analysis.222 They would look at what is being done, by whom, and how 
and consider the totality of effects on the state—without necessarily requiring any 
physical injury or damage.  
In this scenario, the Japanese government might look towards these other 
(non-U.S. government) perspectives as persuasive arguments for why the use of 
force question should be answered without a strict requirement for physical injury 
or damage.223 Japan might then reasonably conclude that State B’s cyber operations 
violated Article 2(4).
The consequences of finding a violation of Article 2(4) could be significant. 
The Japanese government would almost certainly notify the UN Security Council 
of these events and seek assistance while also consulting with its American allies.224 
The U.S.-Japan Alliance would likely consider in this context the U.S. positions 
that “the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of 
force” and that “any cyber operation that constitutes an illegal use of force against 
a State potentially gives rise to a right to take necessary and proportionate action 
in self-defense.”225 Concluding that Article 2(4) was violated could provide legal 
justification for a wide range of responses, including self-defense and operations 
conducted in or through cyberspace, outside of cyberspace, or some combination of 
the two.226
Even if the cyber operations were not deemed to constitute armed attack 
or use of force, they might still be viewed as violations of the international law 
prohibition on coercive intervention in foreign sovereign affairs.227 Under the law of 
state responsibility228, the non-intervention principle would be examined for breach 
by State B.229 The non-intervention rule “prohibits coercive intervention, including 
by cyber means, by one State into the internal or external affairs of another.”230 On 
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their face, the facts—cyber operations impacting public transportation, emergency 
communications, and media platforms—might sound like obvious examples of 
interference in the internal dealings of another state. But the element of coercion is 
a required—and elusive—element necessary for finding unlawful intervention.  
Had these operations been designed to impact Japanese elections instead 
of to refine tactics and measure effects in preparation for future operations against 
U.S. elections, there may have been a clearer case of coercion. Instead, Scenario 2 
leads to an unsettled area of international law. Some debate exists about whether 
coercion requires attempting to influence outcomes or conduct in the targeted state 
or whether in cyberspace merely taking control out of the hands of the state or its 
citizens can be coercion.231 Under the former majority position, it would be difficult 
to find coercion in Scenario 2 (i.e., What would State B be seeking to compel the 
Japanese government or its citizens to do or not do?). Under the latter minority 
view, the revocation of control over transportation, emergency communications, 
and media from the state and its citizenry to State B might allow for a finding of 
coercion and unlawful intervention. 
The U.S. Department of Defense has asserted that “a cyber operation by 
a State that interferes with another country’s ability to hold an election or that 
tampers with ‘another country’s election results would be a clear violation of the 
rule of non-intervention.’”232 That position, while not defined in great detail in 
public, likely focuses on political choice as a matter fundamental to states and not 
open to external coercion.233 It also echoes the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, 
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of another State. 
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.234
And if election interference constitutes a clear violation, then the Japanese 
government might have a reasonable case to make that the invasive activities 
directed into Japan could also be unlawful intervention.
Based on a conclusion of unlawful intervention, the Japanese government 
(or perhaps the U.S.-Japan Alliance) might resort to countermeasures.235 “The 
customary international law doctrine of countermeasures permits a State that is 
the victim of an internationally wrongful act of another State to take otherwise 
unlawful measures against the responsible State in order to cause that State to 
comply with its international obligations, for example, the obligation to cease 
its internationally wrongful act.”236 Here countermeasures would need to target 
State B,237 be necessary and proportional, be designed to compel State B to meet 
its obligations under international law, and stop when State B complies. The 
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traditional view of countermeasures doctrine has limited their use such that only 
the affected state (here, Japan238) can engage in countermeasures. 
However, Estonia’s argument as to why international law should be 
understood to allow collective countermeasures in the interconnected and 
increasingly interdependent cyber domain warrants attention. “Allies matter also 
in cyberspace.”239 This position aligns well with Article IV of the Guidelines for 
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and recent statements by the U.S. and Japanese 
governments about their intentions to collaborate in cyberspace.240 There might 
be countermeasures opportunities that could only be accomplished through 
the more robust cyber architecture, more substantial cyber forces, or perhaps 
unique placement and access that the U.S. government would have. If cyber 
countermeasures were determined by the allies to be the most legally appropriate 
and effective response to Scenario 2, it would be difficult to envision the U.S. and 
Japanese governments refraining from conducting some form of combined or U.S. 
cyber operations as countermeasures solely out of deference to the historic view 
that countermeasures could only be undertaken by the affected state.241
Japan might also be required as a matter of international law to give State B 
notice prior to initiating countermeasures. Although “there are varying State views 
on whether notice would be necessary in all cases in the cyber context because of 
secrecy or urgency,” 242 the U.S. government is among those states that believe that 
notice of countermeasures may not always be required in cyberspace. The United 
States takes the position that notice of countermeasures “should be evaluated on 
a case-by-case basis in light of the particular circumstances of the situation at 
hand and the purpose of the requirement.”243 The United Kingdom agrees and has 
explained, “The covertness and secrecy of the countermeasures must of course be 
considered necessary and proportionate to the original illegality, but we say it could 
not be right for international law to require a countermeasure to expose highly 
sensitive capabilities in defending the country in the cyber arena, as in any other 
arena.”244
This, too, is an important position that Japan could consider—ideally, well 
in advance of circumstances like those described in Scenario 2. The Japanese 
government might view notice as an opportunity to de-escalate while informing 
State B that the cyber operations have been attributed to them and to warn of 
consequences should the violation persist. On the other hand, the Japanese 
government might determine that notice could foreclose opportunity to take more 
decisive action against State B’s cyber capabilities through means and methods 
that might be rendered ineffective, or that might be inappropriately disclosed 
if advance notice was provided. Whichever option the Japanese Government 
might want to choose under Scenario 2, clearly the most advantageous legal 
policy position to take regarding notice is one that accepts the relatively unique 
circumstances of cyberspace as a basis for rejecting the traditional view that notice 
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of countermeasures is always required. 
Scenario 3 
State C has long-standing maritime and territorial disputes with Japan. State C 
also does not appreciate the U.S.-Japan Alliance and regularly objects to American 
military presence in the region. State C is known to have been probing Japanese and 
U.S. command and control systems for years, looking for vulnerabilities to exploit. As 
U.S. and Japanese ships are conducting close quarters naval and air exercises in and 
above international waters in the region, State C, relying on previously unknown 
vulnerabilities in Alliance networks, launches a cyber attack that deliberately 
disrupts command and control of the two nations’ ships and aircraft. This disruption 
creates a significant risk of damaging or deadly collision, but thanks to the skill of the 
relevant crews no injuries or damage occur.
Although Scenario 3 likely does not rise to the level of armed attack, it skirts 
the edges of use of force and unlawful intervention. Most likely, the facts presented 
herein would be viewed as another example of persistent, malicious state cyber 
activity for which arguments could be made that international law was violated but 
that the U.S.-Japan Alliance might instead address through the defend forward and 
proactive security strategies.245 
The absence of any physical injury or damage makes it unlikely that Scenario 
3 would be viewed as armed attack.246 The limited duration and effects also make 
it doubtful, although not impossible, that the cyber operations would constitute 
use of force. The cyber operations likely involved substantial organization and 
premeditation. However, the “scale and effects” of the cyber operations were 
limited and ultimately inconsequential, which weighs against concluding that this 
was a use of force under Nicaragua.247 Likewise, factors used by the U.S., Dutch, 
and French governments to consider cyber use of force questions, as well as those 
promoted in Tallinn 2.0, suggest that this incident does not rise to the level of use 
of force.248 For example, the operations were not particularly severe or far-reaching. 
They appear to have disrupted command and control systems temporarily and 
without further incident and are not known to have interfered with anything other 
than the targeted ships and aircraft. Their impact may have been seen as dramatic 
at the time of occurrence, and the safety of the ships and aircraft and their crew is 
certainly highly significant; however, it would be difficult to point to consequences 
of any real gravity that might approach the use of force.249 To the extent that the 
United States or Japan were to conclude though that the disruption was intended 
to produce or would have a reasonably foreseeable effect of damage to equipment 
or injury or death of the crews, they might conclude that it was indeed an armed 
attack, albeit an ineffectual armed attack.   
Whether the disruption constitutes a prohibited coercive intervention 
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in U.S. or Japanese sovereign prerogatives is a closer call.250 As a preliminary 
matter, command of military forces is a core sovereign prerogative of states. Even 
while beyond the respective territorial seas, warships and military aircraft enjoy 
sovereign immune status, although with somewhat narrower protections against 
interference than international law provides for the geographic territory of states.251 
Thus, deliberate disruption of command and control of those units raises generally 
the issues of a prohibited coercive intervention discussed previously in this paper. 
In essence, it matters little that these exercises were being conducted at sea and in 
the air beyond the territorial seas of any coastal state. In fact, operations targeting 
military assets conducting close quarters exercises, and the inherent danger of such 
conduct, might cause heightened interest in more aggressive, cost-producing cyber 
operations targeting State C. 
Additionally, a strong basis does appear to exist to conclude that the 
cyber attack involved coercion—perhaps that State C was seeking to compel the 
allies to stop the combined exercise and/or reduce the United States’ role in the 
region.252 And State C did disrupt military command and control systems, thereby 
implicating the minority, control theory of coercion discussed under Scenario 
2. Moreover, in Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice placed particular 
emphasis on military acts and implications in analyzing unlawful intervention. 
But coercion, in and of itself, is insufficient to find unlawful intervention. 
Unlawful intervention is generally understood to require both coercion and 
interference into another state’s domaine réservé. Thus, a second element of 
intervention is whether the cyber operations interfered with “matters in which each 
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely.”253 
The general inviolability of state sovereign vessels and aircraft and the 
core nature of the sovereign interest in command and control of state military 
forces might suggest that these operations crossed a line into the domaine réservé 
of the United States and Japan. However, the contours of domaine réservé under 
international law are vague and not well-developed—especially in cyberspace. 
There may be, for example, distinctions between intrusion into military systems 
for intelligence collection, non-intrusive disruption of military systems on the high 
sea, and intrusion to usurp command of the victim’s forces. Historically, states 
have accessed other nations’ military systems for a variety of purposes, including 
intelligence collection and placement and access in advance of potential future 
operations. The absence of opinio juris in this area of customary international 
law, combined with state practice, casts doubt that the mere disruption of military 
command and control systems is per se an intervention within states’ domain 
réservé. 
It is certainly possible that the U.S. and Japanese governments might jointly 
conclude, even in secret, that the rule of non-intervention was violated and that 
response via countermeasures would be legally justified. Such a conclusion could 
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feed into the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation process, with the incident likely to be 
viewed from the Japanese perspective as a “cyber incident against Japan” for which 
“Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and … the United States will 
provide appropriate support to Japan.”254 The U.S. government would be expected 
to draw its own legal conclusions—informed by, but independent of, what might 
be discussed with Japanese officials—and to be prepared to exercise its rights in 
response to Scenario 3.255
Ultimately, while it may be unclear where the U.S.-Japan Alliance would 
come down on the issue of unlawful intervention under Scenario 3, the question 
may be of little practical consequence. Unless the violation continues (i.e., State 
C continues to disrupt or resumes disrupting Alliance command and control 
systems), the violation appears to have ended. Countermeasures would normally 
not be permitted as a response to conduct that has terminated.
Rather Scenario 3 might be an example of the types of circumstances against 
which Japan and the United States would look to more effectively defend their 
networks, unilaterally or bilaterally, in the future without needing to conclude that 
armed attack, use of force, or unlawful intervention had occurred, was occurring, or 
was imminent256 and without necessarily seeking broader international support or 
UN Security Council sanctions. 257 Instead of waiting for similar operations to cause 
actual harm in the future, the U.S.-Japan Alliance might find even greater merit in 
the states’ strategies to defend forward and conduct proactive defense.  
This raises the plea of necessity as a final legal justification for action.258 In 
the future, the U.S.-Japan Alliance may very well find sufficient room to maneuver 
without resorting to necessity. Some combination of diplomacy, retorsion259, self-
defense, countermeasures, and the general freedom to operate under jus extra 
bellum may prove adequate for defending forward and proactive security. If not—
and if there is no other way to “safeguard an essential interest against a grave and 
imminent peril”260 —then necessity is another option. While some view reliance on 
the plea of necessity with skepticism, nevertheless necessity is a well-established 
legal justification in international law. 
The plea of necessity, which applies equally inside and outside of 
cyberspace,261 does present a high bar. “Acting on the basis of necessity is only 
permissible when a State’s essential interests are gravely threatened.”262 Yet it would 
seem that any of the three scenarios discussed might involve essential interests 
of the targeted states (e.g., a nuclear plant, public transportation, emergency 
communications, media, and military ships and aircraft). 
Moreover, necessity may be invoked as legal justification without attribution 
of unlawful conduct to a state (e.g., no requirement to demonstrate that State C 
used force or engaged in an unlawful intervention).263 This could present much 
greater freedom in cyberspace if the United States and/or Japan lawfully invoke the 
plea. Furthermore, necessity seems a rather significant foundation atop which some 
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substantial amount of the U.S.-Japan Alliance’s future cyber operations might rest. 
Necessity might support precisely what would be required going forward 
from Scenario 3 and, more broadly, for the future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: more 
proactive defenses that impose costs; defending forward in the proactive pursuit of 
peace; and collective self-defense, countermeasures, and other means and methods 
of combatting advance persistent threats. 
Conclusion
 
As the United States moves ahead with clear authority to defend forward and 
directly address the most pressing threats the nation faces across cyberspace, the 
Japanese government is also well-positioned to assume the more substantial and 
impactful cyber role it seeks. The complexity, severity, and pervasiveness of cyber 
threats to the U.S.-Japan Alliance will continue to grow for the foreseeable future. 
Although cyber armed attack and use of force remain significant concerns, they 
likely will rarely manifest into concrete events. Instead, malicious “sub-use of 
force” cyber operations may present more frequent and perhaps more substantial 
occasions for Alliance forces to conduct self-help and mutual aid. The gray zone 
will likely continue to be an arena in which proactive security measures face few 
directly applicable international legal constraints and where the United States and 
Japan will retain states’ rights that support their cyber strategies. It is in this space 
where the United States and Japan can most effectively defend their computer 
systems and networks instead of waiting for adversaries to cause harm.
Japan might view the generally permissive international legal environment 
surrounding “sub-use of force” operations as an opportunity to further advance 
its ambitions as a guardian and trusted ally in cyberspace. The principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention should be given due regard, as should other 
aspects of international law applicable to cyber operations. But the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance should not feel unnecessarily constrained by international legal 
considerations when they are not applicable to facts at-hand. Rather the U.S. and 
Japanese governments might embrace the general applicability of international law 
to states’ actions in and through cyberspace while carefully considering the legal 
policy choices they will make in unsettled areas of international law. 
There is room to maneuver, and U.S. and Japanese cyber forces will 
undoubtedly want the ability to move with speed and agility. To do so, both U.S. 
and Japanese domestic law and policy will need to continue to adjust to meet 
challenges presented by new threats and technologies. Just as U.S. cyber forces 
will need to maintain operational authority to meet cyber adversaries “beyond 
the blue” in “sub-use of force” situations, Japanese cyber forces could benefit 
from clear, forward-looking domestic laws that permit engagement in persistent 
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cyber activities tailored to address advanced persistent threats without necessarily 
requiring further Cabinet decisions and Diet approval to act when time and 
circumstances do not allow.  
Both nations appear to recognize a model of cyber collaboration. The model 
requires something more than diplomacy, information sharing, and capacity 
building. As the Japanese government has explained, a profound need exists for 
both states to “take actual action.”264 The international legal framework can support 
the allies engaging in mutual defense in and through cyberspace. The necessary 
domestic legal and policy architectures will likely always be under construction to 
some degree, but the foundations have been laid for more proactive and effective 
mutual defense. 
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must be applied to situations in which the 
actions of states are masked, often deliber-
ately, by the involvement of non-state actors. 
And international law is clear - states cannot 
escape accountability under the law simply by 
the involvement of such proxy actors acting 
under their direction and control.”).
228   Egan, supra note 3 (“From a legal 
perspective, the customary international law 
of state responsibility supplies the standards 
for attributing acts, including cyber acts, to 
States. For example, cyber operations con-
ducted by organs of a State or by persons or 
entities empowered by domestic law to exer-
cise governmental authority are attributable to 
that State, if such organs, persons, or entities 
are acting in that capacity. Additionally, cyber 
operations conducted by non-State actors are 
attributable to a State under the law of state 
responsibility when such actors engage in op-
erations pursuant to the State’s instructions or 
under the State’s direction or control, or when 
the State later acknowledges and adopts the 
operations as its own.”). 
229   Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at 
312 (“A State may not intervene, including by 
cyber means, in the internal or external affairs 
of another State.”). 
230   Id.
231   See Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, 
at 318.
232   Ney, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
233   See also Nicaragua, supra note 161, ¶ 
205 (“A prohibited intervention must . . . be 
one bearing on matters in which each State 
is permitted, by the principle of sovereignty, 
to decide freely [such as] choice of a political, 
economic, social, and cultural system, and 
the formulation of public policy.”). The U.S. 
by geopolitics in light of Russia’s interference 
in the 2016 U.S. elections and reports of 
continued efforts by Russia and other states 
to engage in similar future activities by cyber 
means. 
234   G.A. Res. 2625, Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States 
(Oct. 24, 1970).
235   Discussion of collective countermea-
sures follows later in this section.
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236   Egan, supra note 3 (“[C]ountermeasures 
taken in response to internationally wrong-
ful cyber activities attributable to a State 
generally may take the form of cyber-based 
countermeasures or non-cyber-based counter-
measures. That is a decision typically within 
the discretion of the responding State and will 
depend on the circumstances.”). It should be 
victim state engaging in “otherwise unlawful 
measures.” Id. (emphasis added). Depending 
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on the sovereignty question, not all count-
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the U.S. government, “[t]he law of state re-
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or standards of proof for making a determina-
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(e.g., U.S. forces stationed in Japan).
239   “Among other options for collective re-
sponse, Estonia is furthering the position that 
states which are not directly injured may apply 
countermeasures to support the state directly 
affected by the malicious cyber operation. 
The countermeasures applied should follow 
the principle of proportionality and other 
principles established within the international 
customary law. International security and the 
rules-based international order have long 
violations. We have seen this practice in the 
form of collective self-defense against armed 
attacks. For malicious cyber operations, we 
are starting to see this in collective diplomatic 
measures I mentioned before. The threats 
to the security of states increasingly involve 
unlawful cyber operations. It is therefore 
important that states may respond collectively 
to unlawful cyber operations where diplomatic 
use of force exists. Allies matter also in cyber-
space.” Kaljulaid Remarks, supra note 182. 
240   “The United States Armed Forces and 
the Self-Defense Forces will conduct bilateral 
operations across domains to repel an armed 
attack against Japan and to deter further 
attacks. These operations will be designed 
to achieve effects across multiple domains 
simultaneously.” Dep’t of Def., Guidelines for 
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, supra note 
31, art. IV.C.2.b.v.
241   “Japan’s collective self-defense is 
tailored and limited to the defense of the 
United States, Japan’s only ally. Nevertheless, 
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anticipatory self-defense against an imminent 
threat of armed attack. . . . Japan has rejected 
that doctrine as a matter of international law.” 
Kurosaki, supra note 141, at 11. 
242   Ney, supra note 3.
243   Egan, supra note 3.
244   Wright, supra note 91 (“The one area 
where the UK departs from the excellent work 
of the International Law Commission on this 
issue is where the UK is responding to covert 
cyber intrusion with countermeasures. In 
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countermeasures against it. The covertness 
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245   Ney, supra note 3 (“We will defend for-
ward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity 
at its source, including activity that falls below 
Cyber Strategy, supra note 8, at 1. Scenario 3 
would also implicate Section IV.A.4 of Dep’t of 
Def., Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Co-
operation, supra note 31 (“The United States 
Armed Forces and the Self-Defense Forces 
will provide mutual protection of each other’s 
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that contribute to the defense of Japan in a 
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and exercises.”).
246   Scenario 3 would not implicate the 
armed attack provisions of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty. See also CDR Peter Pascucci, 
Distinction and Proportionality in Cyber War: 
Virtual Problems with a Real Solution, 26 
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purposes of IHL [International Humanitarian 
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an attack by the principles of distinction and 
proportionality do not apply.”).
247   See generally Nicaragua, supra note 
161, ¶ 103–04.
248   See also the use of force discussion in 
Part III, Scenario 2.
249   Had the cyber operations proximately 
caused physical injury, death or severe, inva-
sive, or far-reaching effects, this analysis would 
not be the same.
250   One might consider a number of inter-
national law rules that may have been violated 
(e.g., the prohibition against harmful interfer-
ence under the International Telecommunica-
tion Union Constitution), thereby implicating 
the law of state responsibility. For brevity and 
analytical focus, the author limits his remarks 
about state responsibility to the application of 
the principle of non-intervention, consistent 
with the approach taken under Scenario 2.
251   See International Status and Naviga-
tion of Warships and Military Aircraft, in 73 
Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 
109–10 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan 
eds., 1997).
252   Sean Watts, Cyber War: Law and Ethics 
, in Low-Intensity Cyber 
Operations and the Principle of Non-Interven-
tion 256 (Jens David Ohlin et al. eds., 2015) 
(“Actions merely restricting a state’s choice 
with respect to a course of action or com-
to amount to violations of the principle of 
non-intervention.”). 
253   Nicaragua, supra note 161, ¶ 205.
254   Dep’t of Def., Guidelines for U.S.-Japan 
Defense Cooperation, supra note 31, art. VI.B.
255   For example, if the Japanese govern-
ment did not conclude that State C violated 
the non-intervention principle but the U.S. 
government disagreed, the United States 
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via cyber or other means based on the U.S. 
government’s own legal conclusion. Egan, 
supra note 4 (“[A] State acts as its own judge 
of the facts and may make a unilateral deter-
mination with respect to attribution of a cyber 
operation to another State.”).
256   “In Japan’s view, actual harm is not nec-
essary for armed attack to occur as it includes 
its initiation phase. Take, for example, the 
time when a ballistic missile directed at Japan 
is being fueled. There is no need to wait until 
the attack hits the target.” Kurosaki, supra 
note 141, at 32. 
257   The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative 
allied cooperation in cyberspace, in 2019. See 
Joint Statement, U.S.-Japan Sec. Consultative 
Comm., supra note 36.
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258   Egan, supra note 3 (“[I]n exceptional 
circumstances, a State may be able to avail 
itself of the plea of necessity, which, subject to 
certain conditions, might preclude the wrong-
fulness of an act if the act is the only way for 
the State to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril.”).
259   Id. (“As an initial matter, a State can 
always undertake unfriendly acts that are not 
inconsistent with any of its international obli-
other States. Such acts—which are known as 
acts of retorsion—may include, for example, 
the imposition of sanctions or the declaration 
that a diplomat is persona non grata.”).
260   ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra 
note 116, art. 25. According to Article 25:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as 
a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of 
an act not in conformity with an international 
obligation of that State unless the act:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard 
an essential interest against a grave and immi-
nent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential 
interest of the State or States towards which 
the obligation exists, or of the international 
community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked 
by a State as a ground for precluding wrong-
fulness if:
(a) the international obligation in question ex-
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(b) the State has contributed to the situation 
of necessity.
261   See Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, 
at 135.
262   Id. Furthermore, “[t]he mere fact that a 
cyber operation targets an essential interest 
In addition, the potential harm posed to that 
interest must be ‘graver.’” Id. at 136.
263   “This is of exceptional importance in the 
cyber context because the plea of necessity 
will lie when individuals or non-State groups 
such as companies, activist groups, or ter-
rorists, conduct cyber operations that satisfy 
the standard set forth in this Rule. There is 
no need to attribute the underlying act to a 
State. Therefore, in cases where a non-State 
actor has launched an operation that falls 
below the armed attack threshold, the plea 
of necessity may present the sole option for a 
response that would otherwise be unlawful.” 
Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at 137–38.
264   Gov’t of Japan, Cybersecurity Strategy, 
supra note 2, at 41 (emphasis added).
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Introduction
Space systems are inseparable from today’s socio-economic activities and security. 
No planes can take off or land without Global Positioning System (GPS) signals. 
Financial institutions will be in chaos if there are no precision timing signals from 
space. Drones cannot be flown without communication through space. Disaster 
response will be much more difficult if we don’t have satellite images, and so on. 
Space systems are vital to human society and the security of mankind.
Space systems are also critically important for national security. Modern 
warfare relies on data collected by reconnaissance satellites, navigation and 
positioning information provided by GPS systems, and communications over long 
distance via telecommunication satellites. In short, the C4ISR (Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 
networks are the eyes, ears and nerve system of today’s warfare1. 
As a consequence, if one can degrade or destroy the space capabilities of an 
enemy, it can potentially cripple the adversary’s ability to continue to undertake all 
but the most basic military operations. The more a country depends on space systems, 
the more vulnerable it will be. This is the situation of many countries, including 
both the United States and China. In a situation of conflict, attacking an adversary’s 
vulnerabilities and causing maximum damage to an opponent’s fielded forces and 
supporting economic infrastructure are the most effective ways to gain superiority and 
potentially force an end to the fight. Space systems, therefore, can be a prime target.
Having established the importance of space-based systems to both modern 
life and modern combat operations, how can we defend the security of such 
space systems? Traditionally, military strategists have sought to prevent attacks 
on vulnerable systems through deterrence, or a mix of hardening and resiliency 
to convince the adversary their actions will fail to achieve the desired effect at 
an acceptable cost, plus threats of punishment designed to convince others to 
refrain from taking actions that may cause harm by credibly vowing to hurt them 
in unacceptable ways if they do carry out an attack. However, such traditional 
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notions of deterrence do not work well in outer space due to the different physical 
characteristics of the space environment. Also, it would be difficult to assume that 
tit-for-tat space deterrence may work because of the asymmetric use of space. In 
cases where some states depend heavily on space infrastructure but others do not, 
degrading space capability would have less impact on the latter, so that the latter 
states may not fear retaliation to their space assets. For example, North Korea may 
kill U.S. satellites by exploding nuclear devices in outer space, but retaliation by the 
U.S. against North Korean space assets may have very limited impact since North 
Korea does not depend on space infrastructure.
This chapter argues that, in order to protect the key space-based assets that 
the United States and Japan rely on for both peaceful purposes and deterrence and 
warfighting, we need to develop a strategy for cross-domain deterrence situated within 
the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.2 Because of the vulnerabilities of space systems, 
defending space assets from possible hostile attack is neither easy nor cost-efficient. 
To make matters more complicated, deterrence in space is also extremely difficult. 
Thus, it is the central argument of this chapter that the U.S.-Japan alliance will need 
to deter and defeat attacks on critical space-based systems primarily through the 
employment of cross-domain deterrence. In other words, such deterrence will require 
a combination of terrestrial and space-based intelligence assets to identify the source 
of hostile attack, at which point the U.S.-Japan alliance will likely need to respond 
with actions undertaken in other domains to reinforce or restore deterrence against 
attacks on the allies’ space-based systems. In short, achieving deterrence in space will 
require actions undertaken on the ground and in cyberspace. 
Vulnerabilities to  
Unintentional Incidents in Space
Space assets are vulnerable. They are designed to be light in order to reduce weight 
for effective launch, and they are therefore largely undefended by any sort of 
protective armor. In addition, because space assets in earth orbit are travelling very 
fast (approximately 28,000km per hour), any collision can produce devastating 
effects. These are delicate machines carrying large numbers of electronic parts 
which are exposed to radiation, solar flares and electromagnetic pulses. Although 
they are not stationary, their orbits can be easily detected and predicted, and can 
therefore be targeted without much difficulty. Because of the physics of the space 
environment, space-based assets are extremely vulnerable and there are very few 
ways to improve their resilience other than duplication or reconstruction (both 
of which are extremely costly and/or time-consuming and neither of which does 
anything to make the targeted platform any more difficult to attack or capable of 
surviving an adversary’s assault).
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Further complicating matters, space assets are vulnerable to unintentional 
incidents. The largest threat to space assets is actually collision with space debris. 
There are about 20,000 known pieces of space debris larger than 10cm in diameter 
in orbit (about 3,000 of these were created by a Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) 
weapon test in 2007 and approximately 40 by an Indian ASAT test in 2019), 
and estimated several millions of debris items smaller than 10cm diameter.3 
The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) under the U.S. Department 
of Defense monitors the movement of orbital debris and issues warnings to 
satellite operators to avoid collisions. Supporting and further improving this 
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) mission is an important contribution that the 
U.S.-Japan alliance can make for not only Japan and the U.S. but for all satellite 
operating nations. 
Solar flares and geomagnetic activities are another source of unintentional 
threats to space assets. High-energy showers of radiation such as those occurring 
during solar flares can impact the electronic systems onboard satellites; they can 
also impact the accuracy of GPS signals. There is little that can be done to avoid the 
impact of solar flares, but some space weather forecasts may provide early warning, 
so that the operators can turn off their machines and thereby reduce the impact on 
sensitive systems.
Unintentional threats such as space debris and solar flares have been the 
primary threats to space activities from the beginning of human activities in 
space. More recently, however, the bigger threat to space-based assets comes from 
intentional, hostile activities directed towards space assets.
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Attack
Because space assets are highly vulnerable and at the same time play a vital role 
in U.S. combat operations, there is a strong incentive for any militarily advanced 
nation that is confronting the prospect of conflict with the United States to attempt 
to attack the space capabilities of the U.S. and any allies who may be supporting it, 
such as Japan. Attacks on space assets can be more appealing to adversaries since 
these are not as easily visible to terrestrially-based observers as, for example, aerial 
bombardment or missile attacks on ground targets. In addition, any casualties 
caused would largely be indirect as a result of systems knocked off-line rather 
than deaths caused directly by the attacker. Furthermore, there is likely to be an 
attribution problem in most attacks on space-based assets. The only way to know 
whether space assets are under attack is through the collection and monitoring 
of data based on radar and optical SSA monitoring. But in many cases it will be 
difficult to identify who carried out the attack and how it was executed because 
it is almost impossible to monitor space assets continuously due to the nature 
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of the monitoring systems. Satellites travel around the globe in 90 minutes, and 
SSA radars and telescopes remain in one place on the surface of the earth and 
can therefore only see a part of the satellite’s circumnavigatory movement. There 
are a substantial number of blind spots and a sophisticated adversary could take 
hostile action in those areas without the U.S. or Japan noticing4. While there 
are mathematical ways to analyze the trajectory of space objects so as to deduce 
the most likely perpetrators of any given attack, it is nonetheless difficult if not 
impossible in many cases to capture definitive proof of the exact moment when the 
attack took place as well as the identity of the actor who perpetrated it. 
The ASAT tests conducted by China in 2007 and by India in 2019 were a 
good example of countries demonstrating its ability to take action against the space 
assets of other countries, possibly in the hopes that this would deter other countries 
from engaging in conflict with China or India. The 2007 ASAT test was a wake-
up call for all spacefaring nations that space assets are vulnerable and can be easy 
targets if a conflict takes place. India was the one which strongly reacted to this call 
and demonstrated that it can also destroy Chinese satellites if China attempted to 
disable Indian satellites. Thus, the 2019 Indian ASAT test was clearly a message to 
China to deter its activities. These tests also reminded observers that space is a vital 
domain for national security and that attacks aimed at degrading national space 
capabilities would significantly erode warfighting capability.
The 2007 ASAT test also taught China a number of lessons. The test 
created thousands of new pieces of space debris that pose a risk of harm to China’s 
own space assets. Since China is in the process of modernizing its own military 
forces, its reliance on space assets is increasing. As of March 2019 the number of 
operational Chinese satellites, including both civilian and military satellites, totals 
just 299 whereas the United States operates more than 900 satellites of all types5. 
So the likelihood of hitting U.S. satellites is higher than Chinese satellites, but the 
number of satellites that China owns and operates are increasing. India, on the 
other hand, has tried to minimize creation of debris when it conducted an ASAT 
test to its own satellite at lower orbit, in order to avoid increasing the risk of space 
debris to its own satellites, but there are a substantial number of debris remaining 
in orbit as of today.6 
Also, because of the international condemnation of its ASAT test and the 
consequential creation of a large debris field, China recognized the impact of the 
test. Immediately after the test, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (UNCOPUOS) adopted “Debris Mitigation Guidelines7” that call for avoiding 
the intentional creation of long-term debris fields in orbit. The European Union 
took the initiative to establish an “International Code of Conduct in Outer Space8” 
which prohibits attacks on space assets and invokes the inherent rights of states 
to self-defense, implying that attacks on space assets are to be considered as acts 
of war and conferring upon states the right to retaliate. Although the negotiation 
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of the “International Code of Conduct” has been stalled by strong opposition from 
China and Russia, who proposed a “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space 
Objects” (PPWT)9 as an alternative to the “International Code of Conduct”, China 
has at a minimum had to deal with international criticism towards its kinetic ASAT 
test. The lack of internationally agreed rules and norms facilitated India’s launch of 
its ASAT test in 2019. 
India, unlike the case of China’s ASAT, was not heavily criticized by the 
international community. On the one hand, it was because the United States and 
many other spacefaring countries believed the Indian ASAT capability might deter 
Chinese counterspace activities. Although the Indian ASAT test created debris, 
it was not as serious as the Chinese one in 2007. The international community 
may have deemed it an acceptable risk, and decided to remain calm. On the other 
hand, China and Russia have promoted the right of ground-to-space ASAT in 
order to give them freedom to shoot down satellites, so they cannot blame India 
for exercising similar legal rights. Whether the Indian ASAT test will change the 
positions and strategic thinking of China and Russia is unknown, but they certainly 
have been aware of the risk that other countries might take down their satellites.
Non-kinetic ASAT:  
Cyber Attack on Space Systems
While the Chinese ASAT test helpfully called attention to the fact that kinetic 
ASAT capabilities pose a threat to the space capabilities of other countries, it also 
convinced many observers that the cost of attacking other nations’ systems in this 
way was too high in terms of both diplomatic fall out and potential debris fields 
that don’t subsequently distinguish between the space assets of the victim or the 
attacker in later years. Thus, non-kinetic methods are now seen by many observers 
as likely to be more attractive methods for taking out opponents’ space assets 
(because they are more covert and less likely to produce unwanted side effects such 
as a debris field). One way of attacking an adversary’s satellites without creating 
debris is via cyber-attack. Cyber-attacks can be conducted both on satellites (i.e., by 
taking over control of the satellite), and through satellites (i.e., by taking over the 
communication network and hacking the satellite network). A number of studies 
have been conducted to improve cyber defenses and protect networks. However, 
the number of studies on how to defend against a cyber-attack on a satellite is 
much smaller.10 For military and civilian operators, the network is much more 
valuable than the satellite itself, so it is understandable that attention is paid to 
cyber-attacks on the network as a whole. However, protecting satellite control is 
equally important for protecting assets from adversaries.
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Obviously, military space systems pay more attention to these 
vulnerabilities. However, increases in the military use of commercial satellite 
telecommunications or Earth observation data, which are not as resilient as 
military systems, may increase the vulnerability of military operations. Further, 
civilian critical infrastructure—such as air traffic control, train control, or 
control over the electrical grid—also relies on the use of commercial and civilian 
satellites. These can be soft targets for adversaries to attack. In addition to 
the vulnerabilities of commercial and civilian satellites, global networks of 
ground stations can also be targets of attack. Satellite telemetry datalinks need 
to have global network access across different jurisdictions, and sometimes 
security arrangements for these stations can be complicated or patchwork, 
exhibiting uneven integrity. If ground stations are located in other countries 
(e.g., the Chinese ground station in Argentina), it would raise some suspicions 
of hosting countries when military personnel were located to secure protection 
of those ground stations.11 Satellite communications involve lots of confidential 
transmissions including military communications, and depend on the security of 
ground stations of these satellites in other sovereign states (command and control 
of satellites as well as uplink and downlink of data requires ground stations all 
over the world). 
It is well known that the radio frequency for satellite communications is 
limited. Traditionally, the radio frequency bands were distributed through the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), but the increase in the number 
of commercial and private satellites put huge pressure on the distribution of this 
scarce resource. 12 Some operators, particularly small satellite operators, are now 
using less secure frequencies, sometimes including ham radio frequency. This 
frequency is open to anyone, and therefore, it is easy to detect and hack if malign 
actors want to take over those satellites. Furthermore, the cost for upgrading 
security against cyber-attacks would discourage small satellite operators from 
taking appropriate measures to harden themselves against this threat. The cost of 
encrypting command and telemetry data and the cost of securing ground stations 
would put additional financial pressure on commercial ventures. Currently there is 
no regulatory mechanism to force these types of operators to improve their security 
against cyber-attacks.
Many satellites have a life expectation of 10-15 years. Satellites are, as 
discussed above, chunks of electronic hardware. Once a satellite is launched, it 
would be hard to fix or replace because of the cost of getting access to the machines 
in orbit. Therefore, the hardware on the satellite can be 10-15 years old. This 
would mean that the satellites are not fit for modern, up-to-date cyber security. Of 
course, software can be upgraded but given the speed of the evolution of computing 
hardware, new software may not be fit for the 10-15-year-old hardware in orbit 
(imagine that you are working on a 15-year-old computer at your workplace). Such 
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limitations on hardware replacement would also increase vulnerability to cyber-
attacks in space.
Another aspect of cyber-attacks on satellite systems is the spoofing of 
telemetry data. Spoofing is a technique to provide false information about a 
satellite’s location, its position and its health (in this case, its mechanical condition). 
It can be done by either hacking satellite frequencies or providing false signals to 
ground station networks. If satellite operators receive false information, they will 
likely try to change the satellite’s orbit to maintain continuous service. However, 
if someone with malign intent calculates the post-spoofing maneuvers carefully, 
it can direct the satellite onto a collision course with another satellite. It would be 
hard to detect spoofing unless the false data received shows extreme abnormality 
from the original data.
Other ASATs
Apart from cyber-attacks on satellites, there are other methods for attacking 
adversaries’ satellite capabilities without using kinetic forces. Jamming radio 
waves from satellites is one way to interfere with satellite communications. In 
2013, for example, North Korea directed a very strong radio frequency signal 
towards South Korea so as to disrupt GPS signals. This mass-scale jamming 
caused huge confusion in air traffic and other vital socio-economic infrastructure. 
This incident took place using only local terrestrial means so the effect was 
geographically quite limited, but if it had been done using assets in orbit, the effect 
might have been more widespread in scale. Jamming of GPS signals or other radio 
telecommunications can be done with very simple and commercially available tools. 
They are mostly available for local jamming, i.e., within a range of 500 meters, but 
with more powerful devices, they can cause much wider area effects.
Another method of non-kinetic attack on satellites is dazzling. Dazzling is 
the use of narrowly focused beams of energy, such as lasers or other types of light, 
to temporarily or permanently blind satellites. There are some reports that lasers 
already have been used against European civilian and military earth observation 
satellites. U.S. military authorities have commented that they too have experienced 
dazzling attacks for some time. While these attacks to date have not caused 
permanent damage to satellites, if more powerful laser devices are used in the 
future they can burn out satellites’ sensors permanently. 
One final method of attacking satellites is through the use of rendezvous 
and docking technologies. With sufficient sophistication and thrust control, a 
hostile satellite can approach a target satellite and use electronic or kinetic forces to 
undertake an attack directly or in close proximity to the target. China, for example, 
is known to have been testing satellites that can deploy robotic arms to grab, smash, 
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or otherwise interfere with orbiting satellites. Such an approach can reduce the 
creation of space debris substantially or even entirely. Other measures include the 
use of co-orbital satellites to deliver small explosive packages that would detonate 
on or near the targeted satellite. One drawback of these methods is that, because 
such attacks require time to synchronize the attacking satellite’s orbit with that of 
its target, it is difficult for hostile actors to carry out such attacks without being 
detected, making it harder to preserve anonymity. The United States and its 
allies are rapidly developing the capacity to monitor the movements of satellites 
and space debris through Space Situational Awareness (SSA), which detects any 
satellite or debris approaching existing space assets. With a more complete picture 
of the space domain, it becomes more difficult for an attacking nation to avoid 
attribution when using these methods to perpetrate an attack. 
Deterrence in Space?
In order to prevent kinetic, cyber-based, and other attacks on space assets, nations 
need to develop a space deterrence strategy. However, as discussed above, deterrence 
in space is quite different from other conventional or nuclear deterrence strategies. 
First of all, it is impossible to develop a space deterrence strategy based on 
concepts of territorial control. Space objects in orbit are very high-speed, high-
velocity objects that are moving in a vacuum of space across foreign territories 
on the ground. States can claim sovereignty over space objects, like vessels on 
the high seas, but they cannot occupy territory or even claim rights to specific 
orbital trajectories. The Bogota Declaration—declared by countries on the equator 
(Colombia, Ecuador, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, 
Kenya and Uganda)—categorized geostationary orbit as a natural resource, not a 
region of space. These countries sought to claim that sovereign airspace does not 
have a limit and that therefore they should have absolute control over geostationary 
orbit—36,000 kilometers above the equator—as a natural resource. However, none 
of these countries have the actual ability to exercise control over such “sovereign 
space”. In case of a space station, a state can occupy a certain limited space in orbit, 
but this is analogous to a vessel operating on the high seas. Even in the case of high 
seas, there is a concept of A2/AD (Anti-Access and Area Denial) based on certain 
geographical control by excluding foreign vessels from the geographical area. Thus, 
any deterrence strategy in space is different from traditional ones and has to be 
based on concepts of non-territorial control.
Second, tit-for-tat deterrence is unlikely to be an effective strategy because 
of the asymmetric nature of space dependency. If one country heavily depends on 
space assets (such as the United States), while another is less dependent (such as 
North Korea), then an attack on the space assets of the more space-dependent 
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country would likely be a very effective way to even the odds in a conflict. By 
contrast, if a country does not depend on space assets for either its economy or its 
military operations (such as is largely the case with North Korea today), it would be 
ineffective to retaliate against that nation’s space assets because either they do not 
exist or they hold very little value to the country in question. Even though China 
is increasingly dependent on space assets for its military operation, the degree of 
dependence on space is less significant than that of the United States and its allies. 
If the United States launches a tit-for-tat retaliation, it may not be proportional to 
the damage incurred. Since countries hold substantially differing attachment to 
and dependency on space-based assets, deterrence in space cannot simply rely on 
“in-kind” responses the way nuclear deterrence operates.
Third, deterrence by denial is a difficult strategy to pursue in space. The 
core concept of deterrence by denial is to make it difficult for an adversary to 
achieve its objective by making a successful attack more difficult and costly to 
achieve. If one tries to apply a “deterrence by denial” approach in space, one 
has to be able to exercise denial against attacks on space assets. Since there 
are many ways to attack space assets, this is an extremely difficult proposition. 
For example, a state would need to be able to defend against kinetic ASAT 
attacks by ground-based missiles, which would require the ability to shoot down 
any missile targeting a space asset. While not impossible, this is nonetheless 
extremely difficult and most nations prefer to reserve their ballistic missile 
defenses for prevention of attacks on their homelands, not their space assets. 
Additionally, deterrence by denial would require defending against cyber-based 
ASAT attacks, meaning a state needs the ability to protect its satellites’ command 
and control systems. Again, this is possible, and states already try to prevent 
such attacks, but it is extremely difficult to guarantee that no cyber intrusions 
can succeed in seizing control of a satellite. Further complicating matters, to 
pursue deterrence by denial a state would need to defend its satellites against 
jamming, which requires protecting a satellite’s ability to receive and deliver its 
signals through the use of frequency hopping and encryption. This is possible 
too, but it would increase the cost of building and operating satellites. To defend 
against the threat of dazzling, one has to improve the protection of sensors, but 
at present this is not technically feasible. The adversaries may use co-orbital 
satellites which operate in proximity to critical space assets and interfere with 
electronic communications or use robot arms to manipulate those assets. It 
is possible to evade such attacks by co-orbital satellites but evasion requires 
constant monitoring of the movement of all satellites, which would require 
large scale investment in ground-based monitoring systems with international 
partners. Overall, the cost of attacking a satellite is extremely low whereas the 
cost of denying an attack is very high. Thus, the strategy of deterrence by denial 
may be applicable in theory but practically very fragile and costly. It may reduce 
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incentives for adversaries to take certain actions, but attacking satellites is much 
easier and cheaper than defending them. In other words, attacks on satellites are 
effective cost-imposing strategies for adversaries.
Fourth, like the case of cyber security, there is an attribution problem. Space 
objects are registered when launched under the Convention on the Registration 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space (commonly referred to as the Registration 
Treaty) and catalogued by the U.S. Air Force’s CSpOC, so if a collision in space 
occurs, ownership of the assets involved in the collision can be identified. However, 
there will always be some degree of uncertainty over the question of who is 
responsible for the collision. There may be a natural cause behind the malfunction 
of the space system, such as a solar flare or geomagnetic activities, or unintentional 
collision with space debris. Since current SSA efforts can only detect space debris 
bigger than the size of a softball, there is always a possibility that a malfunction 
occurred due to collision with space debris smaller than 10cm in diameter. Even if 
the collision took place between active satellites, one cannot be sure whether the 
collision occurred due to malign intention or was the unintended consequence 
of an attempted satellite maneuver. It would be difficult to make a judgment 
whether to launch retaliatory action under such uncertainties. Given the recent 
development of “hybrid warfare” strategies by countries like Russia and China, the 
recognition and identification of hostile action may be even more difficult since 
a given adversary may choose to employ such a strategy to exploit the gray area 
nature of outer space.13
A Tallinn Manual  
for Space?
Deterrence in space, therefore, has to be based on something other than 
conventional deterrence strategies. One can argue that the space security 
situation looks somewhat similar to that of cyber security where actions can be 
taken without kinetic force, with difficulties of attribution, territorial control and 
effective retaliation. In fact, both cyber and space security issues were discussed 
at the United Nations by the Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) in a similar 
timeframe (early 2010’s). 
One achievement that grew out of the international discussions on how 
to establish norms governing cyber security was the Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, which was published in 2013.14 
This document was developed by an international group of experts on international 
law from NATO countries, so it is rather academic and not legally binding, but it 
provides certain ideas on how to apply international law in a non-conventional 
deterrence setting such as the cyber domain. The Tallinn Manual identifies the 
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extent to which national sovereignty may be applied to the disruptive nature of 
cyber-attacks, which can be regarded as “armed attacks” during periods of armed 
conflict, and reaffirms that inherent rights of self-defense can be applied to these 
attacks. It defines the means and methods of warfare in retaliation to cyber-attacks 
with principles of necessity and proportionality. The Tallinn Manual is a collection 
of existing international law on armed conflict applied to the cyber domain, but 
cyber-attacks are taking place on a daily basis even in the absence of armed conflict. 
Thus, the international group of experts revised their study and re-published it as 
the Tallinn Manual 2.0 in 2017.15 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 emphasizes that even in case of an instance of cyber-
attack and retaliation, the rule of state sovereignty dictates the military action. In 
short, it argues that retaliation to cyber-attacks with force is not legitimate unless 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council. If a cyber-attack is conducted 
by a non-state actor, countermeasures can only be taken with the consent of the 
sovereign state from which the attack was launched, unless there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the state government is conspiring with the non-state actors. 
In case of space, there is no equivalent to the Tallinn Manual, but there is 
a project launched in 2016 by McGill University and the University of Adelaide 
to develop a Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer 
Space (MILAMOS).16 Some participants of MILAMOS have left the project and 
established another group to discuss the Woomera Manual on the International 
Law of Military Space Operations.17 Both are pursuing the same objectives but 
approaching the issue from different angles. 
Such manuals for the military use of space would certainly contribute to 
the transparency and predictability of state actions. Although not legally binding 
documents, they would give some clarity as to what can be expected if a state or 
non-state actor tries to attack the space assets of another state. However, it is 
almost certain that existing international law is far from sufficient to define this 
new domain of military activities. Thus, the U.S.-Japan alliance, a defense treaty-
based partnership between two of the most highly capable states in space, needs to 
play a defining role in developing international rules to regulate military actions in 
responding to threats against space assets.
The Role of the U.S.-Japan Alliance  
in Space Deterrence
Even though deterrence in space may not be as straightforward as nuclear 
deterrence, there are several things that the U.S.-Japan alliance can do to achieve 
deterrence to prevent adversaries from undertaking hostile actions against the two 
countries’ space assets. 
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First, both Japan and the United States can work together to increase 
transparency of activities in space. Japan has already decided to upgrade its 
telescope and radar facilities in Okayama prefecture in order to enable it to detect 
space objects less than 1m in diameter (the exact capabilities of the system Japan 
is preparing to deploy have not been publicly disclosed). However, these facilities 
are owned and operated by a civilian space agency, JAXA (Japan Aerospace 
Exploration Agency). Because of the military nature of SSA data collected by the 
U.S. Air Force, the U.S. government demanded the Japanese Ministry of Defense 
to get involved to enhance the security of information exchange. Thus, Japan 
has decided to construct a new SSA facility in Yamaguchi prefecture, which will 
be operated by the Self-Defense Force (SDF). Japanese participation in the SSA 
network is extremely important because the current SSA network does not cover 
the western Pacific and Asian regions. Japanese SSA installations will help cover 
blind spots, including the space above North Korea and China. Although Japanese 
SSA capabilities do not provide ballistic missile early warning for the purposes of 
immediately detecting ground-based ASAT missile launches, they should provide 
sufficient data to determine whether a given ASAT action is attributable to China 
or North Korea. 
Transparency in space activities is obviously the most important element 
for deterring hostile activities against space assets. Without monitoring space 
activities through SSA, the cost of anti-satellite attacks drops off precipitously 
making it very attractive for an adversary of the U.S.-Japan alliance to strike 
at the allies’ space assets. The most likely targets for any adversary’s attack 
are the allies’ reconnaissance satellites in Low Earth Orbit, including Japan’s 
Information Gathering Satellites (IGS), and also their satellites in Medium 
Earth Orbit such as GPS. Effective SSA increases the cost of hostile actions 
against these systems, particularly kinetic attacks, but does little to prevent 
non-kinetic activities. Thus, the U.S.-Japan alliance also has to work together 
to improve detection of cyber and non-cyber ASAT activities. The allies need 
to share information so as to quickly and accurately identify and attribute 
such attacks, with the goal of increasing the economic and social costs to any 
adversary of taking such actions by providing evidence of hostile activities to the 
international community.
Second, the U.S.-Japan alliance can work together to improve the resilience 
of space systems. Resilience (or mission assurance) is necessary because space 
assets are both vulnerable as well as crucial for socio-economic and security 
purposes. If the functions of space assets are taken away intentionally or 
unintentionally, they need to be replaced in as short a period of time as possible 
by alternative assets. Those alternative assets can be small satellites that can be 
launched rapidly, but could also be the assets of allied or friendly countries. The 
U.S.-Japan alliance would be able to provide ideal alternative assets for each of 
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the two partner nations because the assets of both countries are interoperable 
and easily replaceable. In this context, the Space Security Working Group of the 
National Space Policy Committee of Japan has issued a policy paper on the “Basic 
Framework for Improving Mission Assurance of Space Systems” in 2018.18 In this 
document, Japan recognized its role in the alliance of providing mission assurance 
for the alliance as well as coordinating with allies in case of loss of Japanese 
satellite capabilities.
Last but not least, the U.S.-Japan alliance implies a ‘deterrence through 
punishment’ approach by planning possible military actions in retaliation for 
attacks on the allies’ space assets. Although the rules and regulations on how to 
respond to attacks on space assets are not yet well defined under international 
law, the alliance should use the Bilateral Planning Mechanism initiated in the 
Defense Guidelines issued in 2015 to prepare for the worst-case scenario and 
demonstrate its determination to employ appropriate means to retaliate in case 
of intentional attacks on allied space assets. Furthermore, the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy of the United States has identified space as a warfighting 
domain, and its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review suggested that the United States 
may use nuclear forces as the ultimate form of retaliation for non-nuclear attacks, 
including attacks on space systems. In response to these U.S. actions, Japan has 
decided that “[t]o ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime 
to armed contingencies, SDF will also work to strengthen capabilities including 
mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, 
control, communications and information” in its National Defense Program 
Guidelines in December 2018.19
Deterrence, by definition, is an intersubjective concept. The main purpose 
of deterrence is to convince adversaries not to take any action to harm the allies’ 
space assets in the first place. As discussed above, deterrence by denial and 
deterrence of attacks on space assets through retaliation in space does not seem 
persuasive because of physical and technical difficulties. Therefore, threats of 
punishment by means other than those in space should be used to convince the 
adversary to abjure such attacks. In other words, the alliance should prepare and 
plan for cross-domain deterrence in order to dissuade its enemies from striking at 
its space assets. Of course, Japan has constraints on its ability to take aggressive 
actions towards adversaries, but exercising collective self-defense with the United 
States in joint operations, thanks to the recent amendment of the interpretation 
of the Japanese constitution’s Article 9, plus related collective self-defense 
enabling legislation can be used to reinforce a convincing deterrence posture 
toward potential adversaries. 
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Conclusion
There is no doubt that space systems are vital for our daily lives and security. But 
the security of space systems fall far short of the desired level; such systems are 
fragile and extremely vulnerable to an adversary’s first strike. To date, much of 
the focus on the security of space systems has been on the need to defend against 
direct ascent kinetic attacks such as the Chinese ASAT test in 2007 and the Indian 
ASAT in 2019, but there are many other ways for hostile nations to attack allied 
satellite capabilities. 
It is worth bearing in mind that any satellite in space today can easily be 
repurposed as a space weapon tomorrow. If command uplinks are hacked and the 
satellite is taken over by actors with malign intentions, that satellite can be placed 
in an orbit that will lead it to collide with other satellites. This means that the U.S.-
Japan alliance needs to prioritize the cyber-integrity not only of the satellites of the 
U.S. and Japan but even those of Russia or China, because any satellite, whether it 
is state-operated or run by a commercial or private entity, a university or a scientific 
research group can have its assets hacked and turned into weapons. Protecting 
all satellites from cyber-attacks is an urgent priority for achieving a secure and 
sustainable use of space.
Once a satellite collision creates space debris, it will not only increase 
the risks to other satellites, but also create a situation which is referred to as the 
Kessler Syndrome, where new debris collides with older debris and creates even 
more debris until the orbital environment becomes so contaminated as to be 
fundamentally unsafe for human use20. In such a situation, it would be impossible 
to use space for the benefit of mankind and our socio-economic welfare, not to 
mention our security.
In order to prevent such a catastrophic outcome, the U.S.-Japan alliance 
should prepare for all intentional and unintentional attacks on space assets. To 
deter adversaries, the allies need to aim at increasing the cost of attacks, with the 
goal of establishing global coverage of their SSA capabilities in order to make 
sure that any activities in space are monitored and any malicious activities can be 
detected and attributed. Also, the alliance needs to improve the resilience of their 
space systems to make sure that ASAT attacks do not achieve their objectives. And 
finally, the alliance should develop a plan to respond to any intentional attacks so 
that adversaries can understand that the cost of an attack on allied space assets 
will be exceedingly (and, from their perspective, unacceptably) high. For Japan, 
the alliance with the United States is the key to protecting its space assets from any 
hostile attacks, and therefore, it should play a key role in developing a joint, cross-
domain allied space deterrence strategy. 
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Introduction
It is well known that U.S. and Japanese positions on international law pertaining to 
the use of force do not always align. Japan reportedly holds the view that one state 
can engage in the collective self-defense of another only if the other has explicitly 
requested assistance, but the United States has at times suggested that an implied 
request is sufficient.1 Japan “has repeatedly rejected the notion that the right to 
self-defense applies against imminent threats,”2 but the United States supports 
this notion.3 And while the United States has endorsed the so-called “unwilling or 
unable” test for the use of force against non-state actors, Japan does not appear to 
take a position.4 These differences may generate conflicting views regarding the 
types of action that each state can undertake in furtherance of the alliance.
In contrast, this paper focuses on the role of foreign relations law in the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. As the municipal law that “governs how [a] nation interacts 
with the rest of the world,”5 foreign relations law implicates a wide variety of topics. 
In the United States, it encompasses everything from the War Powers Resolution to 
the Alien Tort Statute, the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, and federal common 
law on foreign official immunity, among other matters. Japanese academia has not 
traditionally conceived of foreign relations law as a distinct field of legal knowledge, 
but from an American perspective, Japanese foreign relations law includes Article 
9 of Japan’s Constitution,6 the 2015 legislation that expanded the authority of 
Japanese self-defense forces to participate in foreign conflicts,7 and decisions from 
Japanese courts on the relationship between international and national law.8 
My contention is that deficiencies in knowledge of foreign foreign-relations 
law can arise and are consequential but are also poorly understood in fact. Thus, 
to strengthen their alliance, the United States and Japan should develop bilateral 
meta-knowledge of their foreign relations laws and then strive to address any 
epistemic gaps through enhanced programs to educate relevant actors and foster 
and preserve institutional memory. 
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The Significance of Foreign Knowledge
The successful maintenance of U.S.-Japan relations is likely to depend not 
only on matters of international law, but also on whether and how each side 
understands the other’s foreign relations law. As an illustration, consider Article 
V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which states that in the event of an armed 
attack against either party in Japanese-administered territory each “would act to 
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and 
processes.”9 From the perspective of Japan, this provision is likely to be unclear 
and even misleading absent knowledge about the separation of war powers under 
the U.S. Constitution. At one extreme, if Japanese officials mistakenly perceive the 
Constitution as allocating to the president exclusive authority over the decision 
to use force, they might disregard the preferences of Congress in attempting to 
anticipate the likelihood and nature of an American response to an attack on 
Japanese territory. At the other extreme, if these officials mistakenly perceive the 
Constitution as allocating exclusive authority to Congress, they might disregard 
the president. In between, Japanese officials are likely to pay attention to both 
the president and Congress if they perceive the use of force as a domain of shared 
authority. Depending on the political alignments and policy preferences of the 
president and congressional majorities at any given point in time, these scenarios 
could yield materially different Japanese expectations regarding the willingness of 
the United States to use force under Article V.
Third-party dynamics are also possible. Imagine, for example, that China 
is contemplating an invasion of Taiwan and seeks to anticipate the responses of 
the United States and Japan. It is conceivable that China would view the foreign 
relations laws of these states as purely epiphenomenal and thus attempt to predict 
reactions exclusively by reference to other factors, such as state interests and 
the regional balance of power. But if China views American and Japanese laws 
as imposing even moderately effective restraints on each state’s use of force, it 
seems likely that China would account for those laws in its models. In this latter 
scenario, China would prepare for an invasion at least in part by studying U.S. and 
Japanese law pertaining to the use of force, Japanese understandings of U.S. law, 
and American understandings of Japanese law. In turn, if there is Chinese law on 
the use of force and it is effective, Washington and Tokyo would do well to study 
not only that law, but also Chinese understandings of American and Japanese 
understandings of Chinese law.
Some legal scholars in the United States have acknowledged these dynamics. 
Jide Nzelibe and John Yoo have argued that the constitutionality of a unilateral 
use of force by the president should depend in part on the sophistication of the 
adversary: congressional authorization should be required when the adversary 
is likely to perceive it correctly as a signal of the seriousness of an American 
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commitment to use force, but not otherwise.10 One of the stated implications of 
this position is that congressional authorization should be unnecessary for military 
operations against terrorist organizations, which Nzelibe and Yoo presume to lack 
understanding of the “institutional context in which the President and Congress 
interact on war powers issues.”11 More recently, Matthew Waxman has examined 
how legislative checks on executive war-making might shape the efficacy of threats 
to use force.12 In his view, “the ultimate effects of any legal reform on war and 
peace will depend not just on the internal effects on U.S. government decision-
making but the external perceptions of actors regarding U.S. signals.”13
But the issue also extends beyond the domain of military conflict. For 
example, the Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Armed Forces 
in Japan provides that U.S. military authorities shall have the right to exercise 
within Japan “all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the 
law of the United States over all persons subject to the military law of the United 
States.”14 In light of this provision, Japan cannot hope to understand U.S. assertions 
of jurisdiction over American forces in Japanese territory without knowledge 
of U.S. rules governing the extraterritoriality of U.S. law. Likewise, members of 
Congress frequently confer with Japanese officials in Tokyo and in doing so make 
representations that are at times contrary to the policy of the executive branch.15 
This practice risks substantial confusion about the nature of U.S. policy unless 
Japanese interlocutors understand that the U.S. Constitution denies Congress 
authority to communicate and transact with foreign governments on behalf of 
the United States. And in the wake of the Trump Administration’s decision to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement, American states and localities have pursued 
various arrangements with Japanese and other foreign partners to combat climate 
change.16 Those partners could misapprehend the nature and scope of the 
arrangements unless they are familiar with the Compact Clause, which prohibits 
U.S. states from entering into “any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign 
Power” absent approval from Congress.17
We know, moreover, that the risk of misunderstanding is not purely 
theoretical. Indeed, misperceptions of law have occurred on a number of 
occasions in the past. To name just one example, in the early 1970s Japanese 
officials acquiesced to an import-control plan that Japanese industry leaders had 
negotiated with a member of Congress on the assumption that the congressman 
spoke for President Nixon, only to later find that Nixon opposed the deal.18 In this 
case, Japan erred by instinctively projecting the institutional dynamics of its own 
parliamentary system, in which coordination between the prime minister and a 
legislator is not uncommon, onto the United States, where the separation of powers 
limits inter-branch cooperation, allocates power over diplomatic negotiations to the 
president rather than Congress, and thus diminishes the prospects for presidential 
approval of a congressionally negotiated agreement.19
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Of course, knowledge gaps are just as plausible and problematic in reverse: 
Lack of U.S. knowledge of Japanese foreign relations law risks confusion about 
which Japanese institutions hold power to decide matters of foreign policy, the 
standards that govern their decision-making, and the nature of the policy itself. If, 
for example, relevant actors in the United States mistakenly perceive Article 98 of 
the Japanese Constitution as establishing that all treaties are self-executing,20 those 
actors would likely misapprehend the available modes of domestic enforcement 
and perhaps the extent of compliance. Comparable risks are possible with respect 
to Article 9, among other laws.21
The Mystery of Foreign Knowledge
Although external knowledge of foreign relations law is an issue of significance to 
the U.S.-Japan alliance, we know very little about the epistemic conditions that 
prevail on each side. We can make certain reasonable assumptions: Presumably, 
Japanese officials understand U.S. law to the extent necessary to carry out their 
duties. Presumably, the average Japanese citizen knows less than the average 
government official. Presumably, Japanese knowledge is much more pervasive 
today than it was at the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853.22 And 
presumably, relevant U.S. officials are aware of the famous Article 9, particularly 
given America’s role in its drafting.23
But conditions are otherwise far from obvious. On the one hand, 
foreign sophistication is entirely plausible. Although U.S. media coverage of 
Japan is comparatively limited, Japanese news media have historically covered 
developments in the United States rather extensively.24 The United States and 
Japan are both wealthy countries that possess the financial resources necessary to 
develop expertise in foreign law. Both states respect the rule of law and exhibit high 
levels of education among their respective national publics. The global diffusion 
of governmental structures may help to ensure a basic familiarity with concepts 
such as the separation of powers, judicial review, and executive primacy in the 
conduct of diplomacy.25 And the tempo and volume of security and economic 
contacts between the United States and Japan seem likely to generate considerable 
functional need in each state for knowledge of the other side’s foreign relations law. 
For instance, when negotiating a trade agreement with the United States, Japanese 
officials may need to understand Trade Promotion Authority under U.S. law in 
order to assess their leverage in negotiations and ascertain the likelihood of U.S. 
ratification of any resulting text. 
On the other hand, foreign naiveté also seems plausible. The United States 
and Japan have different legal traditions. There are considerable language barriers. 
The alliance is vital to both sides, but neither seems to have an incentive to study 
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the other’s foreign relations law beyond what is strictly necessary. Differences 
between the governmental systems and foreign relations laws of the two countries 
create ample opportunities for misunderstanding. And domestic law is often 
abstruse even to native lawyers.
Moreover, important questions remain even if we assume that there are 
pockets of Japanese knowledge on discrete topics in U.S. foreign relations law: 
Who holds that knowledge? Are the ministries of Defense (MOD); Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI); and Foreign Affairs (MOFA) equally well-informed? How 
pervasive is pertinent knowledge within academia, industry, and other sectors? 
Where knowledge exists, how accurate and up-to-date is it? How is it acquired and 
what motivates its acquisition? Are there programs to incorporate knowledge into 
the institutional memory of Japanese government ministries, or are relevant areas 
of U.S. law re-learned from scratch with each personnel rotation? Has the degree 
of Japanese sophistication evolved in recent decades? And how much weight do 
those on the Japanese side accord to U.S. foreign relations law in attempting to 
explain and predict the actions of the U.S. government? The simple answer is that 
American scholars do not know.26 And with the possible exception of Article 9 of 
the Japanese Constitution, the same is probably true in reverse.
In certain ways, this all seems unsurprising. Those who conduct foreign 
relations have no incentive or even freedom to reveal the extent of their naiveté 
or sophistication. Most academic work on U.S. foreign relations law ignores the 
significance of foreign legal knowledge. And as a matter of legal doctrine, each 
state’s interpretation and application of its own foreign relations law generally does 
not require knowledge of foreign understandings. In this context, there is little need 
for domestic practitioners to ascertain foreign knowledge.
Yet uncertainty about foreign knowledge of U.S. law seems consequential, 
not least because it can generate varying assumptions among U.S. officials. 
Sometimes the assumption has been one of foreign naiveté. For example, in 
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme Court held that while Section 214 of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act of 2003 did not change U.S. policy on the status of 
Jerusalem, the statute nevertheless infringed the president’s exclusive power to 
recognize foreign borders by requiring him to issue statements that contradict 
the policy in official passports.27 In justifying this decision, the Court seemed to 
take for granted that important foreign audiences would incorrectly interpret the 
statements as evidence of a change in policy.28 On other occasions, however, the 
assumption has been one of foreign sophistication. For instance, when President 
Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution in 1973, he did so partly on the view 
that the law would undermine deterrence by signaling that, absent congressional 
support, domestic authority to use military force expires after sixty to ninety days.29 
This position assumed that foreign governments would read the War Powers 
Resolution, understand it, and consider it in predicting the actions of the U.S. 
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government. Varying assumptions of naiveté and sophistication are also plausible 
in U.S.-Japan relations.
In this context, it is harder to ascertain whether foreign relations laws serve 
national interests. If foreign audiences are well informed, then the law is likely to 
succeed not only at allocating power internally, but also at facilitating cooperation 
and limiting miscalculation. But if foreign audiences are poorly informed, then the 
law might generate misunderstanding and even conflict on a wide range of issues. 
To name just one conceivable illustration, if China interprets the separation of 
war powers in the United States as preserving U.S. discretion with respect to the 
implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, while Japan understands the 
treaty as obliging U.S. military assistance in the event of an attack notwithstanding 
the separation of powers, then the parties might draw different conclusions 
about the likelihood and nature of a U.S. military response to Chinese seizure of 
Japanese-administered territories. Unless China and Japan perceive U.S. law as 
purely epiphenomenal in this area, their disparate views could increase the risk  
of hostilities.
Toward Meta-Knowledge  
and Mutual Understanding
Current conditions thus suggest the need for meta-knowledge of foreign relations 
law in the U.S.-Japan alliance. How might we develop this knowledge? As I see it, 
the inquiry will be primarily sociological, focusing on the pathways of knowledge 
diffusion and maintenance. The knowledge of government officials will certainly be 
material, but the knowledge of actors in civil society (academics, business leaders, 
think tanks, law firms, etc.) may also carry significance, given that the United States 
and Japan are both relatively democratic states whose foreign policies appear to be 
subject to certain degrees of public influence.
With respect to government officials, the options for evidence-collection 
are probably limited to interviews with the officials themselves and private actors 
from whom the officials might acquire information. These interviews should seek 
to glean insights on professional backgrounds, including not just formal training 
but also interviewee encounters with officials from the other side of the alliance, 
exposure to legal resources and popular media from the other side, and perceptions 
of the pervasiveness and quality of official knowledge within the government. The 
interviews should also seek to glean information on the institutional location of 
relevant knowledge, any official modes of acquisition, the existence of any programs 
to train government officials or otherwise develop and protect institutional 
knowledge, any topics of frequent confusion, and views about the barriers to 
greater understanding. 
Toward Meta-Knowledge of Foreign Relations Law in U.S.-Japan Relations     203
With respect to civil society, the options for evidence-collection are more 
numerous. In addition to interviews, relevant academic literatures are likely 
to serve as sources of insight. We might draw inferences about the state of U.S. 
sophistication on Japanese law pertaining to national defense, for example, by 
reviewing U.S. publications for articles on that topic. We might also examine 
popular media coverage; if major news outlets such as the Asahi Shimbun and 
the New York Times contain varying degrees of coverage on the foreign policies 
and foreign relations laws of the foreign partner, we might infer differences in the 
sophistication of the American and Japanese publics. We might also ascertain 
public knowledge with tools such as Google Surveys. 
I have used a number of these strategies over the past several months as 
part of an initial effort to evaluate conditions in Japan. I met with and interviewed 
numerous academics and officials from MOD, METI, and MOFA. I searched 
Japanese newspaper archives for pertinent coverage. I distributed surveys and 
collected a significant volume of legal academic literature from the National Diet 
Library. The process of organizing and writing about the resulting evidence is 
ongoing, but I would like to offer a few quick impressions from the work that I have 
completed so far. 
First, formal education on U.S. foreign relations law is essentially non-
existent in Japan. No law school offers a course on the topic. Survey courses on 
“Anglo-American law” do not touch upon it, other than through general and fairly 
superficial discussions about the separation of powers and federalism. Nor do 
government agencies formally train officials on U.S. foreign relations law. This is 
true, moreover, even when officials are on assignment to units such as MOFA’s First 
North America Division and the Americas Division of METI’s Trade Policy Bureau, 
and even though formal training occurs on other topics. Japan’s Foreign Service 
Training Institute, for example, educates trainees on contemporary political issues 
in U.S.-Japan relations, but does not cover the laws that govern the U.S. side of 
the relationship. As a result, the acquisition of legal knowledge tends to be highly 
informal.
There are a few potential explanations for this condition. One is that 
relevant actors in Japan generally view training as unnecessary. Another is that 
these actors view the training as helpful but operate under resource constraints that 
require them to prioritize training on topics that are more pressing. Still another 
possibility is a shortage of expert instructors: While a significant number of legal 
academics conduct research on U.S. law, most focus on topics other than foreign 
relations law, such as the rights provisions of the Constitution, which tend to be 
seen as more interesting and innovative than the structural provisions in light 
of recent case law on matters such as gay marriage. In fact, at present, there are 
only a few academics in Japan who publish with any degree of regularity on U.S. 
foreign relations law. Moreover, many of those who have written sporadically have 
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been international law scholars, rather than specialists in U.S. law. In contrast, 
the number of political scientists who study U.S.-Japan relations is significant—
perhaps as many as one hundred, by one estimate. These conditions raise the 
possibility that Japan tends to view U.S. conduct vis-à-vis Japan through the lens of 
politics rather than law. 
Second, notwithstanding the absence of formal training, there is a 
significant Japanese-language literature on U.S. foreign relations law. This 
literature extends back to well before World War II and includes major works on 
war powers and the relationship between domestic and international law in the 
United States, in addition to a significant number of articles on topics ranging 
from the Alien Tort Statute to Trade Promotion Authority and rules about the 
extraterritoriality of federal statutes. Amerika Hou—the leading publication on 
American law—regularly summarizes U.S. Supreme Court decisions and reviews 
U.S. law review articles, including a number that have addressed aspects of U.S. 
foreign relations law. This is an unacknowledged, shadow literature with which 
American scholars simply do not engage. By evaluating its timing, rigor, and topical 
tendencies, we might obtain fresh insights into Japan’s concerns, interests, and 
potential misunderstandings.
Third, to the extent that questions about U.S. foreign relations law arise 
in Japan, Japanese government officials often seek answers in an ad hoc fashion. 
Sometimes officials at MOFA, for example, instruct embassy personnel in 
Washington to consult with think tanks and law firms. Less frequently, they consult 
with Japanese or American academics. Sometimes they acquire information 
directly from U.S. officials. And sometimes they seek out answers on their own, 
using common online search tools. As far as I can tell, there are no formal 
procedures that help officials choose among these options.
Although I have not examined American knowledge of Japanese foreign 
relations law, I suspect that many of the same limitations manifest in the United 
States to an equal or even greater degree. My sense is that, in comparison to Japan, 
American legal education and scholarship are generally quite parochial. Few law 
schools in the United States offer courses in Japanese law. Comparative research 
does not seem to be particularly popular. Even within American scholarship on 
Japanese law, Japanese foreign relations law seems to garner close to zero attention 
aside from Article 9. Moreover, knowledge of the English language is much more 
pervasive among Japanese officials and scholars than knowledge of the Japanese 
language among their American counterparts, and the Japanese government is 
generally less transparent than the U.S. government. These conditions likely inhibit 
the diffusion of knowledge and suggest a risk of law-based misunderstanding in the 
alliance. 
Current conditions also raise questions about how to improve. What can 
each side do to build greater foreign sophistication with respect to its domestic law 
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of foreign relations, and greater domestic sophistication with respect to foreign 
law on foreign relations? There are a number of conceivable options, but most 
will require a significant commitment of resources. Given the financial conditions 
under which many American and Japanese law schools currently operate, I would 
be surprised if any schools outside of the upper ranks have capacity to add faculty 
or courses on foreign foreign-relations law. Indeed, most law schools in the United 
States and Japan do not even offer a course on their own domestic law of foreign 
relations. But top universities could conceivably play an important role. Columbia 
University, to name one example, could help to diffuse knowledge of Japanese 
foreign relations law by collaborating with Japanese experts in this area, just as 
the University of Tokyo could help to diffuse knowledge of U.S. foreign relations 
law in Japan by collaborating with American experts. The same might be said 
of prominent think tanks on both sides. Meanwhile, Japanese scholars might 
profitably study American knowledge of Japanese law with the support of Fulbright 
and other programs, and both governments might consider ways to improve 
institutional knowledge, including through database development and training 
programs for relevant officials. Together these efforts could help to reduce the risk 
of misunderstanding and miscalculation on both sides of the Pacific. 
Ryan Scoville
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